

BALKANIZED EUROPE

PAUL SCOTT MOWRER




EUROPE



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BALKANIZED EUROPE



BALKANIZED EUROPE

A STUDY IN
POLITICAL ANALYSIS AND RECONSTRUCTION

BY
PAUL SCOTT MOWRER



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TO MY WIFE

**MY COMPANION AND COLLABORATOR
IN ALL THINGS**

THESE PAGES ARE DEDICATED



PREFACE

THIS book is the result of eleven consecutive years of experience as a special European correspondent for The Chicago Daily News. It probably contains errors both of observation and of opinion: for to see truly into a complex web of motives and movements is a task whose difficulty can be suspected only by those who have seriously attempted it; and to endeavor to read a few lines of the future out of the evanescent hieroglyphics of the present is perhaps even more temerous. Time alone can reveal to what extent I have been right, and in what respects I have been wrong. Meanwhile, if the book, in presenting certain problems, and raising certain questions, does thereby stimulate broader thinking with regard to international affairs, it will have served its purpose.

The specialist no doubt has his mind made up regarding the war, the peace conference, and all their multiple consequences. It is rather to the general reader that I would address myself; and although I have read much, and absorbed from many sources, I have therefore preferred not to encumber the text with footnotes and bibliographical references.

The book is frankly "journalistic." In order that whatever of value it contains might be placed at the disposition of the public without more delay, I have had to sacrifice the satisfactions of slow composition and of conscientious revision, and write over-hastily in

the leisure moments in busy days. Meanwhile, situations are developing rapidly, and although I have sought in the main to keep to essentials, and to the more enduring aspects, there are almost certain to have been a number of changes or evolutions even before these lines are printed. For all of this, I ask the reader's indulgence.

A considerable amount of my material has already appeared in the form of articles in *The Chicago Daily News* and other affiliated newspapers. For permission to use it again here, I have to thank the kindness of that far-sighted and perspicacious publisher and editor, Mr. Victor F. Lawson, who was one of the first newspaper proprietors to foresee the importance which "foreign news" was destined to attain in the eyes of the American public.

Paul Scott Mowrer.

Paris, Nov. 25, 1920.

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PART I

BALKANIZED EUROPE

BALKANIZED EUROPE

I

INTRODUCTORY

THE thesis which I shall elaborate in the following pages had best be set forth briefly at the outset:

As a result of centuries of invasions, conquests, migrations, marchings and counter-marchings in which whole peoples often took part, eastern and southeastern Europe, including all of what used to be Austria-Hungary and a fringe of what used to be Russia, is an inextricable medley of disparate races whose identity has been fully preserved down through the centuries. This entire region has now been "Balkanized," that is, broken up into a number of nominally "national" states, which are small, weak, jealous, afraid, economically dependent, a prey to intrigue, and pregnant with trouble of many descriptions, not to say wars. Under these circumstances, which must be accepted as they are, only two solutions present themselves: hegemony or federation. Three energetic states, Turkey, Austria and Hungary, have tried hegemony, and have failed; for they could neither gain the consent of the governed, nor assimilate the various subject races by force. There remains to be tried a series of federations of free nations, on an economic or political basis, or on both.

Meanwhile, it is necessary to look more carefully into the nature of the malady which is afflicting "Balkanized Europe." Diagnosis must precede prescription.

This malady is in part material—the result of the destruction and disorganization of war—but it is, to a far greater extent, mental. Each of these small states is morbidly self-important, disillusioned with regard to the great powers, afraid of its neighbors, preoccupied with propaganda and the raising of armies, shaken by social disturbances. Each is attempting the impossible task of achieving economic self-sufficiency, by exercising stringent government control over commerce, finance, transport, and even industrial and agricultural production. The result is interrupted communications, hermetically sealed frontiers and almost complete isolation. Private initiative is effectively blocked and business of every description languishes, or flows into the unhealthy channels of speculation and corruption. The only cure for these ills is to remove the causes of international fear and distrust by a system of alliances, which, bringing about a restoration of confidence, will permit the reopening of frontiers and the relaxation of control. Political solutions must precede economic solutions.

The peoples in question will neither starve from lack of food, nor perish by pestilence. Moreover, despite the incessant alarmist reports of the last two years, bolshevism is not going to overrun Europe, for it is a form of government violently unacceptable to most European peoples. There is, however, a wave of social evolution surging across the continent which bids fair to bring about many important changes—constitutional

reforms, land reform, industrial reform. The new social formula for which all earnest statesmen are seeking is far more likely to come out of Western Europe than out of the backward cultures of the East.

In working to replace the existing international anarchy by a new political combination, not only considerations of general politics and economics, but certain specific considerations, must be borne in mind. Each of the states in question—Hungary, Austria, Bulgaria, Czecho-Slovakia, Poland, Roumania, Jugoslavia, Greece—has its own individual problems with which it is preëminently engrossed. Proposals of understanding must harmonize, so far as may be possible, with these individual, as well as with more general needs.

The worst enemy of success in political undertakings is that kind of idealism which refuses to study and accept the facts of the case, however distressing or disconcerting they may be. The foreign policy of any given nation is not so much the result of the machinations of its diplomats and statesmen as of a kind of national necessity and popular instinct, of which the statesman is merely the interpreter and executive. Therefore, though governments may come and go, and the movement of foreign policy may be retarded or accelerated, the main direction remains the same. The recognition of this principle would do much to facilitate the formation of sound political opinion in foreign affairs.

The League of Nations, though it does indeed provide the machinery for a better understanding, cannot be expected to eradicate at one blow the age-long ills from which men suffer; neither will the increasing eco-

conomic solidarity of the world of itself lead inevitably to political solidarity. As the scientist has learned the necessity of obeying nature in order to conquer nature, so the statesman must seek to found his combinations not on mere theories, but on the realities of international relations—economic interest, the sentiments of nationality and race, the instincts of self-preservation and expansion. The principle of equilibrium, which indeed may be said to underlie the whole created universe, is already acting potently upon the nations in the sense of a new balance of power, either within or without the League of Nations.

The restoration of equilibrium—that is to say, of political health—in Europe is, however, being indefinitely retarded by uncertainty as to the future of Russia, and to a less extent, as to the future of Germany. So long as the definite political orientation of these great countries remains unknown, whatever combinations may now be elaborated must remain undecided and incomplete. Moreover, given the absolute divergence of interest expressed in the present foreign policies of France, Britain and Italy, the dissolution of the entente, lately begun, is seen to be inevitable, thus further increasing the general anarchy. To foresee the new alignment of nations which will gradually grow out of this anarchy is exceedingly difficult. The possibilities are many, the certainties very few. However, the broad political tendencies which have already begun to manifest themselves—Pan-Slavism, the revival of Pan-Germanism, the Danube Confederation movement and the “Petite Entente”—are worthy of the closest observation.

The United States, morally, politically, financially

and commercially, is already inextricably involved in world affairs. Our best course, both from the standpoint of practical expediency, and from that of strict national interest, will be to join the League of Nations with appropriate reservations, and to ratify the Treaty of Versailles, thereafter applying ourselves resolutely to the study of international politics, in knowledge of which we have hitherto been somewhat deficient. The peace of the world in the immediate future may be said to depend to a great extent on Anglo-American relations. The conception of a definite policy with regard to Britain is an urgent necessity for the American people.

THE NEW GEOGRAPHY

A COMPATRIOT of mine, Raymond Duncan by name, is intent upon restoring, in our modern world, what he imagines to have been the beautiful simplicity of ancient Greek life. He goes about Paris bare-legged and bare-headed, in a toga and sandals, with a fillet around his long dark hair. The other day, in the act of paying a cabman, a stranger, seeing Mr. Duncan striding across the Place de l'Opéra in this garb, was overcome by surprise, and from his astonished lips fell the question:

"What on earth is that?"

"Oh, that!" said the cabman, in a tone of easy contempt, "that's one of those Cze-cho-Slo-vaks!"

It is to be feared that in Western Europe and America, ideas popularly prevail, of the peoples of Central and Southern Europe, which are scarcely more accurate than those of the Paris cabman. To the schoolboy, certainly, the collapse of Turkey and Austria-Hungary is a severe blow; instead of learning two countries, he must now learn ten; and no wonder that elderly persons, brought up in the simplicity of the older geography, should feel rather impatient at the complexity of the new. I am reminded of the venerable French astronomer who, when it was first proposed to set forward the clock one hour for the purpose of "saving daylight," protested that such a deed

would be nothing less than "an insult to the stars." But what is, is, and what is done, is done; both stars and men, however indignant they may be, can only make the best of it. The useful student of politics is he who will cease henceforth to be disturbed by mere railings about the state of the world, and will devote his energies to the search for policies of reconstruction.

I wish that to those to whom the opportunities of travel have been denied I could communicate a sense of the vital reality of all these teeming populations, their hates, their fears, their human weaknesses, their human dignity. There are millions and millions and millions of them, eating and drinking, buying and selling, mining, milling, turning the soil, cherishing their children, loving, aspiring, making mistakes. They cannot be ignored. If one will but take the trouble to try to comprehend them, they are all, somehow, and each in a different way, essentially likeable. It is not their fault that, instead of being born in America or Japan, they have grown up crowded in an inextricable tangle in the center of the continent of Europe. They have to take their problems as they find them, and seek what solutions the wisdom they chance to have gathered may suggest. We may smile at their vanity, scold at their politics, look askance at their armies, but we cannot mistake their deep sincerity of purpose. As for helping them, who would help must first understand.

Perhaps the hardest thing for an American to grasp is the shortness of the distances between country and country. You leave Paris one night, to awaken next morning in Switzerland; and from the Swiss frontier

to the beautiful, unhappy city of Vienna, though the trains are slow, is only another night's ride. A hundred and seventy-five miles northeast of Vienna is Prague, the town of medieval towers, the capital of Czecho-Slovakia. Everything changes. The soft South-German tongue is replaced by a sibillant Slav language. To hear a Bohemian saying that "thirty-three silver cuckoos flew over thirty-three silver roofs" is like listening to a leak in an air-brake; and a Prague waiter, adding up a bill, sounds like a child playing "choo-choo."

Czecho-Slovakia is a country of red-tile roofs and baroque church steeples. Flotillas of fat, snowy geese go rocking over the meadows; a shepherd boy, bare to the waist, and brown as a fawn, walks on his hands among the browsing goats. The fields are full of stocky, short-skirted peasant women, bending barefoot over the furrows. A night's ride eastward, and you come to the contested district of Teschen. It is like an industrial suburb of Chicago—grimy, dusty, laborious, factory alternating with farm or garden, while crowded yellow street cars rattle over the prairies, joining innumerable scattered settlements. Just beyond, is the Polish frontier, and once more everything changes.

Poland is one vast muddy plain. The fields are lean, the towns are few, the miserable villages of thatched huts straggle out along unkempt roads. A slender, melancholy-looking woman, barefoot, wrapped full length in a striped shawl, stands guard over a few cattle. In a grove of pines, a few old women and children are picking up sticks. In the streets of Warsaw a religious procession goes by, carrying colored

banners. Three Jews, with ruddy beards, in black skull-cap and long, black gaberdine, stand at a corner, gravely shaking their heads together, bargaining over a rabbit skin. Dignified officers go and come, with clinking swords. Outside a church, a poor woman crawls on her face in the gutter, rapt in religious ecstasy.

Or take the train eastward from Vienna. Thirty miles, and you are in Hungary. The cowboys drive their herds of wild horses down to the Danube to drink. The language is half Asiatic. A hundred miles—beautiful Budapest! Under the locust trees, overlooking the Danube, tall officers, in bright-braided uniforms, walk to and fro in the Corso, with handsome, clear-skinned women. Across the river, on the hill, they are changing the castle guard. The feet tread firmly in unison, the word of command rings clear, the flag flies, the band breaks forth in the national hymn. Now, over the mingled spires and hill-tops, the sun is setting in crimson glory; the river, under the stately bridges, reflects the glow; the sound of music drifts across the water.

A night's ride down the Danube, on the side-wheel steamer, is the Jugo-Slav frontier. A shepherd sits by the willows on the low bank, playing his reedy pipe. Another night, and you are in Belgrade, a crowded, poorly tended village, overgrown into a national capital. Tall peasants, in brown homespun, drive their pigs down the long main street, past the modest yellow palace of the king. A company of ragged but superbly marching soldiers passes by. The people sit at the cafés, on the shady side of the street, drinking Turkish coffee, and conversing interminably. Down by the

railway station, in the moonlight, an orchestra of mandolins is thrumming monotonous airs. A man, from the table where he has been quietly sitting, breaks suddenly into a wild loud song, quavering, strange, almost sad.

"On the road from Nisch to Vranja, how the girls all love me! On the road from Nisch to Vranja, on the road from Nisch to Vranja . . ."

Beyond Serbia lies Bulgaria, a hundred and seventy miles over the mountain passes, and through the biblical valleys. The mother, in bright-colored homespun, swings her baby in a hammock, under a tree, and goes with the other women to reap in the fields. The peasants drive their teams of black water-buffaloes in to market. Sofia, under its mountain, is a modern, pleasant little town, with clean streets, and neat and sober people. The domes of the great new Alexander Nevsky church bulge against the sky. The young Czar dashes past, driving his own motor car, going for his evening spin in the country.

Eastward, a hundred and seventy miles through the northern foothills of the Balkan range, is Rouschouk. A steamer ferries you over the Danube. You are in Roumania.

The peasants, in tight, white-linen trousers, and tall, black, sheepskin hats, loll in the railway station, or walk with baskets of ripe fruit hung from their shoulders, on the ends of a stick, like a yoke. The capital, Bucharest, is a wealthy city of rich stone dwellings, gilded palaces, banks, hotels, and shops of personal adornment. A gypsy boy offers you fresh-shelled walnuts from a glass jar. Two young officers, with powdered cheeks and a suspicion of rouge on their lips,

stroll arm in arm. It is five o'clock. The cafés are crowded. All Bucharest is in the Calea Victorei, walking, talking, sipping ices, watching the fops and painted beauties riding endlessly up and down in two-horse, open carriages, driven by stately cabmen wearing their traditional long gowns of blue or green velvet.

Or go from Sofia southeastward. Three hundred miles, and Europe ends in the swarming, squalid tenements and numberless white minarets of Constantinople. Opposite lies Asia. To the westward, not two days' journey across the Ægean, Greece rises, a jagged miracle of baking rock and mountainous, barren isles. The Piræus—a horde of skiffs, a thicket of tall masts! Athens—clean, pretty, modern! The cicadæ trill in the pepper trees above the hot white pavement. A big-framed Evzone passes, in red cap, tight, white trousers, and plaited kilts. There are black pompons on his sandals. Away to the right of the ancient Acropolis, the blazing sun goes down. Good-looking young Athenians, with neatly pressed trousers, emerge into the streets. The flags of blue and white stir faintly in the evening breeze . . . Greece is the southernmost tip of the Balkan peninsula.

These things are all external, it is true. But within these same brief distances the mental transformations are no less striking than the material. And having listened with equal sympathy, I hope, and an equal desire of understanding, to the eagerly proffered or reluctantly admitted views of many parties and many peoples in these old lands, I find myself returning again and again to the words of my Hungarian friend.

Seated in the restaurant of a Budapest hotel, which, only a year ago, had been the headquarters of a com-

munist revolution, we had been talking for three hours, I to open a way into his mind, he to expound to me his country's virtues and convince me of its wrongs. As he warmed to his subject, his strong young features grew tense, his eyes blazed, and then, at last, he sank back in his chair, he bowed his head, his voice fell.

"Unhappy the man," he said, "who is born into the midst of this whirlpool of conflicting races. If it isn't war, it is revolution. If it isn't revolution, it is war. And yet, I could never go away. Any other life would seem dull to me now. And who knows? Perhaps out of this very clash and turmoil of peoples, some of the finest achievements of man are destined to come—in the future again, as they have in the past."

THE CROSSWAYS OF THE RACES

THE peace treaties have added a new word to the vocabulary of the nations. A large part of Europe, we apprehend, has been "Balkanized." It may be well to inquire what this word means.

In southeastern Europe, between the Black Sea and the Adriatic, lies a mountainous peninsula which has perhaps borne more than its share of the turmoil, grandeur and hardship of human affairs. It is, in fact, a great crossway of the movement of peoples. Here, separated by the narrow waters of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, Asia meets Europe, bare hilly shore to hilly shore, eternally opposed. Here, too, lies the first stopping-place of the great migrations which, moving steadily westward, century after century, along the northern coast of the Black Sea, now swung and crossed the Danube to the south, now pressed on through the Transylvanian valleys into the rich plains of Hungary, conquering, devastating, settling, only to be attacked and overcome in turn, a few generations later, by some new wave of restless warriors.

The streams of modern civilization have their origin in three deep springs: Greece, Rome, Byzance. Two of these, Greece and Byzance, were situated in this same mountainous peninsula of which men now speak, half-contemptuously, as "the Balkans."

Hither, by the Black Sea route, in the early morning

of recorded time, came the Hellenic tribes, who, intermingling with the original inhabitants, the Pelasgians, probably Semitic, developed, under the quickening influences of their trade by sea, with the older culture of Egypt and Asia Minor, that serene civilization which we know as Ancient Greece. In vain the Persians drove their crowded galleys to the conquest of Athens. At Marathon and Salamis the first truly European culture was saved from Asiatic absorption. Indeed, it was the Greeks themselves, in the armies of Alexander, who first carried Europe into Asia—an exploit which the Greeks of to-day, in the armies of Venizelos, are merely repeating.

Greece succumbed to Rome, and though the victors were soon after more than half conquered by the arts and schools of the vanquished, the European center of gravity shifted for a time across the Adriatic to a more westernly peninsula. But for a time only! With the decline of Rome, there arose the dazzling power of Byzance, half Greek, half Oriental. Once more the brightest spot in a darkening continent was in the Balkans. Trade, philosophy, society, art—all centered in the brilliant Constantinople of that day. For half a score of centuries, there lingered here many of the forms and a little of the spirit of the ancient European world. The cunning diplomats and cruel mercenaries of Byzance maintained the empire stubbornly against the ominous encroachments of the barbarians. It was the brothers Cyril and Method, monks of the Greek church, who carried Christianity and a written language to the invading Slavs—an alphabet, that which we know to-day as Cyrillic, or Russian; and a creed, that of

Greek orthodoxy, whose patriarch still dwells in Constantinople.

But little by little the darkness was falling. Driven on perhaps by dearth and famine, perhaps by more mysterious impulses—vague dreams of loot and conquest—the half-wild peoples of the East were moving, one pushing another. In a century and a half of wars, Rome had overcome the Thracians and the Illyrians, and occupied the Balkan peninsula as far as the Danube. Trajan, crossing the Danube, had made of Dacia—the modern Roumania—a Roman province. Adding to the already formidable confusion of races, a number of Gauls had settled in Thrace, for it is recorded that in 278 A. D. they arose and attacked Constantinople. The first of the invincible migrations, however, was that of the Goths, who appeared on the Dacian confines in 247. Less than thirty years later the Romans recrossed the Danube, abandoning Dacia to the fierce newcomers who, already in 269, had daringly raided southward to the very gates of Byzantium. A century passed. The shrill-crying Huns appeared, eating wild grass and raw flesh, and ravaging like a fire. The greater part of the peninsula fell, under these successive onslaughts, until, with the death of Attila, in 453, they disappeared from the Danube as suddenly as they had come, giving place to a little-known Gothic tribe, the Gepidæ.

Cæsar, in the first book of his "Commentaries," writes a detailed account of one of these strange racial dislocations—an attempted migration which failed. The Gauls of Switzerland, imagining that their own country had become too small for them, determined to

cross westward, through Burgundian Gaul, into the seaside province of Saintonge, and possess it for themselves. Their preparations lasted two years. They sowed large crops, they gathered carts, war-chariots, pack-animals. There was violent intrigue for leadership within the tribe, and intrigue as well with neighboring tribes—on the one hand, to secure as many friendly alliances as possible, and on the other, to divide into factions, by exciting the conflicting ambitions of minor chieftains, the peoples whose territories they intended to invade. Finally, taking each three months' provisions, they burned their entire settlement—twelve towns and four hundred villages, with all that they could not carry of their goods and stores of grain, and having thought thus to increase their valor by destroying all hope of return, forded the Rhône, men, women and children, 368,000 primitive souls, of whom 92,000 bore arms. After several months of ruse and ravage, advance and retreat, parley and battle, ending in defeat and disaster at the hands of the Romans, there remained less than a third of the original number. The broken horde was ordered by Cæsar to go back into Switzerland and rebuild its dwellings, lest the Germans, in turn pressing westward, should themselves cross the Rhine and occupy the fair Alpine valleys.

Such tragic reverses, which doubtless were no less frequent on the Danube than on the Rhône and the Rhine, may be regarded as mere incidents in the invincible racial gravitation toward the sunset.

In the Bălkans, another hundred years went by. From their northern home on the Baltic, the Lombards came pouring down, and from Central Asia, simultaneously, came the Avars. A few score years of war and

devastation, and Lombards and Avars, in turn, vanished to the westward. As early as the third century, groups of a remarkable tribe, known as Slavs, had begun to settle south of the Danube, but it was not until the sixth that this people descended in numbers sufficient to occupy nearly the entire southern and western part of the peninsula, driving out or assimilating all previous races. And still, at majestic intervals, the waves of wild humanity surged on. In 750 came the Bulgars, a narrow-eyed, high-cheek-boned Touranian tribe. These horsemen conquered the foot-fighting Slavs, settled, and were absorbed by the more vigorous culture of their victims. By 893, Bulgar still in name, but Slav in language, they had founded an empire, and were waging a successful war with Byzance. The latter's diplomacy succeeded in winning to its cause a new Touranian tribe, the Magyars, who had lately appeared about the mouth of the Danube. The Magyars invaded Bulgaria and were defeated; their camps were burned, their women slain, and retiring northward, they settled in the plains of the middle Danube, whither they were followed, in the course of the next century or two, by the kindred tribes of the Petchenegs and the Kumani. With the Tartar incursion of 1240, the age-long cavalcade out of Central Asia seems to have thinned away. But in Asia-Minor, a new menace to Europe was gathering strength.

In 1071, Jerusalem had surrendered to the Seljuk Turks, whose fanatical sway had been at once extended to the Sea of Marmora. The Eastern church appealed for aid to the Western, and the Balkans were the pathway of a fresh invasion—that of the Crusaders. Two divisions of Crusaders, led by Peter the Hermit, per-

ished under the sword on the sands of Asia Minor, but the following year, 1097, an army of 150,000 Christians—Normans and Provençals—carried the cross to victory. From 1100 on, for nearly a century, Jerusalem was in the hands of the Franks, and for still another hundred and fifty years the bitter struggle of Moslem and Christian continued. But early in the XIII Century, a second Turkish horde, the Ottomans, driven from Central Asia by a turmoil of Mongols, poured down through Persia and Armenia into Asia Minor, where they soon became a dreaded military power. By 1350, they had checked the last crusade; by 1365, they had crossed into the Balkans and taken Adrianople and Philippopolis. The whole of the peninsula fell gradually to them. Hungary itself was in panic, until John Hunyadi and Wladislas of Poland, combining, achieved a defensive victory, and obtained the truce of Szegedin, in 1444. But over the Balkans the darkness had settled at last. Constantinople was besieged and taken in 1453. It was the end, for the time being, of what is probably the most extraordinary going and coming of peoples in history.

With the gradual lifting of the veil, in the latter half of the last century, after five hundred years of Turkish rule, there was seen to remain, of all this surging of restless hordes, this marching and countermarching of armies, the following dazed, half-conscious peoples: the Greeks, descended far, but speaking still the language of their fathers; the Turks, soldiers, overlords, tillers of the soil; the Bulgars, humble peasants; the Serbs, unmixed descendants of the Slavs; the Montenegrins, a branch of the Serbs; the Albanians, a hardy remnant of the ancient Illyrians; and the Roumanians, speaking a

bastard Latin mixed with Slav, descendants, as they proudly claim, of the Dacians, and of Trajan's colonist legionaries. Under the long Turkish régime, a part of the Albanians, and a good number of Bulgarians, known thenceforth as Pomaks, were converted to Islam and partially assimilated; the rest had remained distinct, not only from the Turks, but from one another. The Turks, as the dominant people, were scattered more or less everywhere, but they dwelt, like the various Christian races, in their own separate villages, or their own quarters of the towns. The Christian races, though homogeneously massed at the centers of their respective countries, overlapped bewilderingly at the peripheries. Thus the trading, seafaring Greeks had spread all around the southern coast of the peninsula and into the towns and principal seaports, far up the Adriatic and along the Black Sea. The Albanians were to be found, not only in Albania, but in southern Montenegro, western Macedonia, northern Greece, and even in parts of the Peloponnesus. The Bulgars were scattered down through Thrace, and were the principal inhabitants of Macedonia, into which the Serbs had also penetrated from the north, and the Greeks from the south. The Roumanians were increasingly numerous in Transylvania, Bessarabia and Southern Hungary, and had thrust a wedge over the Danube into north-eastern Serbia; moreover, throughout the Balkans, in Greece, Serbia, Macedonia, Bulgaria, Albania, was to be found a race of wandering shepherds, calling themselves Roumanians, speaking the Roumanian tongue, who have emigrated from Roumania proper, or who may have been the direct descendants of ancient Roman colonists. Of the Spanish Jews, driven out of Spain

and Portugal in the XVI Century by the Holy Inquisition, who found shelter in Saloniki, Constantinople, and to a less extent in other Balkan cities; and of the numerous bands of Balkan gypsies, a mysterious Asiatic people of obscure origin, I merely make mention, for though these are indeed distinct races, they have as yet put forward no claims to separate nationality.

THE MEANING OF "BALKANIZATION"

IF I have dwelt at considerable length on the causes and the character of the inextricable medley of races which we now properly think of as the most salient trait of the Balkan peninsula, it is because, when all is said and done, this racial medley will be found to be at the bottom of most of the mischief. But the word "Balkan" has come also to have certain secondary significations which are not without interest.

The Christian states of the Balkans were no sooner liberated from the Turks than they began fighting among themselves. Clean-cut ethnical and natural boundaries being impossible, each felt that his neighbor was encroaching. The peoples were uneducated and primitive, that is to say, easily aroused and easily led. They were consciously weak, that is to say, jealous, covetous, intriguing, afraid. Their economic frailty, the ruinous condition of their finances—always hopelessly in debt—combined with their feuds to make them an easy prey to the machinations of the great powers. The Balkans became a sort of chess-board on which the diplomats of the Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance maneuvered for advantage. Finding a professed disposition on the part of Western Europe to correct political frontiers in accordance with the principle of nationality, Bulgars, Greeks and Serbs soon turned mixed regions like that of Macedonia into hotbeds of guerilla

warfare, now against the Turks, now against one another, each party seeking the eviction or forcible conversion of its rivals. Priest and peasant, bandit and functionary, all joined in this futile conflict of primitive cultures. The wars of blood were supplemented by wars of propaganda. One set of doctored statistics was hurled furiously against another, and "atrocities report" met "atrocities report" in horrible confrontation.

The so-called Balkan wars are a typical instance of modern Balkan history. In 1912, Turkey being at war with Italy and Tripoli, four Christian states, Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro and Greece, secretly banded together to oust the Turks from Macedonia, Albania and Thrace. They were successful beyond their expectations, and the Bulgars would no doubt have captured Constantinople itself, had not Russia called a halt. By a preliminary treaty, Bulgaria and Serbia had arranged that the former should have Macedonia and Thrace, and the latter Albania, procuring thus an outlet on the Adriatic. But Austria, not wishing the Serbs to reach the sea, intervened. The Triple Alliance insisted upon an independent Albania. Serbia, by way of compensation, demanded a part of Macedonia, which Bulgaria was not disposed to surrender. Greece, whose share in the spoils had not yet been defined, hastily negotiated a secret treaty with Serbia directed against Bulgaria. The latter, foreseeing the inevitable, put itself in the wrong by suddenly attacking the Greeks and Serbs. The war was still in progress, and was going badly for Bulgaria, when Roumania mobilized and invaded Bulgaria over the unprotected northern frontier. Greece and Serbia divided Macedonia between them. Roumania, in the name of "compensation," took a piece of

the Bulgarian Doubroudja. The defeated Turks tranquilly reoccupied Adrianople and Eastern Thrace, and there was none to say them nay. One treacherous intrigue followed another, with always just enough indecisive interference on the part of the powers to increase the complication. At the present time, political conditions have vastly changed, but not the mentality of the Balkan peoples.

And this, then, we find to be the meaning of the word "Balkanization": the creation, in a region of hopelessly mixed races, of a medley of small states with more or less backward populations, economically and financially weak, covetous, intriguing, afraid, a continual prey to the machinations of the great powers, and to the violent promptings of their own passions.

THE DISINTEGRATION OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

OF all the countries which bore great weight in the ante-bellum balance of power, the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, it may safely be said, was the least well known. To most people, outside this conglomerate realm, not only its institutions, but its very composition, were obscure. Like Turkey, it was a veil; and its falling away, in the Treaties of Paris, has revealed, somewhat to the astonishment even of those who made the treaties, that the typical "Balkan" condition no longer ends on the banks of the lower Danube: it extends right up through the center of Europe. By Russia's collapse, it is prolonged through Poland, and in Lithuania, Latvia and Esthonia, far up the coast of the Baltic.

The Central European culture, which attained to such notable heights in Vienna and Budapest, appears, in other parts of the Hapsburg realm, to have been an exceedingly thin veneer, overlaid on people, still immature. Even in those two capitals, the repeated shocks of defeat and misery have caused the level of culture temporarily to decline. The succession states of Austria-Hungary, like the Balkan states, are small and ill at ease, at once covetous and fearful, passionate and intriguing. Their political weakness excites the diplomatic initiative, as their economic and financial weakness attracts the competitive investments, of the great powers. Already the eager fingers of France,

Britain and Italy vie with the sly, shadowy hands of Germany and Russia in the attempt to maneuver the pieces on this new and fascinating chessboard. No element of the definition is lacking. Here, too, was a crossroads of peoples; in successive migrations, numerous races clashed and swirled; here, too, strong offshoots of these races have existed, cohesive and mutually unassimilated, right through the centuries: Slovaks and Slovenes; Serbs and Croats; Czechs and Poles; Ruthenians; Italians; Bosnian Moslems; Germans; Roumanians; Tyrolese; Bulgars; Gypsies and Jews. Here, again, as in the Balkans, the racial groups, though homogeneous at the center, seem intermixed irrevocably where race meets race, and to complete the despair of the partisans of ethnological boundaries, while some peoples, like the Gypsies and the Jews, are scattered more or less everywhere, others, like the Magyars of Eastern Transylvania, or the Bulgars and Germans of the Banat, live on as isolated groups, though far removed from the bulk of the parent stock.

Geographically, as well as politically, Austria was frankly a patchwork. Even Hungary, which, with Croatia omitted, was considered as perhaps the type of geographical unity, had around its Magyar nucleus a broad rim of other and mutually uncongenial peoples. Count Paul Teleki, the Hungarian geographer, has recently published an ethnological map, in colors, of former Hungary. It looks like a new-art sofa-pillow. Roughly, the center is more or less solidly colored red, to represent Magyars; the north is green, of two shades, to show Slovaks and Ruthenians; the easternmost third is splotched with the purple of the Roumanians; and the narrow western border is yellow,

meant for Germans. But the mass of red is daubed with spots of yellow and green; the green is dotted red, and the purple is also streaked and scrawled with red and yellow. As for the south, the rich black-earth plains of the famous Banat region, after having been depopulated in the Turkish wars, it was re-settled not only from the nearby groups of Roumanians, Serbs and Magyars, but by Germans from far to the north, and by bands of Bulgars and Slovaks. And this part of Count Teleki's map looks like a kaleidoscope. The patient historian can explain the presence of each of these bits of color; but the task of the boundary expert, charged with contriving amongst them a reasonable racial frontier, is of entirely different, not to say an impossible, nature.

Moreover, not all these shiftings of population are historic. What with human restlessness and human ambition, changes were constantly taking place right up to the time of the war. The gypsies were ceasing to wander, and were slowly being assimilated. The small German immigration, which started into Hungary over ten centuries ago, was falling off. The presence of Jews in Hungary is quite modern; they were steadily trickling in from Galicia. The Magyars, who, at the end of the Seventeenth Century, are said to have formed only a fourth of a total population of ten million, were making a tremendous effort at "Magyarization" and in 1910 numbered over one-half of a population of more than twenty million. Attempted assimilation of the Slovaks by the Magyars was just beginning to give results. In Transylvania, the number of Roumanians was growing, as was the number of Magyars speaking Roumanian—a phenomenon which the indig-

nant Magyars explain by saying that the Roumanians, being "too stupid" to learn Magyar, the Magyars were obliged to learn Roumanian. Parallel to the "Magyarization" effort in Hungary was a "Germanization" program in Austria. The resistance of the Czechs in Bohemia to the attempt to turn them into Germans had developed into a cultural combat of such bitterness that it may almost be said each faction counted each baby born in its ranks as a racial victory. A smaller cultural struggle, but of a similar kind, was in progress between Italians and Slovenes, around Fiume and Trieste.

In case no war had broken out, it is difficult to estimate what would have been the results of the determination of Magyars and Germans to dominate and absorb the other peoples of the dual monarchy. All these peoples were showing remarkable vitality. Even the Italians and Roumanians seem to have been making some numerical progress. But it was the various Slav elements who formed the real danger. Taken together, they formed nearly half of the total population, and they exceeded the combined total of Germans and Magyars. The principle, "divide and rule," was that applied, therefore, by the government. The Czechs belonged to Austria, the Slovaks to Hungary; the Poles and Slovenes belonged to Austria; the Ruthenians, Serbs, and Croats were divided between the two kingdoms; and the Slavs of Bosnia and Herzegovina were placed under still a third, intermediate, régime of "crown" administration. Economic and religious differences were cleverly exploited. The town-dwelling Galician Poles were sent against the Galician Ruthenian peasants, and the Roman Catholic Slovenes against the Greek Orthodox Croats. In Austria, the

Poles were politically privileged at the expense of the other Slavs, and to the utter disgust of the Czechs. In short, no means of preventing the Slavs from uniting in a common cause was overlooked.

The economic advantages of this combination of disparate races in a single realm were obvious, and as the government had the upper hand, it could, I believe, have kept the monarchy together, had there been no war, by a deft display of conciliation and firmness, perhaps even ending in a large measure of assimilation.

But with the war, the destruction or the complete transformation of the Hapsburg monarchy became inevitable. If the Central Powers had won, Serbia, in whole or in part, and Russian Poland, in whole or in part, would have been annexed, thereby enormously increasing the number of Slavs, and giving them not only a relative but an absolute majority; a fundamental transformation could not, I think, have been avoided. But as it was the allies who won, the other alternative—destruction—was that which came into play.

It is the fashion, just now, in all countries and all societies, to criticize the decisions of the Peace Conference as regards Central Europe. The topic is like the weather—something regarding which every one can agree, provided the discussion is not carried too far. The contradictions and absurdities in certain attempted applications of economic or political principles are obvious to any one. But when the question of how these could have been avoided comes to be considered, probably no two persons will be found in accord. Negative criticism is easy; constructive criticism, almost impossible. The forces of national feeling and racial aspiration released by the allies' military victory, were

too powerful, too deeply instinctive, to be controlled; and though it is legally right that the Three Old Men of Paris should accept the responsibility for the texts to which they put their names, I suspect that not they, but incorrigible circumstances, were the real authors of these treaties. In saying sternly to the defeated nations: "Sign here," the Three were only repeating the imperative admonition which Fate had already spoken in their own ears.

The sentiment of race was everywhere strengthened by the war. In Austria-Hungary, it had already been aroused by the "Magyarization" and "Germanization" tentatives of the government. And just as the Central Powers, in their effort to weaken Russia, had sought to quicken racial feeling in the Ukraine, the Caucasus and the Baltic States, so the allies, particularly the United States, which had a formidable tool to its hand in the various national organizations formed by immigrants, were quick to seize the opportunity to provoke and stimulate race consciousness in the Dual Monarchy. Long before the armistice, engagements had been taken which, in case of victory, left no choice save the break-up of Austria-Hungary. If this was not clear at the time, it is so now. There is no one to deny that France must have recovered Alsace-Lorraine. But the realization of one "irridentist" aim entails the realization of all. If France recovered Alsace-Lorraine, Italy must recover Trent and Trieste. If Italy recovered Trent and Trieste, why should not Roumania occupy Transylvania? Czech and Polish legions fought in the allied armies. An independent Poland and an independent Czecho-Slovakia were foregone conclusions. But if these groups of Slavs won their independence, why not

the others—the Croats, Serbs and Slovenes? The thing was unavoidable. Nothing on earth could have kept the peoples of the old monarchy even partially federated, save perhaps the continuation, in all due honor, of the Hapsburg dynasty; and this, again, was one of the very contingencies the allies were fighting against. It was doubtless impossible in any event.

Even granting this much, why, it may be asked, was it necessary, in breaking up the doomed Empire, to draw the new frontiers so badly? But I think I have already said enough about racial confusion in this part of the world to indicate that to draw ideal frontiers was beyond human skill. While a strictly economic line does violence to the principle of nationality, an even approximately "national" line does violence to the principle of economic unity. Both these factors had to be taken into consideration. In case of doubt or contest, perhaps a third, a strategic reason, turned the scales. Certainly, in all such cases, the victors were favored to the detriment of the vanquished. The alternative was to favor the vanquished at the expense of the victors. No middle ground was possible.

In expressing these views I am not attempting to defend the peace treaties but to convey the impression resulting from extensive travels in the countries chiefly concerned. The surgeon who has a major operation to perform must cut boldly and cut deep, severing such nerves and arteries as may be necessary, in the trust that all will heal again in the course of time. The disintegration of Austria-Hungary was inevitable, and to the Paris Conference fell the lot of acting as surgeon. Without some loss of blood there can be no operation. Certainly, bad wounds remain—both racial

and economic. These, too, were, for the most part, inevitable. But the flesh is alive and quivering. In time, one way or another, it will, I am confident, heal.

Nevertheless, policies of federation, which dream merely of a restoration of the old order; which, however unfortunate it may seem, do not accept the "Balkanization" of this part of Europe as an accomplished fact, are predestined, in my opinion, to come to naught.

SOME RACIAL DISTINCTIONS

To an American, it seems nothing short of a miracle that the fifteen or twenty odd races and remnants of races of the Balkans and Central Europe have continued to live thus for centuries side by side, overlapping and intertwined, without losing, to any appreciable extent, their distinct racial characteristics. In America, national absorption has been speedy and, for the most part, sure. Caucasian peoples from every clime pour into the port of New York by thousands. If they came in regiments and marched ashore in column of fours, they would present the aspect of a veritable invasion. But their eyes are bewildered and their step uncertain. With their unkempt clothes, their cloth-bound parcels and canvas bags, they inspire in the native American a feeling, not so much of fear as of contempt. They scatter away through the vast spaces of the continent, settle and bear children, who go to American schools, forget the language of their parents, intermarry with peoples of different stocks, and are molded afresh in the spirit of the new world.

It is still too soon, perhaps, to descry the modifications which this wave upon wave of diverse foreign bloods is certain to have been bringing about in the American character, as it existed, say, seventy years ago. The modifications which the American spirit brings about in the character of the immigrant, how-

ever, are almost immediately obvious. Magyar and Greek, Italian and Pole alike, in a generation or two, are found to have lost their original racial identity. The old world languages, customs, feuds and affections, all are forgotten. The same communities of Bulgar or Ruthenian peasants who, in Hungary, might live on for hundreds of years in the midst of a population of Germans or Magyars, without changing their ways by so much as a word or a gesture, if they emigrated to America, would be completely assimilated in a bare half century. Their children would be mono-lingual, chew gum, play baseball, scoff at emperors, marry Swedes or Irish, and run for alderman. What makes this enormous difference between the Old World and the New?

To assume that American culture is a solvent so much more powerful than any European culture, or that the difference is merely one of youth and age, is not enough. There are plenty of peoples in Europe at present who give every appearance of being both young and amazingly vital, ambitious as adolescents, and optimistic as Californians. Such, for example, are the Jugo-Slavs, or even the Greeks. Italy is in its second renaissance. The Slavs, everywhere, are dreamy with a growing sense of latent power. It is not by any means, therefore, that Europe feels its rôle to be ended, or is disposed to resign in favor of its trans-Atlantic offspring. The real divergence, I will venture to suggest, is one of *acceptance* on the part of the peoples concerned.

The foreigners who emigrate to America through desire for change, or in search of better economic opportunities, have usually broken for good with their

former life. Like the Swiss who invaded Burgundian Gaul, they have, in spirit at least, burnt their villages behind them, and think of no return. They come with open minds and open hearts, converted in advance to the *vita nuova*. New laws, new plays, new freedoms, new restraints—they accept all, accept with eagerness—and many, within a short time, have become more American than the Americans.

There are, in Europe, a few cases of individual assimilation in the American style. There are Germans who have become fervent Magyars; Poles who have become French; and Slavs, Italian. But they have done so of their own free will, not under compulsion; and they are the exception. As a rule, no sooner does one European people set out to absorb another, either violently or by peaceful means, than the latter begins to resist, and race consciousness on both sides is merely strengthened. The races are too numerous for any one to assimilate the others, too compact to be easily disintegrated. Each has its own history, its traditions of grandeur and glory. They live on, substantially unchanged, on the very ground their ancestors conquered. In the village graveyard lie the forebears of the present villagers. Upon this field, perhaps, the nation's independence was bloodily maintained. Bulgarians, remembering the distant epoch when their empire filled the Balkans, will never yield homage to the Serbs; who, in turn, recalling their own days of domination, would scorn to bow to Bulgars. There is scarcely a race in Europe, however low it may have fallen, which cannot refer back with pride to a time when its name was glorified, and its sway widespread. Unless their consent is won, they will never acquiesce to foreign rule;

and their consent, for the most part, is stubbornly withheld. If there is any dominating to be done, let it be done, they argue, by those preëminently equipped by nature for this task; and each, I need scarcely add, is thinking, in this connection, of itself. The achievement of national unity, even in France, Germany and Italy, has been the work, not of a generation, but of centuries.

These sentiments of distinction are continually quickened by differences of language, dialect, customs, culture, and even of architecture. America is relatively homogeneous; Europe, infinitely diversified. The Slovak, who speaks a dialect of Czech, considers Czech to be the dialect, and Slovak the prototype. The Magyar and the Austrian, like the peoples of Western Europe, nod their heads to affirm and shake them to deny. The Serb and the Bulgar shake them to say yes, and nod them to say no. The Roumanian, who frequents cafés in the company of women, offends the moral sense of the more rigorous Bulgar. The Hungarian plows with an iron plow; the Serb still uses a wooden. The Bulgars, generally speaking, believe in giving education to women; the Greeks do not. In Bosnia the Moslems, in Bohemia the Germans, in Transylvania the Magyars, in Galicia the Poles, were overlords and managers, and looked down upon Croats, Czechs, Roumanians and Ruthenians as being in every way inferiors. All Czechs can read and write; most Slovaks cannot. Religion and race are often inseparably intertwined. Poles and Ruthenians are both Slavs, but the Poles are Roman Catholic, the Ruthenians Greek Orthodox. The Pole is smooth-shaven, the Polish Jew has a full beard. The Bulgars, in order to distinguish themselves from other Greek Orthodox peo-

ples, established a secession church, called the Exarchate. The Croats and Serbs are Greek church, the Slovenes Roman. The Moslem wears a fez, the Christian a hat. Such divergences which, in America, may come to mean little or nothing, in Europe, because of what they symbolize, mean everything.

Through such factors as these, and many others deeper and less tangible, the national character of the various European peoples has been formed. National character is one of those paradoxes in which nature seems to delight. Each individual man is at the same time nothing, and everything; an insignificant unit in the human swarm, and the center of the universe. Similarly, while on the one hand every individual is different, and each race produces an apparently infinite variety of types, on the other, the people of any given race are seen in the aggregate to possess a number of definite national peculiarities. My friend, M. Leon Bazalgette, swears that his "hereditary enemies" live not across the frontier, but in the same street with him, and trade at the same shops, and that the only fellow-countrymen he recognizes are those who, wherever they may have been born, feel what he feels, love what he loves, hate what he hates. The other half of the truth was recently presented by Mr. Bertrand Russell, who, returning from a visit to Soviet Russia, was "convinced that there is far more resemblance between Mr. Smillie and Mr. Winston Churchill than between the former and Lenin, or the latter and Kolchak." The two viewpoints do not cancel, they complete one another. However different we may feel ourselves to be from a host of members of our own race, we live in the spirit of that race just the same and doubtless exemplify, without

knowing it, some of the salient national traits. It is so, that if people are kept away for a long enough time from the environment in which flames the spirit of their race, they "lose contact"—that is to say, they fall under the influence of some other social group, and, in the end, may retain only so much of their original national character as fell to them through heredity. But so long as the contact remains unbroken, the compelling influence of race or country is unescapable. Man is a social animal; we flatter ourselves that our thoughts and actions are our own; more often than not, they are merely those of our class and clan.

The character of a race, like the character of a man, is complex. It is composed of various elements which may emerge in turn, under different provocations, thereby disconcerting the superficial observer, who leaps to the conclusion that the character itself has changed. I will not pretend that a genuine change of race character is impossible, but the process is tediously slow, and the resistance discouragingly stubborn.

"It is as essential," said Bismarck, "to know nations' characters as to know their interests." The peoples of "Balkanized Europe" are perhaps even more distinct from one another psychologically than linguistically.

The Austrians are decidedly easy-going; the country-people sincerely religious, the towns-people gentle and kind. Free without prudery, artistic and musical without affectation, they are marked by a spirit of genial culture and an unusual aversion to violence.

The Magyars are of sterner stuff. They are farmers, officials, soldiers, with no taste for commerce. Careless in time of prosperity, in time of adversity they are sternly energetic. Polite, elegant, aristocratic, pas-

sionate, proud, they are the type of a people which feels itself born to rule.

The Czechs seem heavy and somewhat slow, but their minds are active and they reason well. They are practical; the mere shows of life do not interest them. Athletic exercises mean as much to them as religion. They are liberal, unwarlike, law-abiding, progressive, and, at the same time, cautious.

The Poles, though also Slavs, are as different from the Czechs as March from August. Here you have temperament, and to spare. A deep, almost fanatical religious and patriotic feeling is perhaps their chief characteristic. They take to the life of the soldier without hesitation. "O little war, what kind of siren are you, that all the young men follow you away?" runs a Polish folk song. They are jealous, impulsive, intelligent, individualistic, and so sensitive that their susceptibilities are continually being wounded.

The Serbs are Slavs of still another type. With them, the primordial virtue is bravery; all else is secondary. And this, combined with their exceptional hardihood, places them among the best natural warriors in Europe. Fond of dancing and of song, a bit impractical, a bit intriguing (like all Balkan peoples), they are, on the whole, serious and grave in character, and naturally democratic.

A fourth type of Slavs are the Bulgars. Their complete democracy resembles that of the Serbs, but in other respects they are antithetical, or, as I like to put it, the two peoples complete one another. Suspicious and economical in practical affairs, the Bulgars are sober, industrious, moral. Their minds are realistic, and their temper highly disciplined.

The Roumanians claim, and indeed seem, to be a Latin race. Their senses are alert, but their country is naturally so rich that they can afford to be somewhat indolent. They are expansive, poetic, impulsive, tolerant, unmilitary, fond of display.

The traditional traits of the Greeks seem to have changed very little in the course of a long history. Like Ulysses, they are ingenious and adaptable, not to say sharp. A nation of lawyers, merchants and sailors, they are eloquent, courteous, patriotic, proud. Politics play a great part in their waking hours, and perhaps in their dreams. They are not a military people, yet they seem to be unconquerable, for though they will bend, they always recover; and an advantage once gained, they never let go.

And there they all live, in the south and the middle of Europe, close neighbors for more than a thousand years, but strangers still to one another.

HEGEMONY OR FEDERATION

IN the foregoing pages I have tried to revivify some of the historic causes of race conglomerations and distinctions in eastern and southeastern Europe, and to indicate certain fundamental reasons why the present situation exists, and why it must be accepted as it is. Just how bad this situation has become, we shall presently examine into. All the "defeated" peoples, and some of the "victors," qualify it as "impossible," and I am not far from agreeing with them, though each of us, doubtless, is using the word in his own sense. I consider the situation "impossible," because it holds economic necessities of small account, and because, if it continues unmodified, it will further impoverish the peoples concerned, both materially and morally, and will lead to one or several wars which will ill answer the desires of the rest of the world. It is morbid, perverse, and dangerous to an extent even greater than that of the Balkans proper in 1914—out of which issued the great war.

Ultimately, there are two conceivable remedies. One is a renewed hegemony of one state over the others. The unities of France, Italy and Germany, which a few centuries ago seemed improbable, were indeed forged by successions of wars intermixed with a growing sense of common interest; but this process is so slow as to offer lean satisfaction to an impatient gen-

eration. Turkey tried hegemony and failed through sheer inefficiency and lack of imagination. Austria and Hungary, after hundreds of years of strife, won joint hegemony, attempted forcible assimilation, and failed, partly from lack of tact, partly from lack of time. It is possible that, in the future, one or more of the new states, as Jugo-Slavia, or an older power, as Russia, or Germany, may attempt to extend its influence over the rest. But this means war—perhaps a series of wars. From the standpoint of world-interest, if it cannot be prevented by the international machinery at our disposal it must at least be decried, for it means a prolongation, even if only temporary, of the very condition requiring to be cured.

The other remedy, in my opinion, the only feasible one, is federation—a voluntary association of free peoples for self-protection, and the furtherance of their common political and economic interests. If men were guided by reason rather than passion and sentiment, this idea would undoubtedly be acted upon without hesitation, for it is obviously to the advantage of all concerned. Leaving out of account the United States of America, there are already two successful examples of its realization: Switzerland and Belgium—the one composed of unequal numbers of German-speaking, French-speaking and Italian-speaking races, without serious grounds for complaint on the part of racial minorities; the other composed of almost equal parts of French-speaking and Flemish-speaking races, organized on a bi-lingual system. But both the Swiss and the Belgians are politically well advanced, and therefore perhaps better able to sacrifice sentiment to reason than the more backward peoples living farther east.

A federation of any two or more Danube or Balkan peoples does certainly present formidable sentimental obstacles which it would be foolish to underestimate. At the same time, the advantages are so obvious that one need not despair in the long run of making them compellingly apparent even to the fear-blinded and passion-warped nations of Central and Eastern Europe.

The achievement either of a new hegemony, or of a series of federations, will of course require a considerable lapse of time. In the meanwhile, the most that can be hoped for is a combination of ententes or alliances, which evolving slowly into a new balance of power, will gradually eliminate the existing anarchy, and give the weary continent at least a temporary stability. As an entente, either commercial or political, or both, may normally precede the conclusion of a hard and fast alliance, so an alliance will sometimes prove to be the first step toward federation. The statesman's first task will therefore be to devise and conclude appropriate accords. Stability is the first desideratum. Federation may follow later.

But before discussing the actual possibilities in this sense—for certain constructive tendencies have already begun to appear—it will be necessary to observe in some detail the nature of the obstacles which are opposing the course of more general harmony. The student of diplomacy, like the doctor, must diagnose before he can prescribe.

PART II

PROBLEMS OF RECONSTRUCTION

I

ECONOMICS AND POLITICS

IN all human affairs there are two elements which, whatever their ultimate identity, may be practically referred to as matter and mind, and which, transferred into the realm of public life, become economics and politics. The two are intertwined and inseparable, as many a modern statesman has found to his discomfiture. Both have therefore to be taken into consideration. Economic, are all such factors as the distribution of raw-stuffs, industrial and agricultural production, finance, the search for markets, transportation; political, such factors as the struggle of parties for power, race hatreds and jealousies, national character and ambition. Matter limits mind, but mind tends often to oppose and overrule matter. If people allowed their conduct to be governed solely by considerations of economic necessity, no doubt the world would soon subside into a dead level of reasonable materialistic contentment. But to this empire of mathematics man has never been willing to submit. We are, it would seem, a restless, troublesome breed, scornful at heart of mere things, swayed by dislikes and affections, bitten by sudden, uncontrollable jealousies or anger, lured on ever by the sphinx-like fascination of attempting the unknown, or the fortunes of chance. In the very teeth of probability, great deeds have been achieved. More than once, boldness and moral cour-

age have conquered, when reason could predict only defeat. The successful defiances of the rule of common sense are just frequent enough to keep mankind in a fever of daring hopes. And while economic necessity must obviously always limit political policy, the latter is continually chafing under the restraint, when, indeed, it does not revolt and break away altogether.

On a strictly economic basis, it was possible to demonstrate, in the spring of 1914, that no European war could occur. Economically, for Germany to provoke the war, was madness; a few more years of peace, and she would, from all evidence, have been the commercial mistress of the world. But there entered into play the fierce itch of military ambition, the desire for forcible domination, and mere economic reasons were blown to the winds. In the same way, if the United States had followed the dictates of its material interest, which was to secure a foundation for world trade while the opportunity was favorable, the Senate would have ratified the Treaty of Versailles with a few reservations, to which the President would have consented, in the fall of 1919. But both Senators and President were filled with a sense of injured pride, and the mere interests of the nation were forgotten in a deadlock of conflicting passions. Once more, a purely political issue proved stronger than issues of economics. An even more striking example is that of Ireland. The English, betraying an ingrained habit of mind, have spared no pains to prove both to the Irish and to foreigners that Ireland has waxed decidedly prosperous under British rule. But here again, the economic argument is weightless. Ireland's discontent is wholly political.

In most circumstances, and in the long run, it is perhaps generally true—though not always—that the drift of men's political sentiments will follow the urge of their pocketbooks; and to underestimate that natural tendency would be a grave error. But the attempt to explain all human motives in terms of pocketbooks is an equally grave and, at the present time, a much more common mistake. The Russian Soviet dictators have even established, as an axiom, that the working class does not know its own best interest, and that this is why—pending the period of one generation necessary to its education in the matter—a dictatorship must be exercised by those who do understand this interest. I am inclined to agree with Mr. Lenin, that the working-class does not always know what is best for it; but neither does any other class, or, I had almost said, any individual. Men, nevertheless, will continue to act in accordance with their lights, and their lights, as we have seen, will be distorted, as often as not, from the cold line of economic reason by the intricate prisms of political sentiment.

Every people, in its domestic affairs, realizes the necessity of accepting the reality of questions of passion and even of personalities; a certain school of practical politicians will even insist that these are the only realities. Yet in international affairs, it is assumed, particularly by American and English contemporaries, that nations will always act reasonably in accordance with their material interests. For example, when the covenant of the League of Nations was being drafted, both the British and the American delegations were of the opinion that economic penalties applied to offenders would be sufficient for any eventuality, and only

the French, with their deeper psychological insight, opposed this view. The inclination to fix the attention on economic to the detriment of political considerations has marked nearly all Anglo-Saxon thought concerning European reconstruction. The same bias is impressed deeply into the organization of the American Department of State, which receives economic reports of the first quality from a highly trained consular and commercial corps, but which provides no adequate machinery for the accumulation of foreign political information.

I will declare at once that, in my opinion, the sickness of "Balkanized Europe" is largely political, that is to say psychological, and that the cure, if it is to succeed, must be of like nature. There are, however, a number of serious material obstacles to reconstruction which must be reckoned at their due weight.

Famine, disease and war have wrought terrible ravages in man, beast and field. The farmer, to a certain extent, still lacks animals, tools and fertilizer, so that crops are below normal. In mine and factory, machinery has deteriorated without having been replaced. Coal production in Czecho-Slovakia was at one time considerably retarded merely because the miners could not be furnished good quality oil for their little headlamps, which kept going out as they worked. Most industries are on a short coal allowance, and many have been unable to procure raw stuffs. Rail and water traffic is still disorganized; and engines, ill repaired, are reduced in efficiency. It has not yet been found possible, for example, to restore the copper parts in certain former Austro-Hungarian locomotives and steamboats which the government, needing the copper dur-

ing the war, had replaced by entirely unsatisfactory iron parts. Finally, in every country, public finance is in a deplorable plight. Hungary, Austria and Bulgaria have to all intents been declared bankrupt, and have been placed in the hands of a receiver known as the Reparations Commission. In other countries, as well, unsecured paper money is the sole circulating medium, the exchange is low and continually fluctuating, and the budget shows a deficit more or less grave.

But the menace of famine is passing, health is conquering disease, and in the thinned ranks of European humanity, a surge of fresh vitality is already striving to fill up the gaps. To supply the farmer with animals and tools is a question of only a year or so, and to supply him with fertilizer is a question of transport. Machinery for factory and mine is gradually being made and delivered, and by now the Czecho-Slovak coal-diggers, I believe, have got the proper kind of illuminating oil. The shortage of fuel is serious, but the distribution could be improved if the railroads were more efficient, and the energy derived even from present allotments could, in many cases, be increased, experts tell me, by forty or fifty per cent., if the coal were burned less unscientifically. Transportation conditions are steadily improving. Copper has been ordered from America, and its arrival will permit of more thorough repairs to locomotives and steam-tugs. There are signs, in some countries, as, for example, in Czecho-Slovakia, of a really constructive preoccupation with the question of finances; the reorganization of taxes and the resumption of commerce ought gradually to permit the evolution of order out of the present budgetary chaos. Other things being equal, the finan-

cial crisis should normally begin to pass, and production and business be reasonably restored by, say, the end of 1922.

But the trouble is, other things are not equal. Psychological considerations, as I shall now endeavor to show, are exercising a formidable restraint on the natural healthy course of reconstruction processes; and until these psychological considerations are recognized and properly dealt with, there can be no real solution of the European problem.

MORBID PSYCHOLOGY

THE present state of mind of the people of "Balkanized Europe" is explicable, and perhaps even natural; it is none the less morbid, that is, a hindrance to the recovery of economic and political health.

The first symptoms which attract the attention of the observer are self-consciousness, and an exaggerated sense of self-importance. In conversing with officials and party-leaders in successive capitals, I found there was one question which would be put to me almost invariably:

"What is your impression?"—meaning "of us and our affairs."

Knowing that on my reply I should be judged penetrating or hopelessly dull, and much might depend, I learned to pause for a moment in careful deliberation, and then, without any malice, to make this answer:

"I consider that right here is the key to the whole situation."

And my interlocutor would beam with pleasure. I had convinced him at once of my native intelligence!

For, in fact, each one of this half-score of small and struggling nationalities, intent on its own problems, does feel itself and these problems to be of paramount importance to the rest of the world, and their only misgiving is that the stranger may fail to appreciate their viewpoint. This viewpoint, in each case, is set forth

with astonishing force and lucidity. Even foreigners are convinced, provided, that is, that they have not had occasion to hear in neighboring countries similar arguments adduced with the same fervor to prove an opposite contention.

The Austrians consider Vienna to be the logical economic and political center of Europe. If their problems were solved, all would be solved. The Czechs feel the same way about Prague, and the Magyars about Budapest. All three of these cities are near enough to the middle of the continent to lend color to the pretensions of their inhabitants. Warsaw and Bucharest, though separated by more than six hundred miles, are both "the key to Eastern Europe," and the eastern European problem is considered by eastern Europeans to be the touchstone on which depends the future of modern civilization. Bucharest, being placed by its geographical position in a double relation, is also felt to be "the key to the Balkans"—a preëminence which is equally claimed by Belgrade, Sofia, Athens and Constantinople. The disconcerting element is, that in each of these claims there is just enough truth to justify the pretension; and he would be an over-bold critic who should venture to deny a certain fundamental importance to a single one of these countries. At the same time, the persistent refusal of each to share the dignity of preëminence with any of the others is a bit delirious. And one wonders whether at heart they are not governed by hidden misgivings. Peoples, like the English or the French, who are really convinced by long tradition and experience, of their own superiority, are content to let it be taken for granted without making a stir.

The second symptom which appears is that each of the smaller countries feels itself to have been grievously wronged at the hands of the Peace Conference, and suffers in this respect from what the nerve-doctors call, I believe, the persecution-mania. The enemy countries feel that they were betrayed by the promise of a moderate peace, which was never accorded them. Each of the smaller allies complains that its sacrifices have gone unappreciated, that the vital part which it played in winning the war has been systematically ignored, that it was unjustly excluded from the Supreme Council, that its notes of protest received no more attention than its suggestions of advice or warning, that its rightful demands were not granted, that it was kept down to the profit of its rivals, that its motives, though honorable and pure, were regarded with suspicion, and altogether, that it was completely misunderstood. Here again, no one can deny that there is a good deal of truth in all these assertions. But to dwell on them continually is to exaggerate them, and one cannot avoid remarking that, while the decisions made in the favor of each country have been accepted as a matter of just due, and promptly put out of mind, contrary decisions have been carefully kept in the memory, where they rankle and burn at the least provocation. Everybody, in short, feels bitter and hurt, and a little bit angry.

To make matters worse, the "principal allied powers" have perhaps proceeded too confidently in the way of offering "friendly advice" to their lesser associates. French military missions, composed of experienced technicians, have performed invaluable work in reorganizing and training the Czech and Polish armies;

but the irritation of mind of the beneficiaries is such that I feel sure these services have not been adequately appreciated. The United States, for its part, at the instance of Mr. Herbert Hoover, placed skilled American engineers at the disposal of several states to help them out of their transportation difficulties. The idea was good and the studies and suggestions laid before the various ministries by the American missions are doubtless of great value; but they have not, to any extent, been followed. Again, relief organizations, like the Red Cross, have frequently had inexplicable difficulties in securing anything like genuine coöperation from the peoples they desired to serve. And I could multiply examples. Advice may be exactly what these countries need; it is the last thing they want. They will solicit loans of money or raw stuffs, but they do not want to be told how they shall employ them.

The basis of this disinclination to take advice is a growing distrust which the smaller powers have conceived of the larger. They are not only sensitive under the suspicion of criticism, and exceedingly jealous of their independence, but they incline to suspect ungenerous motives under even the friendliest proposals. A suggestion which seems at first glance intended merely for their own good, must be weighed and analyzed from every point of view, lest it be found to contain a double import. The precaution is perhaps well-founded, but it might be exercised with more discretion. There have been some over-heated brains which have thought they detected in some of the most innocent charitable endeavors the spirit of a hostile propaganda, or the forerunner of an attempt at economic enslavement. All in all, Mr. Vesnitch was expressing a senti-

ment by no means unique when, as premier of Jugo-Slavia, he said to me:

"We do not intend to take orders henceforth from anybody—not from Moscow any more than from Berlin, and not from London any more than from Paris. The powers must understand that the child has grown up."

This hypersensitive independence is aggravated by the acute fear in which each country seems now to stand of all its neighbors. Not one but feels itself to be entirely surrounded by enemies, whom it supposes to be plotting against it, and who, as a fact, generally are; although each believes itself to be conspiring solely in self-defense, and would indignantly combat the charge that it was contemplating aggression.

"My neighbor is my enemy, but my neighbor's neighbor is my friend." So runs the old ironical saying. And this is indeed the political principle on which most of the nations seem to be acting. Five states—Italy, Jugo-Slavia, Hungary, Czecho-Slovakia and Poland—lie in a row up through the middle of Europe. Applying the foregoing principle, Italy flirts with Hungary over the shoulder of Jugo-Slavia, and Hungary winks understandingly across Czecho-Slovakia to Poland; while Jugo-Slavia and Czecho-Slovakia, squeezing Hungary between them, sign a "defensive alliance." In the same way, Greece and Roumania, under the influence of Bulgaria's antipathy, become the warmest of friends. The Czechs sympathize with the Russians against the Poles, whom the Russians are of one mind with the Germans in desiring to crush.

Between this fear and this distrust, the sentiment of xenophobia, never entirely absent in any people, has

reached a rare intensity in the south and the center of Europe, and is extended with especial vigor to racial minorities. The peace treaties tried to make provision against this contingency by inserting clauses guaranteeing minority rights; but you cannot legislate about peoples' feelings, and where the law contradicts the feeling, ways of evasion of the spirit, if not of the letter, of the law will always be found. Within their own boundaries, the Roumanians hate the Magyars, Bulgars and Russians; the Magyars and Poles hate the Jews; and the Czechs hate the Germans. There may even be alliances of minorities against majorities, as, for example, that of the Germans and Magyars against the Czechs in Czecho-Slovakia. The hatred of racial minorities is extended in less degree to all foreigners, whose presence is looked upon with more or less suspicion. Popular speculation regarding a foreigner generally runs over grounds something like these: he may be an "enemy" spy; he may, although politically innocent, be trying to crowd some native out of a job; taking advantage of the depreciated currency, he may be a speculator, a usurer, or a profiteer; or again, it may be that, in spite of his protestations of friendship, his impressions are unjustly unfavorable, and that when he leaves the country, he will poison public opinion against it; in any case, he is eating food and drinking wine which are none too plentiful, and thereby helping to increase the already exorbitant cost of living. Such reasoning may be naïve; it is nevertheless current. Foreigners simply are not welcome, so far, at least, as the masses of the population are concerned.

Finally, not only is each country unnaturally sensitive as to its own importance, smarting under a sense

of wrong, unwilling to take advice, distrustful of its friends, afraid of its neighbors, suspicious of everything and everybody; but, to top the climax, each is fervently and ineradicably convinced of its own essential rightness. Always and always, it is the opponent who is at fault. The confidence of these various peoples in this exceedingly dubious axiom is little short of sublime. Their hands tremble, their eyes flash, their voices break, as they retail to you the story of their injured innocence. It seems impossible, yet it is so. It seems like a comedy, but it is tragic—the age-long tragedy of human frailty, ever ready to cry out against the failings of others, but of one's own shortcomings, respectful and shy. The real trouble with Europe is, too much human frailty.

This morbid psychology is further accentuated by two factors—intensive propaganda, and an anxious preoccupation with the idea of national defense, the workings of each of which in turn I shall now go on to discuss.

3

PROPAGANDA

THE phenomena of modern propaganda are so effective and so significant that they are worthy of the statesman's keenest study; and, indeed, statesmen have not been lax in putting their newly acquired knowledge into practice. I am not unfamiliar with the official point of view: in countries weakened by distress, or countries newly created, patriotism is life itself. It is nervous energy, it is reserve strength, it is the will to survive. Without its generous support, a government can do nothing; with it, everything becomes possible. Where national sentiment does not exist, it must be stimulated artificially. For example, Austria's present failure to realize this is costing it dear. Feeling no common bonds of sentiment or interest, each class and each locality goes its own egoistic way; the result is disintegration, mild anarchy, beggary—until it is only by the will and pleasure of other states that Austria's existence is preserved. Waving the flag, cheering the king or the president, celebrating one's own virtues and damning the foreigner, are therefore political expedients of genuine value, under certain conditions. They can, however, be overdone; and what might have remained a virtue becomes a vice.

Slander, distortion and deliberate falsehood, evoked for the double purpose of strengthening one's own morale, and weakening the morale of the enemy by

provoking internal dissensions, are weapons as old as history. Their development in the late war, however, was based on something quite modern—the new science of psychology, as professed in the universities, and as popularized in the great recent frenzy of commercial publicity. We are, it appears, poor creatures enough, a prey to the hypnotics of every charlatan, and able no better than so many lunatics to resist the influence of repeated suggestion. Our brains are like so much soft wax, to be scrawled upon ad libitum by the reflex of colored-poster or large black type. The image of a clean cow on a label convinces us that the milk is pure; and it suffices to repeat over a large number of billboards that "Benjamin's Bacon is Best," for us to believe it. The "age of reason," whose near advent was confidently predicted a hundred years ago, has been ignominiously preëmpted by the "age of advertising."

The Germans were the first to grasp the potentialities of propaganda in the war; but in this, as in military initiative, the allies were not slow to follow; and by the time the United States, with its genius for publicity, came into the field, the moral equilibrium was definitely broken. It may almost be said that President Wilson gave more personal attention to the organization of the Committee on Public Information than he did to the organization of the army. There are those who maintain that the President's notes and speeches, fired boldly into the middle of Europe, were more powerful than the largest guns, and that propaganda played a larger part than strategy in the enemy's defeat—a view, however, which must be received with reserve.

These momentous lessons were not lost on the governments concerned. The Peace Conference, conceived originally as a great court of public opinion, degenerated into an orgy of after-dinner speeches, newspaper conferences, communiqués, pamphlets and press agents. Truth cowered colder and more neglected than ever at the bottom of the well, and "things as they are" were crowded aside in the struggle of a hundred conflicting presentations of "things as they might be made to seem." From such distracting contaminations the supreme council shrank in fright, and, on the whole, I do not believe that its decisions were much influenced by public opinion; but these great press campaigns have had a permanent effect, nevertheless, for the nations have now acquired the propaganda habit. "Control of public opinion" has become a function of state.

How is this control exercised? The problem falls naturally under two heads: home opinion, and foreign. With regard to home opinion, the government's first step is to determine what it wants to make people believe; its second is to associate as many political leaders as possible with its viewpoint, and make to important opponents such concessions as may seem expedient. Having thus assembled the necessary prestige, it may now proceed, by the well-known process of affirmation and reiteration, to open its campaign, in speeches, press editorials and interviews, and in the selection and pruning of news. Mental contagion will do the rest.

In America, the pruning of news is a difficult and dangerous, if not an impossible undertaking. In America, the press is still, thanks to its wealth and its initiative, relatively free. But in "Balkanized Europe"

the newspapers are poor; and not being able to afford correspondents of their own, even opposition organs are obliged to accept such reports and dispatches as the government, controlling the telegraph wires and all the important news sources, may choose to dole out to them. This is of course especially true regarding news from abroad. In theory, the censorship is now abolished nearly everywhere. In practice, it still has ways of maintaining itself. Some dispatches "never arrive." Others, when delivered, are found to be so badly garbled in transmission that to reduce them to sense is beyond editorial skill.

The influencing of foreign opinion may be a no less desirable, but it is a far more delicate undertaking. The Germans who, during the war, placed a \$50,000,000 propaganda credit at the disposition of their ambassador in Washington, and who were ready to spend as much as \$1,400,000 to buy a single French newspaper, found to their cost that mere money is not enough. Crude or brutal methods are apt to prove a boomerang. It is essential to study the mentality of each people, and adapt one's efforts in consequence. The Bolshevik dictators seem to have grasped this principle very well. They talk loan reimbursements to the French, commerce and concessions to Britain and America, wheat to Italy, and the destruction of the Versailles Treaty to the Germans. Their tone with financiers differs nicely from their tone with the proletariat. All this is, of course, entirely in accordance with the precepts of the new science of publicity. When it is decided what is best to be ladled out to the various countries, distribution is effected by means of interviews to foreign correspondents, the speeches of official, or

semi-official missions, and the tentatives of press agents attached to embassies and legations. An exchange of professors or pastors, reports to international scientific or charitable bodies—all, alas, may be turned to advantage. The presence of a colony of loyal emigrants in the country which it is desired to influence is especially useful. The Greeks in America are merely one case in point. It is impossible for an American paper to print anything critical regarding Greece without at once receiving one or a series of letters of protest and denial.

If I were to classify the states with which I am now chiefly concerned, in the order of their advertising efficiency, I should rate them as follows: Hungary, Czecho-Slovakia, Bulgaria, Greece, Poland, Austria, Jugo-Slavia, Roumania. The Roumanian government does not maintain so much as a press bureau in the national capital. Roumanian opinion, apparently, is little inclined to get out of hand. As regards propaganda, Roumania may probably be considered the most backward country of Europe, but whether this is to its credit, or its discredit, one hesitates to say.

A good specimen of a nation in a high fever of publicity is Hungary. Before the war, the Hungarians had scarcely given a thought to such matters. But they are an intelligent people, and having lost two-thirds of their country through what they believe to have been the sheer ignorance of the western powers regarding the merits of their case, they have decided that the time has come to make themselves known. The government's endeavors are being seconded by an organization known as the "Territorial Integrity League," which claims—perhaps not without exaggera-

tion—to have three and a half million members. Pamphlets, leaflets, maps, books and posters are being printed in every language. To such countries as Poland and Italy, with which, for political reasons, it is desired to form special ties, lecturers with moving-pictures are being dispatched. Hungary, itself, is flooded with posters and picture postcards, protesting against the dismemberment. “Nem, nem, soha!” cry the bold-faced letters: “No, no, never!” And in this spirit the temper of the people is being firmly forged.

For foreign consumption, the following arguments are put forth: Hungary is a thousand years old; under the Dual Monarchy, Austria overshadowed it, and it never had a chance to win the sympathies of other powers; it accepted the war solely to avenge itself on Russia for having helped Austria to crush it in 1848; it is a complete economic and geographical unit, and economic unity is of more importance than the principle of nationality, as the allies, themselves, recognized, when in drawing the frontiers of Bohemia, they included a couple of million Germans; within this geographical unit, the Magyars ruled solely because they happened to be the strongest, numerically and in character, of seven races; plebiscites should have been held—most of the people taken away from Hungary would have preferred to remain; the allies, in arousing race fanaticism, are stirring a volcano; the Treaty is a death-sentence; the loss of Pressburg, the coronation city, and of Kassa, Rakoczy’s birthplace, are worse than the loss to France of Metz and Strassburg in 1871; Hungary will never rest until it recovers its natural frontiers; it will give up—reluctantly—Croatia and Slavonia, which lie beyond the rivers

Drave and Danube; but the rest of its fortified territories—no, no, never!

This is good strong material, well conceived. The Magyars, however, have opposed to them two groups of hostile propagandists, who are not to be disdained—the Czechs, whose able president, Mr. Thomas Masaryk, is well aware that there is in existence an ingenious machine known as a printing-press; and the refugee Jew communists, who, after the fall of Bela Kun, fled from Budapest and took refuge in Vienna. Publicity seems to be a communist specialty; this group is no exception. Provided, apparently, with ample funds from headquarters at Moscow, well-organized, and possessing a newspaper or two, they have devoted themselves relentlessly to the purpose of blackening Hungary's name in the eyes of the world in general, and of the Austrians in particular. In the present disorganized state of Central European communications, they occupy a strong strategic position. No wires can go out of Hungary without passing through hostile territory. The émigré communists are free to invent what yarns they please regarding the Magyars. Their inventions are maliciously reproduced in the Viennese papers, and are thence cabled all over the world, in more or less good faith, by the representatives of foreign press agencies.

Their masterpiece was the "white terror" propaganda. There was just enough truth in the assertion that the Magyars, exasperated by their experience of the "red terror" under communism, were maltreating the Jews in Budapest, to permit full play to the unscrupulous imaginations of hatred and malice. I happened to visit Budapest at a time when the so-called

"white terror" was supposed to be at its height. From assurances given me in Vienna I had even expected to run personal danger. I was warned, for example, not to venture in the streets after dark on pain of my life. It was with considerable astonishment, therefore, that I found absolute order and perfect quiet prevailing in Budapest. The streets at night were thronged with peaceful pedestrians. I had occasion to pass several times through the Jewish quarter, and it was as calm and as crowded and active as the rest of the city. There had, indeed, been several hundred executions, official and otherwise, of workmen and Jews, in the troubles following the overthrow of Bela Kun, and there were some two thousand of his partisans awaiting trial in a concentration camp. There had been, I was told, cases of assault against Jews in the streets of the capital, but I talked to a good many people, and I did not meet one who had actually happened to see anything of the kind. Yet so effective was the "information" invented by the Vienna refugees that the various foreign legations in Budapest were asked by their governments to make personal investigations; and the Austrian workmen, who are half-starved, were induced, by way of protest against the "white terror," to declare a futile blockade against Hungary, which had food to export!

Propaganda wars of a similar description are constantly breaking out at present in Central Europe and the Balkans, and do much to increase the general nervous tension. The number of falsehoods, which sometimes in good faith, but oftener in bad, are continually being set in circulation by each country regarding the others, must be enormous. Everything that goes wrong

at home is laid to enemy propaganda, and everything that goes wrong abroad becomes an occasion for redoubling one's own propagandist activities. The air seethes with rumors, none of which are seriously investigated, and all of which are more or less believed.

Though the word has acquired an evil connotation, there is nothing essentially objectionable about propaganda. It may be good as well as bad. It may be used to arouse sentiments of friendship as well as sentiments of hate. I, personally, do not object to even the most violent tracts provided I am able to procure the equally violent tracts of the other side, and confront the two. If I read in one street that "Benjamin's Bacon is the Best" and in another that "Bolliver's Bacon is Unexcelled," I flatter myself that either I, or any other normal human being, would have the critical sense to compare the two before deciding between them.

It is only when it excludes altogether the opposing viewpoint; when, instead of serving the cause of friendship and better understanding, it is put to the opposite uses, as in much of Europe to-day, that its results become truly nefarious. Through its potent agency, self-glorification is abused to the point of indecency; the sense of wrong is stung to an incessant fever; the paralyzing spirit of distrust and fear is fostered, and the peoples walk in blind self-righteousness. The only consoling thought is that a day may come when this mighty force will be set conscientiously to the task of improving, rather than embittering, international relations.

THE NEW MILITARISM

As if by a kind of fatal irony, out of the war which was to have ended all wars, there has sprung up in "Balkanized Europe" a new militarism, which, in its psychological effects, is no less important than propaganda has been shown to be.

To countries which, rightly or wrongly, imagine themselves to be surrounded by enemies, preoccupations of national defense are of the first importance.

It was commonly believed, at the time of the armistice, that the formation of a League of Nations would be succeeded by a general disarmament; but the failure of the League to provide a system of international police precluded this happy eventuality. I consent to go out at night, unarmed, only when I know that in every street is a fully equipped policeman whose business it is to defend me in case I am attacked. The fact that many of the pronunciamientos of the allies in council could not be enforced for lack of available troops was not lost on the smaller states. In the face of repeated summons from the conference, Poles and Ruthenians only stopped fighting after the Poles were victorious. The Roumanians who, having defeated the Hungarian communists, were ordered by the conference not to enter Budapest, disregarded this order with complete impunity. The Poles, in August, 1920, had only themselves to rely upon to save their capital from the

onslaught of Russian Bolsheviks; and the Germans, in the opinion of some European statesmen, are fulfilling the terms of the treaty only because of the menace of a French army on the Rhine.

It is considered to be clear, therefore, that as the larger powers can at present accord the smaller no real guarantee of safety, the smaller must look to themselves as best they are able. A national army, moreover, in these times of social convulsions, is deemed necessary for the preservation of internal order. In countries like Roumania, Poland, and Jugo-Slavia, whose internal unity is still far from complete, military service is regarded as a powerful solvent for the different new elements comprised in the nation.

Only two of the countries of "Balkanized Europe,"—namely Roumania and Jugo-Slavia, have frontiers which are militarily defensible, and even they are not satisfied. Greece, Bulgaria, Czecho-Slovakia, Poland, and especially Hungary and Austria—all feel themselves to lie practically at the mercy of their inimically-minded neighbors. Consequently, they endeavor, as I have explained, to conclude alliances with their neighbor's neighbor against their neighbor, and for the rest, they build up their army, gathering arms and material wherever and however they can.

Bulgaria, Austria and Hungary being "enemy" countries, the size of their military establishments has been definitely limited by the peace treaties, and only recruiting by voluntary enlistment for a long term of years is permitted. Bulgaria is accorded a maximum of 20,000 soldiers and 10,000 police; the Hungarian army is set at 35,000 men, and the Austrian is similarly reduced.

Austria's situation is special. Austria differs funda-

mentally from the other countries in having seemingly lost even the desire to live. Its feeble socialist government was recently feeding an army of something like 30,000 men, of whom people said that they wore uniforms because they had no other clothes, and carried guns for lack of picks and shovels. They were poorly disciplined and of small military value. At the same time the "red" government resisted all efforts to force it to transform the exclusively socialist character of this army; and when the allies insisted that recruiting must be regional, the government simply distributed its workmen soldiers over the provinces, and saw to it that of all the volunteers who presented themselves, these only were accepted. It thus appears that the Austrian army, such as it is, is social in character rather than national.

Bulgaria, being a community of farmers, is having considerable trouble in recruiting troops by voluntary enlistment. The people are used to conscription, and prefer it. With this in mind, the government is putting into effect a scheme of universal "labor" conscription, male and female, for a two-year period, which, while it is supposedly industrial rather than military, does obviously maintain the whole machinery of full mobilization, and extends it even to women, the value of whose labor, in time of war, has been sufficiently attested.

Hungary has, I believe, only about 22,000 men at present under arms, but they are as fine troops as one could wish to see, alert, fiery and well in hand. The task of restoring discipline after the communism of the Bela Kun régime, was no slight one; but it has been successfully accomplished. The Magyars are a vigorous and war-like people. They have all had sufficient military training in the late war to last them the rest

of their lives. It is only the question of how to train the young, new classes without infringing the treaty which is perplexing the government.

Austria, Bulgaria and Hungary have all nominally surrendered their surplus arms to the Entente; but in Hungary and Bulgaria, if I am properly informed, there are still hidden arsenals, and weapons privately concealed, throughout the country.

Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Roumania, Jugo-Slavia and Greece, being rated as members of the Entente, have been left free to develop whatever military system they choose, and indeed have been materially assisted in the task by the larger powers. Britain, Italy, the United States and France have furnished them arms or equipment. France has supplied staffs of military technicians for purposes of training and organization.

Poland was born into war. Its prime necessity was to raise an army, first by volunteers, then by conscription. Until August, 1920, when a general mobilization was proclaimed for the defense of Warsaw, there had been six classes under arms—all men from the ages of eighteen to twenty-five—a total of something like half a million. The army particularly lacks technicians and experienced superior officers, but, under the influence of a devout patriotism, its discipline is good. General Joseph Pilsudski, the commander-in-chief, is also the chief-of-state. One of the burning questions of Polish politics today is whether, in the future, these two decisive functions may safely be entrusted to the same man.

Czecho-Slovakia, when its demobilization is completed, will have a standing army of 150,000, somewhat lacking in experienced upper officers, and some-

what honeycombed by internal politics (soldiers here are allowed to vote), but good sound material, although the Czechs are not essentially a military people. Military service is compulsory for a period of two years, though it is said that this term is to be gradually reduced in the future.

In Roumania, the period of conscription is also two years, giving a standing army of 150,000. Owing to the necessity of keeping troops of occupation in the new provinces—Transylvania, the Banat, the Boukovina and Bessarabia—there are still nearly double this number of men in uniform (September, 1920). The Roumanians are not conspicuous for military genius, but they have been working hard at army reorganization, and are said to have accomplished good results.

The Greek army of the future will probably also be based on two years' conscription. This army has shown itself, in its campaigns of occupation in Thrace and Asia-Minor, to be unexpectedly competent and well-led. There are at present, I believe, something like 200,000 men under arms.

All in all, the best army in "Balkanized Europe" is probably that of Jugo-Slavia. The framework is that of the Serbian establishment which has now experienced eight consecutive years of campaign service. The command is said to be excellent, and the quality of the soldiers has been well proved. The Serbian peasant takes naturally to military life; bravery in battle is the national ideal; and as for the Croats, they were considered the best soldiers of Austria. Conscription is for two years in the cavalry and artillery, a year and a half in the infantry. In addition, in the new provinces—Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia, Montenegro, Dalmatia,

the Banat—all men, up to the age of thirty-two, are being conscripted for two months' periods, to accustom them to the Serbian system. There is a standing army of 150,000, but full mobilization would, it is declared, give a million and a half. Despite the disasters and hardships of the great war, this army is in fine fettle, and would fight, one is led to believe, at the drop of a hat. In this respect, it is probably unique in Europe to-day.

The financial burden of these important armies on small and impoverished states is very heavy; but it is accepted without a murmur. The tendency is rather to increase than to diminish military efficiency. For the peoples of this part of the world are unanimous in the belief that the latest war was by no means the last.

It is out of this belief that the new militarism has risen; and preoccupations of national defense react in turn on the national psychology to strengthen the belief. Bulgaria and Hungary are especially irritable. Not only are these countries now filled with professional officers who, having no longer any employment, are ready for any kind of patriotic adventure, but the whole population smarts under the reductions of armament imposed by the treaties, the spirit of which they are far from accepting. The neighboring countries, keenly aware of this explosive discontent, disquieted further by national propaganda, impressed by Poland's struggle with Russia, and nervous over Jugo-Slavia's quarrel with Italy, to say nothing of half a dozen minor quarrels, are taking their precautions accordingly, and live to-day rather in an atmosphere of war than of peace.

To the confused, overwrought, unhealthy and dangerous state of mind which I have attempted to

describe, one other element of disturbance must be added. Across the currents of nationalist and racial unrest there blows a wind of social unrest—a mysterious sirocco which may be said to leave no brain entirely untouched by its cunning trouble. Although not so strong as national sentiment, class-feeling, quickened by the war, is still sufficient to set workman against manufacturer, and peasant against proprietor. I shall have occasion later to discuss the great social tendencies of the present time in more detail. Let it suffice for the moment to state that, while these tendencies, in their constructive phases, are really less developed in the culturally backward nations of “Balkanized Europe” than in the advanced civilizations of the West, they are nevertheless a serious complication.

The morbid psychology which we have been studying may now be defined as follows: A nervous exaggeration, affecting whole peoples, of distrust, fear, self-pity, self-glorification and self-righteousness, accentuated by propaganda and militarism, and complicated by social unrest.

It is this condition of mind, and not simply the material effects of the war, which is delaying the normal processes of reconstruction. Considering presently its action on finance, commerce, industry, and agriculture, particularly in the form of government control, we shall see the extraordinary perversion and paralysis into which it has contorted a large part of Europe.

ECONOMIC SELF-SUFFICIENCY

It is the idea of national defense which gives birth to the idea of economic self-sufficiency. If a state were indeed in no possible danger of external aggression, then it would be far more difficult to reply to those economists and radicals who assert that free trade is the only rational régime. As among individuals, so among the nations: each would devote itself to producing what it can furnish easiest and best, procuring the rest of its needs by exchange with other peoples. But suppose that, following out this economy, certain nations should become almost entirely industrial, while the rest devoted themselves exclusively to agriculture. The day has passed when it was sufficient to forge plowshares into swords to arm a legion. Modern war is essentially industrial. Cæsar's Balearic slingers could be recruited among shepherds and could make their own slings. But modern projectiles, themselves a complicated factory product, can only be discharged by the force of special chemicals, from large and complex machines.

The tendency is for war to become more and more industrial. The gradual industrialization of the French army, for example, in the late war is well illustrated by the following tables published recently by Col. Fabry, formerly of the French general staff:

	1914	1918	1919 (projected)
Rifles	900,000	260,000
Machine guns	4,000	20,000
Heavy cannon	300	4,000
Aeroplanes	200	3,400	6,000
Tanks	2,300	4,600
Camions	9,000	100,000
Aviation service (men).....	6,000	100,000	250,000
Rear services (men).....	50,000	1,700,000

Effectives (percentage of total)

	1914	1918
Infantry	66%	44%
Artillery	16%	26%

"In 1914," concludes Col. Fabry, "men—especially infantry; in 1918, machines—and specialists, mechanics, to work them."

History shows on almost every page how hard it is for powerful nations to abstain from abusing their power. At the present time, an agricultural nation may be said to be almost at the complete mercy of an industrial one. However bravely France might have defended itself, it would have been overwhelmed within three months, without the aid of British and American industry, by the output of the superior German munition factories. Almost the first preoccupation of Japan, in its ambition to become a modern state, has been to create industries; and Russia has proved to its cost that a great metallurgical establishment is indeed essential to a great power.

It has always been the custom for the great powers, either as a matter of business or of political policy, to sell arms to the smaller, which have no manufactories of their own. In the chess game of diplomacy, even a pawn may play a rôle of prime importance. A small state has had only to begin intriguing to wrest a concession of arms from either one side or the other.

Albania, which is the most backward country in Europe, has of late years abounded in rifles of the latest pattern, bearing the mark of three or four rival powers. The first act of the allies, after the armistice, was to equip the armies of their friends in Eastern Europe; and there is no reason to suppose that any of the "Balkanized" states will ever be left entirely without means of self-defense.

But this semi-dependence no longer satisfies the smaller states. They are ambitious, they are distrustful, and they want to be completely free. The Serbs, it is true, boast that they can always take sufficient weapons from the enemy in the first battle to complete their supplies. Yet even the Serbs are planning to develop industries. The big powers set the pace, and the others follow as best they can, breathless, but never disheartened. There is not one among them which does not dream of ultimately achieving complete economic self-sufficiency. It is true that a small school of economists has arisen in Italy who decry this costly mania for industrialization, and who advocate a league of agricultural states, which, by controlling the world's food supply, could stand successfully against the pressure or attempted extortions of the industrial states. Thus Spain, Italy, Bulgaria, Jugo-Slavia, Roumania, Russia, Hungary would form a sort of wheat trust which would be able to deal on equal terms with the steel trust of Britain, Germany and France. But while this scheme might work in time of peace, it leaves the armament question unsolved. The industrial state could invade the agricultural state at will, and seize by force the food that it required. For this reason, if

for no other, the "league of agricultural states" will never, I think, be realized.

But how are undeveloped nations, or nations poorly endowed with coal and iron, to create a great metallurgical establishment? The United States, having the resources, attained the development under cover of high protective tariffs. Japan, lacking both, is attempting to obtain the resources by annexations on the Asiatic mainland, and the development by the combination of tariffs and subsidies. Italy, which is in much the same plight as Japan, has indeed created factories, but still finds itself dependent on foreign countries for fuel and ore. If Italy and Japan, which are relatively large, have had such difficulties in creating industries, how are smaller power peoples to succeed? I myself am convinced that they cannot. Czecho-Slovakia inherited sixty per cent of Austria's industries, and is therefore born industrial; Poland has rich resources and plenty of cheap labor, and may succeed in becoming industrial; the present Austria has still some industries and may develop more, though it lacks coal. The others—Hungary, Jugo-Slavia, Roumania, Bulgaria, Greece—though they all have fine industrial programmes on paper, will simply ruin themselves, I fear, in the effort to do what nature has not fitted them for.

As we have seen, however, the fact that a thing may appear impossible does not necessarily deter either an individual or a nation from attempting it. All the nations are determined to be absolutely independent. Independence hinges on national defense, and national defense hinges, in the last analyses, on the achievement of economic self-sufficiency. Economic self-sufficiency has therefore become a universal aim. Instead of fed-

erating in such a way as to make a division of labor between them possible and profitable, the nations of "Balkanized Europe" have hastened to surround themselves with air-tight economic barriers. And each within its own little enclosure has instituted complete government control over all of the machinery of foreign trade and most of the machinery of internal production. I will not pretend that a certain amount of control is not necessary. The food shortage—the need for setting the domestic price of bread lower than the market price, fluctuations of exchange, the abuses of speculation and profiteering, the lack of coal and rolling-stock,—all make obligatory the exercise of strict vigilance on the part of governments. The peoples of Europe became accustomed during the war to the idea of government control, and they have accepted its present extension, and the corresponding loss of individual liberty, with docility. The energy and initiative of its citizens, however, is perhaps the chief strength of the state. The paralysis of this initiative, under government control, and the almost complete stoppage of ordinary commercial activity, is a tremendous price to pay for the small amount of national economic independence actually obtained.

A government, after all, is composed merely of human beings who are neither all-wise nor all-efficient. A man will work harder, and exercise more ingenuity in his own interest than in that of the state, even though he be a patriot; for state salaries are relatively modest and advancement is slow. Government control means simply control by a bureaucracy; and even if the government's intentions were wholly scientific and right, they would still be in danger of miscarriage by reason

of the doubtful ability of the officials entrusted with the execution. Trained functionaries—themselves perhaps never entirely satisfactory—cannot be created in a day. Bulgaria, Austria and Hungary, who now have least need for them, all have experienced corps of officials, and to spare; but of the countries which need them most, Greece, Jugo-Slavia and Roumania have not nearly enough, and Czecho-Slovakia and Poland, at the time of their formation, had none at all. A certain amount of centralized supervision under present conditions is unavoidable; but the results of attempting to exercise an exaggerated control of nearly all things through the agency of ignorant or incompetent public servants, and under the influence of a mentality of distrust and fear, are little short of ruinous.

6

GOVERNMENT CONTROL

I SHALL not go into the intricacies of the clacking, squeaking machinery by which those in power are attempting to regulate all the public activities of their nationals; decree has followed decree, and the requirements have reached a complexity which even the officials themselves have difficulty in expounding. For present purposes, a survey of the broad generalities will suffice; these, despite local variations, are now everywhere essentially the same, for one government has copied another, each determined not be outdone in the exercise of centralized authority. In this respect there is no sensible difference between the socialism of Prague, and the monarchism of Budapest. The one exception is Greece, which entered the war late, which has made few restrictions on trade, and whose economic situation is relatively excellent. Financially, but not in other respects, allowance should also be made for the special situation of Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria, which have practically been declared insolvent, and whose future is in the hands of the all-powerful reparations commission.

All the "Balkanized" countries have heavy and increasing debts. A part of these debts is healthful, corresponding to a sinking fund for reconstruction purposes. A larger part is due to diminished production, necessitating repeated and unprofitable purchases

abroad, and to continual excess of public expenditures over receipts. To prevent these debts from growing indefinitely, it is necessary to increase production and to equilibrate budgets. The governments are doing neither. Of production I shall speak presently. The budget deficit equals fifty per cent of the receipts in Czecho-Slovakia; in Roumania it is no less than three times the receipts, and in Poland it is so large I doubt if it has ever been estimated. With public opinion in its present nervous condition, internal loans are out of the question. The only sound way to equilibrate a budget is to readjust taxes so as to increase revenues, and to cut down expenditures to a minimum. But the governments are afraid to increase taxes radically lest they plunge the irritated populace into serious social disorder. They run public services, such as railways and the post, at a deficit, from the same kind of fear. The two largest items of expense are the salaries of government employees, and the military establishment. In Poland, the cost of the war against Russia has come to a half of the entire budget. Even in Jugo-Slavia the army absorbs a third of the budget. But in some states the government employees are already threatening revolt because they are underpaid; and in others, under the influence of socialistic ideas, they will not readily relinquish the pecuniary advantages they have won. As for reducing the cost of the army, I have already shown that this, for the time being, is a psychological impossibility.

In these circumstances, what do the governments do? They borrow money abroad, which increases the debt. They print floods of unsecured paper money which, in addition to increasing the debt still further, lowers

the exchange to a point where purchases abroad become exorbitantly costly. For the rest, they launch the state into the banking business, and into commerce, in the hope of saving the financial situation by the resulting profits. They manipulate the exchange market by buying and selling their own money, speculating like so many profiteers, and thus adding to the fluctuations of exchange which already have contributed so much to the difficulties of resuscitating commerce. The latest Jugo-Slav budget report (July, 1920) even carried the following naïve item, under the heading of receipts: "900,000,000 dinars, profit on exchange." Within their own frontiers they refuse to recognize the international exchange rate. They set one of their own, four to six per cent higher, enforce it upon the banks, and collect a part of the difference as a special tax. In Roumania, on a letter of credit, I was unable to obtain better than eight per cent less than the real rate. In Czecho-Slovakia, a respected bank paid me only two-thirds of the sum due me, explaining that if I would return in two days I could have the balance, which, if the exchange had risen in the meantime, would be computed at the rate on the day of the first payment, but if it had fallen, then at the new rate! And, finally, they prohibit the export of currency altogether. Even the traveler may not carry more over the frontier than a sum barely large enough for one day's expenses. Payments abroad can only be made by special permission. In consequence of these and other similar measures, the whole mechanism of credit and exchange has ceased to function.

In establishing a complete control over imports and exports, so that no one can carry on foreign trade with-

out continually applying for import and export licenses, the idea of the government seems to be three-fold: first, to keep the country from being drained of its wealth; second, to make profits; third, to reinforce political policies. It is felt that were commerce left free not only would the people buy more luxuries than they could afford, but the country would be disadvantageously drained of some of its most valuable assets by foreigners taking advantage of the low rate of exchange. The importer, before he can procure a license to bring in his shipment, must prove that the goods are of public utility. The exporter must sign an engagement to employ within the country, within a given number of months, the amount of the payment which he expects to receive abroad. Frontier examinations are stringent. Nothing appearing new can be brought in or taken out. The Poles even try to take jewelry off the persons of women who are leaving Poland, the pretext being that if the jewelry was carried in by the wearer, she should have had an import license, and if she procured it within the country, export being forbidden, the attempt at export is illegal, and the jewelry may be confiscated. The fact that food is sometimes sold by the government to the people below the market price is considered to be another reason for forbidding free export.

Regarding the import of raw stuffs and fuel, the governments have taken this into their own hands in order, as they think, first to obtain better terms than individuals could get; second, to limit purchases to essentials, and third, to redistribute them according to genuine economic needs. But the export of fuel and raw-stuffs is controlled for the sake of the profits. Britain itself sells coal abroad at four times the domestic price, the

government collecting the difference. The countries of Balkanized Europe all desire to emulate this shining example. Countries which export wheat requisition it from the peasants at a relatively low price, and sell it high in the open market. In Czecho-Slovakia, which exports sugar, the government made nearly 3,000,000,000 crowns last year on this one item alone. In according an export license to a private individual, the governments also clap on export surtaxes in such a way as to make up the difference in exchange, in case it is unfavorable to the seller. In Czecho-Slovakia, for example, this scale of surtaxes runs as follows: 60% on the price of sale, to the United States, Holland, Switzerland and Portugal; 50% to Britain, Scandinavia, Finland; 35% to France and Belgium; 25% to Germany; 15% to Roumania, Bulgaria, Russia, the Ukraine; 10% to Jugo-Slavia and Hungary. Though nominally for the purpose of "correcting the exchange," these surtaxes also show a certain political bias. Jugo-Slavia, Czecho-Slovakia's ally, whose money is even better than that of Czecho-Slovakia, is given a preferential treatment, being taxed only as much as Hungary, Czecho-Slovakia's enemy, whose money is very low. The tendency everywhere is to favor one's friends, and to refuse to deal with one's enemies. As one's enemies are usually one's neighbors, the complications ensuing from this incursion of politics into business can easily be imagined.

Transportation is another important factor with which short-sighted governmental political policies are playing havoc. There is of course an absolute shortage of both engines and cars as a result of the war. No country has enough. Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria,

being "enemy" states, have been stripped of their rolling-stock to the profit of Czecho-Slovakia, Poland, and especially Jugo-Slavia and Roumania. Most of this war-worn rolling stock is in bad repair. For Jugo-Slavia and Roumania, which have no adequate machine-shops, the nearest repair stations are in Austria and Hungary. But they hesitate to send the stock to be repaired, first because they are afraid it might never come back, and second, because they dislike doing business with their "enemies." Their side-tracks are therefore crowded with useless cars and engines, which lie rotting and rusting under the weather, pillaged and mutilated by vandals. The waste seems little short of criminal. For a long time the Serbs would not even take an inventory of their cars, tugs and barges, for fear that if the Entente knew how many they had, it would try to take some away from them. At the present time I have reason to believe that the Jugo-Slavs have twelve hundred engines, eight hundred of which are not in use; twenty-six thousand cars, two-thirds of which are broken down; eighteen Danube passenger steamers, forty-five tugs, and eight hundred barges, most of which are lying idle. The Serbs, with their primitive railway organization, are apparently incapable of repairing or utilizing their transport units, but neither will they allow any one else to use them. This is the typical spirit of "Balkanized Europe."

Let me return now to the fundamental question of production. Why does it not increase more rapidly? Except perhaps in Poland, and to a less degree in Roumania, neither the mines nor the factories in this part of the world were seriously damaged by the war. In the mines, if it were not for repeated labor

troubles, due to the general social unrest, the returns would probably already be very nearly normal. In the factories, the labor problem is even more acute, on account of the irregularity of employment under existing conditions. It has moreover been noted that, in most factories, while the number of workmen has been increased, their actual accomplishment has decreased. In other words, influenced by radical ideas, they do not work so hard as before the war. But labor troubles, annoying as they may be, are not a sufficient explanation of low productivity. The manufacturer's first problem is to get coal and raw materials. This he must do through the government bureaucracy. It may take weeks. He may fail altogether. Then, having procured the permit, he must see to the transport of his fuel and rawstuffs to his factory. This usually means more delay, for cars are hard to procure. If he can market his produce at home, well and good; but if he is manufacturing for export, he has first to find a client with whom he can agree as to payment—no easy task with exchange fluctuating as it does from day to day. He has next to apply for an export license. Finally, when he gets his license, he must find cars or barges, and if he really wants the shipment to reach its destination, he must send with it an armed guard; for theft from railway cars has become a steady source of income to a large number of people.

The net results of these various natural and artificial restrictions is that ordinary business has been almost entirely replaced by a system of joint speculation and corruption, in which the risks are so great that the merchant is scarcely content with less than one hundred per cent profit. No wonder the cost of living

soars! The fixing of food prices by governments prepares the way for the food speculator and for the clandestine traffic known generally as the "sleichhandlung." The fixing of artificial exchange rates offers an easy living to the exchange speculator. The difficulty of procuring fuel and rawstuffs from the governments, and the institution of import and export licenses, open wide the doors to a vast scale of corruption. "Before the war," an eminent professional man remarked to me in Vienna, "our Austrian officials, while perhaps not comparable for sterling integrity with those of England and Prussia, were about equal to those of France and the United States, and were superior to those of Italy and Russia. Now—it is the corruption of Asia!"

Even in agriculture, the lowered production, though due to some extent to such material causes as the insufficiency of tools and animals, and the lack of cars for distributing fertilizer and for hauling the crops to market, is attributable still more to psychological causes. In the first place, the governments have fixed the price of grain at a rate well below the price in the world market. They requisition the grain, which, if they export it, yields them a handsome profit, and if they consume it at home, represents a considerable saving. In either case, it is the peasant who is the loser. In his indignation at this treatment, he refuses to sow more than enough grain for his own needs, or else he hides it from the government officials and sells it to speculators. In the second place, nearly every agricultural country is now in the throes of some kind of land reform. The claim of the large landowners, that a large property can produce more and cheaper than a number of small properties covering the same surface,

is perhaps specious. At the same time, there is not the slightest doubt that with the present world shortage of food, this wave of land reforms, though perhaps in the abstract an excellent thing, is most inopportune. For in the period preceding the execution of the reform, the large landowner is indisposed to invest money in property which he is about to lose, and the farms are allowed to run down. And in the period just after the reform, the peasant, inexperienced in management, and perhaps even ignorant of the advantages of a large surplus, is inclined to raise only sufficient grain for himself. This, for example, is the reason why Roumania, formerly a great wheat exporting country, has this year barely enough grain for its own needs. The Roumanian peasant is not interested in export. He asks only to live. A long education will perhaps be necessary to arouse him to a sense of his new responsibilities.

7

FRONTIERS

UNDER the influence of these multiple restrictions, frontiers have ceased to be merely imaginary lines of demarcation. They have become more impenetrable than Chinese walls. They are, so to speak, sealed hermetically. If it were possible, I have no doubt the various countries would even attempt to prevent the birds from flying over, and the rivers from flowing freely through. A frontier is now a place where everything must stop. Approaching by rail, the traveler quickly recognizes that he has reached the boundary line by the characteristic jam of cars, extending back sometimes for miles along the sidetracks. On navigable rivers, the frontier is marked by a similar congestion of barges; and on roads there are barricades and armed guards. Rustic communities, which for centuries have commersed amicably together, may now find themselves separated as by an abyss, and the unlucky countryman who is espied trying to run a frontier is promptly challenged and fired upon. No longer may the mountaineers of the South Tyrol go down to Innsbruck to market, or the mountaineers of Slovakia go harvesting in the Hungarian plains. New frontiers have been drawn; and to attempt to cross them without due authorization is to risk instant death.

There are, it is true, certain avenues of travel which are nominally open. The Danube and the principal

railroad lines are at the disposition of the public. Boats do run between Vienna and Budapest without hindrance, but between Austria and Jugo-Slavia, and between the latter and Roumania, it is necessary to change at the frontier. There are now even a few through trains. The French expresses which radiate from Paris to Warsaw, Bucharest and Constantinople, seem almost miraculous to people who have become accustomed to local trains and frontier changes. There is also a through train between Vienna and Berlin, by Prague. But I know of no other. As late as the summer of 1920, the surest way to go from Slovakia to Hungary was by Prague, Vienna and Budapest; and from Hungary to Transylvania, by Belgrade and Bucharest—tremendous detours! Government couriers, experimenting with what appeared to be more direct routes, were sometimes delayed three days or a week.

As the volume of travel is already far too large for the available accommodation, no doubt the various restrictions to which the traveler must submit do serve a purpose, in discouraging a certain number of applicants. These restrictions, while not insurmountable, are tedious in the extreme! I estimate that, in the course of a three months' trip, about half my time was taken up mainly with making traveling arrangements. I had no sooner reached a country than I had at once to set in motion the meticulous processes which would enable me, perhaps a fortnight later, to leave it—and I may add that to American newspaper correspondents, special facilities are granted; the ordinary mortal receives far less consideration. The traveler's first difficulty, on arriving in a given country, will be to find hotel accommodations. With the exception of Con-

stantinople and Athens, I know of no large city in "Balkanized Europe" where a room can be had merely for the asking. If he has written or telegraphed ahead, he will probably find that his letter or telegram has not been received. The desk clerk will insult him, the manager will turn a cold shoulder. In the end he will probably succeed by bribing the hotel porter, who has become a rich and all-powerful personage in European capitals. I have heard, however, of people having to pass a week or more in makeshift quarters before they could succeed in getting into a genuine hotel. The Czechs, with laudable initiative, have established a "Foreigners' Bureau," under government auspices, whose business is to requisition rooms for strangers. The only trouble, under this arrangement, is that you cannot choose your own hotel or room, but must accept the one assigned to you, no matter how unsatisfactory.

The traveler must next go to the police-station and register. Sometimes photographs are required, sometimes not. He must then estimate the probable length of his stay, and draw from the bank as much money as he thinks he will need. If he expects to leave within ten days, he must make application at once for the necessary visas. He will require first the visa of his own country, second, that of the country to which he is going, third, that of all the others which he may be obliged to pass through on the way, and finally, the visa of the country he is leaving. Each passport bureau is open only about two hours a day, and at each there is always a line of applicants many yards long. Unless some such expedient as that of bribing the door-keeper be adopted, one may have to return two days in suc-

cession merely for one visa. Desiring to go from Warsaw to Budapest, I had to obtain in Warsaw five different visas—American, Czech, Austrian, Hungarian, Polish. By dint of much corruption and a little official assistance, I managed to complete the task in two days; but it took the whole of my time.

After being sure of his visas the traveler may next apply for a railroad ticket and a place in the train. If there are no places left, as is generally the case, no ticket may be sold. To obtain a place under these conditions, it is sometimes necessary to get a government order through a friend; or perhaps a swift and informal transfer of a few banknotes will do the trick. As a last resort, the traveler can always go to the train and trust to the chance of being able to corrupt the conductor. In any case, the ticket sold him will take him only as far as the frontier. There, he must buy a new one, and as for this purpose he must be furnished with a sum of the currency of the country he expects to enter, as well as of those he will merely traverse, once more he must visit the bank or the money-changer.

Before leaving he will make sure that he has no new articles in his baggage, and that his total residue of money does not exceed the small sum which he is allowed to take out of the country. He had best provide himself also with something to eat, in case of emergencies; for the only trains with dining-cars are the special French expresses. Now, barring the ever-present possibility of a strike or an unannounced change of schedule, he may go and crowd himself into the train and endeavor to claim the place to which he believes himself entitled.

At the frontier the train will stop. It will even stop

a long time. The traveler will be invited to get out with his baggage. He will stand in line. He will stand in line a long time. He will stand till his feet ache and his back is lame. During the war he would have been searched for secret military information. Now he will be searched for stocks and bonds, money and jewels. When his turn finally comes, he will be thrust into a small cabin, and an impervious functionary will go through his pockets, run a finger in his hat-band, and feel inside his shoes. He may even be asked to undress, though this is becoming rare. If he has money about him in excess of the amount permitted, but declares it, it will be taken from him and a receipt given so that he can get it back if he ever returns the same way. If he fails to declare it, it will be taken from him just the same and he will be fined. He will now be graduated into another cabin where his visas will be verified. Finally, his baggage will be opened and thoroughly examined. If he is found to be taking out any new articles for which he cannot show an export license, the articles are confiscated, and if he has not declared them, he is fined. From some countries, it is forbidden even to take out a cake of chocolate. Three or four hours will now have elapsed. The traveler may resume his place in the train, which in the course of time will steam over the frontier and stop at the first station on the other side, where the entire operation will be repeated by a new set of customs officers—passport examination, personal search, inspection of baggage. I may add that if he is carrying any letters and they are discovered they will be opened and read. If the official disapproves of their tenor they may be confiscated. Some frontier officials appear to possess human intelli-

gence, but many do not. Some frontiers are worse than others—not according to any system, so far as I have been able to judge, but in an arbitrary way. They are all bad enough. They are the sign and symbol of the morbid psychology of “Balkanized Europe.”

Within these tightly closed boundaries, the peoples live in an isolation resembling that of the islanders of Oceania. They do not know and do not seem very much to care what is going on in the outside world. They see only the local newspapers, which present their limited budgets of news in a very special way. The few people who do really want information depend largely upon travelers, whom they will probe and question for hours together, as in the old days when newspapers and a fast mail service did not exist. Indeed, it may also be said that those days, for the time being, have returned. The international mails are as slow as if they were carried by coach-and-four instead of by train; and what with secret censorships, ill-will, carelessness and inefficiency, they are far less certain. There seems to be no definite rule: it has simply to be accepted that sometimes letters arrive and sometimes not. The prudent man will post his correspondence in triplicate at intervals of several days. International telegrams are even more precarious. Rates are high, and the telegraph offices will gladly accept as many messages as may be brought to them, taking payment and returning receipts; but if there is any doubt as to its contents, or perhaps if the address happens to displease the operator, the message may be dropped into the wastebasket. Or again, if the wires are crowded, it may be forwarded by mail. Here again, inefficiency, ill-will and carelessness play a leading rôle. I dispatched a

considerable number of telegrams in the course of my last trip, some of which never reached their destination, and some of which arrived too late to be of any use. The worst is the complete uncertainty. You never know whether your letter or telegram has been received or not, unless you chance miraculously to receive a reply to it before the lapse of so many weeks that you have forgotten what it was about. The American minister in Bucharest, having temporarily to leave his post, was to be replaced by a secretary from the Berne legation. But though many messages were sent forth into the void of telegraphic space by both of these diplomats neither was able to receive a reply as to when the other expected to travel. When even official communications are in these straits, what is one to expect of private communications? The only sure way for one business man to get a message to another is to send a personal emissary, or go himself. It is the Dark Ages over again.

THE RESTORATION OF CONFIDENCE

IF specific remedies could be applied to the ills from which "Balkanized Europe" is suffering, these remedies might now be envisaged as follows:

Restore internal order by restraining the disturbing opposition of social and racial minorities. Equilibrate the budget so as to arrest the multiplication of public debts. For this purpose, stimulate production, so as to increase wealth and permit the reorganization of taxes; which in turn will permit gradual deflation of currency, which will ameliorate the exchange. Increased production, moreover, will repair the damages of the war, give regular employment to workers, renew the food supply and give a surplus of commodities for foreign exchange. Diminish armament expenses for the sake of economy, and pay government employees adequately, so as to remove the necessity for official corruption. Reduce government control to a minimum, so as to permit larger play to the tremendous powers of individual initiative. Stimulate this initiative by letting private individuals make the profits on big business, instead of the government; the money can always be taken from them again, if necessary, in the form of taxes, and abuses of power by individuals can always be regulated by the state. Stop requisitioning grain; pay the peasants the market price, and help them to see the advantage of producing the largest possible

crops. Replace the idea of economic self-sufficiency, which is utterly unpractical for groups of small countries, by the idea of mutually beneficial trade. Restore the mechanism of international credit. Reduce travel restrictions and re-open frontiers. Insure international postal and telegraphic communications. Resume through transit, and contract for car and engine repairs wherever necessary, so as to enlarge the quantity of available rolling-stock. This is no doubt a vast and difficult programme in itself, for many of its features are interdependent, and the one helps or hinders the other, making for extreme complexity.

But as a matter of fact, specific remedies are not applicable. What is required first is a general tonic, and this tonic must be political in character rather than economic; for individual health here depends on the general health, and this in turn depends on one essential factor: the restoration of confidence. For you cannot establish internal order as long as social and racial minorities are continually being acted upon and even subsidized by foreign influences hostile to the state. You cannot trade with neighbors whom you consider to be enemies and you cannot elaborate a credit system with them. You cannot reduce travel restrictions and open frontiers so long as you are suspicious of every traveler. You cannot ensure postal and telegraphic communications, or resume through transit across hostile territory; and you cannot entrust your rolling-stock for repairs to countries which perhaps will neglect to return it. Moreover, without having done these things, you cannot successfully stimulate that increase of production on which depends the reorganization of finances and the amelioration of exchange. It is a


vicious circle; and it all turns about one point: the first solution to be sought is a political solution, for on this, and this alone, the restoration of confidence and goodwill is wholly dependent.

I am glad to be able to add that certain Central European statesmen are beginning to realize this truth, and to act upon it. Mr. Edward Benes, the able young Foreign-Minister of Czecho-Slovakia, in a speech before the permanent parliamentary commission on September 1, 1920, of which I have just received a copy, declares that as a result of the "terrible complication" of government control of customs and exchange, the economic difficulties of these (Central European) states has merely increased, and is still increasing . . . "There is no doubt," he continues, "that the present tendencies toward moral dissolution, the economic distress, and in great part, the social anarchy can only disappear through the reestablishment, as rapidly as possible, of normal economic relations between the states, which should, from this point of view, mutually complete one another." This exaggerated government control, he considers, is due to "political nationalism, supplemented by extreme economic nationalism." And the root of the whole matter, he conceives to be fear—"fear of revolution, dissolution and anarchy; fear of armed conflict with this or that neighbor; fear of a return to the old situation; fear, especially of a monarchist, or some other kind of reaction. It is clear," he argues, "that neither individuals nor, especially, nations can live any longer in such a state of mind. This situation would end by provoking complete moral dissolution, and the ruin of the entire political order, both social and economic."

The first step to be taken, as Dr. Benes so wisely concludes, is some acceptable and appropriate form of entente, or federation. Of the Czech minister's famous "petite entente," and of other possible schemes of alliances, I shall have occasion to speak in greater detail, in another part of this book.

PART III

PHYSICAL AND SOCIAL HEALTH



I

EPIDEMICS

THE question has frequently been raised, whether, before the necessary economic and political reconstructive policies can be put into effect, all Europe will not have succumbed irrevocably under the ravages of disease and social disorder—epidemics, famine, revolution, bolshevism. Of the two, the social danger is undoubtedly greater than the physical; but I must confess that in neither respect do I share the general pessimism. I am afraid that, in both, the popular anxiety is sustained largely by interested propaganda.

Certainly, to ignore the facts is to double the peril. But is it not possible that the facts have been exaggerated? The Russian soviets have declared repeatedly that their aim is world revolution, for which they assume that the hour is ripe, and by reiteration, they seem even to have convinced many otherwise intelligent people. But is the hour ripe? Will it ever be ripe? This is something which deserves to be looked into very closely.

Again, the great allied charitable bodies developed during the war feel that, affiliated perhaps with the League of Nations, their rôle, profitably for the welfare of mankind, should be indefinitely extended. For this prolongation of life, they need public support, and they realize perfectly that the best way to enlist this support is by widespread propaganda. Their agents,

men and women trained in the sanitary principles of the western world, taking as a matter of course such novelties as personal cleanliness, porcelain plumbing, and active indignation against all forms of disease, have penetrated, for the first time in their lives, into the age-long filth and fatalism of Eastern Europe. They are shocked and excited. They want to clean it all up without a moment's delay. Typhus flourishes, people lie around dying miserably in the midst of general indifference, and the western-trained charity workers emit a great cry of alarm and warning. The press department gets to work, a slogan is invented, as, that all Europe is starving or dying, and there is an appeal for funds to "save Europe." But are these startling generalizations to be taken at their face value? Are they really accurate?

It is with considerable hesitation that I raise these questions. The impulse of mutual aid, the gentle spirit of charity—these are among the finest qualities of our race, and he would be an evil genius indeed who should seek to blunt them by ill-founded scepticism. Again, what more ungrateful task could one assume than to pretend to weigh and measure the immense anguish of millions of people? The work of relief is necessary and good. It was far more necessary a year ago than it is now, but it must still be continued. And those who contribute funds to it are aiding a splendid cause. At the same time, it is entirely possible that all this generous effort has not been directed with complete wisdom. A better understanding of the real conditions, a closer analysis of the facts, would perhaps enable a concentration, an economy, a perfection of method, which have heretofore, to a certain extent,

been absent. I shall be gratified, moreover, if I can help to free sensitive and sympathetic minds from a nightmare of distress, when I venture the opinion that the crisis is passed, and that Europe will go under neither to bolshevism nor to disease.

I shall not attempt a history of the two terrible epidemics which have depopulated Europe since 1914. By far the deadliest of these was the influenza, which was of course world-wide, and which now seems to be extinguishing itself. The only other really great epidemic is that of typhus, which, though it still continues, seems also to be on a sort of natural decline, due to increased immunity, and which fortunately has been strictly localized. The fear has lately been expressed that the typhus may sweep the whole continent. But it should not be overlooked that those same hermetically sealed frontiers, which play such havoc economically, are a sure guarantee against the spread of contagious disease. In fact, thanks to these frontiers, never, probably, has there been so little contagious disease in most of the countries concerned, as at present. Austria, Hungary, Jugo-Slavia, Greece, Bulgaria, Roumania, are all practically free, at the present time, from diseases of this description. In Czecho-Slovakia, the provinces of Bohemia and Moravia are also free. But in the mountain villages of Eastern Slovakia and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, where the people from time immemorial have been accustomed to live in verminous filth, men, women, children, cows, chickens and pigs, all, as it were, sleeping in the same bed, typhus is endemic. The Czech health authorities, however, are confident of their ability to handle the situation, and though they estimate that it may take ten years to

clean up these infected villages thoroughly, they express no uneasiness whatever as to the possible spread of the contagion.

There remains to consider Poland—Poland, together with Eastern Galicia, parts of the Ukraine, Western Russia, and the Baltic states. This is the real typhus area. And here again, let me say at once that there seems to be no likelihood of its extending farther westward: the frontier authorities are too vigilant and too strict. The problem is therefore pretty well circumscribed.

Even in Poland, one entire district has escaped—Posnania, former German Poland, which is precisely that part where the standard of living is highest. Typhus, indeed, is a "dirt" disease, flourishing only among overcrowded and verminous peoples. It is propagated almost exclusively by the body-louse. The epidemic was at its worst in former Russian Poland in the winter of 1918-19, and in Galicia in the winter of 1919-20. The Poles are a hardy stock, with exceptional powers of resistance, else the death-rate, relatively low, might have run much higher. At the present time, thanks to the enlarged immunity, the disease seems to be on the decline, not only in Poland, but also in Russia and the Baltic States, although sporadic recurrences are to be expected for perhaps a number of winters to come.

For more than a year now, various allied sanitary organizations have been struggling to find a way to eradicate the typhus from Poland. They have spent a good deal of money and a great deal of effort, but my opinion is that, up to the present, except in the way of merely temporary relief, they have ac-

complished little or nothing; and this, as I shall explain, through no fault of their own. The first idea of the American and other foreign experts was to establish a "cordon" behind the army which was fighting the Russians on the eastern front, the theory being that the disease was being brought in principally by refugees, and that if the refugees were isolated the disease could soon be stamped out. But gradually they perceived that, not only the refugees, but a large part of the population were infected. To stamp out typhus in Poland would require nothing short of an army of foreign doctors, nurses and workers. Such an army being out of the question, the experts were obliged to fall back for assistance on the Poles themselves. And here they met two formidable obstacles which, up to the present, it has seemed impossible to overcome: first, the indifference of the Polish government, and, second, the superstition and fatalism of the Polish masses.

This indifference and this fatalism seem to be based largely on the fact that not only typhus but many other forms of human misery are endemic in Poland. The villages are dirty and poor, the towns overcrowded, seeming to consist largely of slums. The following "case," which I copied from the notebook of an American relief worker, is perhaps typical:

"Joseph Zurek, Krochmalna II, Warsaw. Has two children. One miserable, dirty room—no chair, table or cloth. In bed, covered only with straw, woman with new-born babe, both wrapped in dirty rag. Baby crying. Had no milk since born. Man sitting near wife, pale, tired, face hidden in hands. Was porter but got asthma. Woman before child-bed earned few

marks a day, overworked, fell ill. Despair. Mother's dream is buy chemise for baby. Confessed had had no warm food for several weeks. Lived on bits bread and potatoes given by neighbors."

Such dull and long-sustained tragedies being of common occurrence, how should the Poles get excited over them? They are accepted as a matter of course. Is not life itself a tragedy, and death often enough a happy release? So the funerals pass endlessly through the streets of Warsaw; now a hearse with a few people in black walking behind, now a one-horse cart with a lonely woman weeping after; now a lone man trundling the corpse of his wife to the graveyard on a wheelbarrow. The foreign relief workers, dismayed, count the coffins as they go by: eleven in front of one window in the lapse of half an hour, twenty-one in the course of a two-hours walk! But the people of Warsaw look calmly on, unable to understand the indignant alarm of the foreigner at the aspect of death—an alarm which seems to them, perhaps, a bit unchristian, a kind of modern paganism.

In October, 1919, Col. H. L. Gilchrist, head of the American Typhus Mission, presented to the Polish government the following formal recommendations for the extermination of the epidemic: (1) a cordon along the eastern border to isolate infected refugees; (2) a campaign of publicity to educate the inhabitants toward cleaner habits; (3) the establishment of a complete hospital system; (4) the establishment of a complete ambulance service in connection with the hospitals; (5) the organization of a number of disinfection crews to clean up the houses where cases were reported; (6) the installation of bathing and

delousing plants in every community, and the passage of laws, making the use of them obligatory; (7) the establishment of a complete local quarantine wherever necessary; (8) the exaction of an official personal cleanliness certificate with each demand for a railroad ticket. This is probably an ideal program. If carried out it could hardly fail to accomplish its aim. It is no less practical and no more stringent, I am told, than the régimes successfully enforced in some of the American army's sanitary campaigns in Central America, the West Indies and the Philippines. But the Polish government, while wholly approving it in the abstract, has not even begun to carry it out. For Poland has been at war. It has been at war from the first. Between two dangers, that of the typhus epidemic, and that of the hostile "red army," no Pole could be found who would not instantly affirm the latter to be by far the more formidable. Not having enough energy or equipment to fight both simultaneously, the government has felt obliged, for the time being, to let the typhus run its own course. The greater part of the nation's sanitary personnel and equipment being needed for the army, there was not enough left to combat the epidemic. What with the fuel shortage and the transport crisis due to the prolongation of hostilities, most of the time, even the delousing apparatus supplied by foreign initiative has been without coal and is therefore useless. Moreover, the entire Polish administration is so inexperienced, so torn by personal jealousies and lack of coordination, that the few measures which the government has endeavored to enforce have remained dead letters. There is, for example, a decree which makes the scrub-

bing of all railway stations obligatory; but as yet, no hose has been provided to carry a free flow of water, and there are neither brushes nor rags nor soap. The disorganization is such that, in spite of the regulations of the department of hygiene, it is still possible for the railway authorities to unload a train of typhus-infected refugees in the Warsaw station, and an hour later, without the cars having even been so much as swept, send it forth again as a regular passenger train.

But even more favorable to the epidemic than the government's preoccupation with other matters, is the attitude of the people themselves—the crowded population of the slums, the very ones who suffer and die. In vain the foreign workers have endeavored to teach them to bathe; in vain they have been told of the dangers of vermin. There is a time-honored superstition in Poland, among Jews and Christians alike, that body-lice ward off disease. What is the word of a foreigner against the traditional wisdom of one's ancestors? The ordinary common-sense Pole feels nervous, apparently, so long as he has not a few protective lice on his person. Again, the very fact that the government orders them to bathe is sufficient reason for the Poles to evade the order, if they can. For generations, the only government these unhappy people have known has been a government of oppression. For generations, they have been accustomed to suspect a hidden motive of oppression in every edict, and a hostile trap in every decree. They have therefore developed to a high degree the quality of passive resistance, and even knowing that the present government is wholly different from the old, they cannot change their attitude in a day.

In the matter of hygiene, as in the matter of economics, it would appear, then, that the first solution to be sought for is political. The task of cleaning up Poland is too vast for even a combination of foreign agencies to undertake without the help of the Poles themselves. So long as all its energies were occupied by war, the government was incapable of lending real assistance; and after peace is declared, its first care, properly enough, must be to perfect and coordinate the administration, which will be no small undertaking. After that, it may be able to enforce its sanitary regulations and begin the patient work of educating the people out of their harmful superstitions, and into a spirit of confidence toward the government and its decrees. What is true of Poland is true of the Baltic states, the Ukraine and Western Russia.

Apart from typhus, which, as we have seen, is pretty well localized and little likely to spread, the only other maladies which are general in "Balkanized Europe" are tuberculosis and rickets. Both of these affect principally children, and both are due chiefly to malnutrition. I shall accordingly discuss them in connection with the danger of famine, with which they are intimately associated. On the whole, in reviewing the general sanitary situation, one is struck not so much by how bad it is as by how good! After four and a half years of war and blockade, supplemented by two years of dislocation and disorder, one might well expect, in each of these countries, to see a large part of the population dragging itself about in utter misery. There is misery enough, heaven knows. But the miracle is, how quickly the instincts of life and health seem to have covered up the devastations of death and

disease. There are plenty of hopeless cripples, there are widows and orphans unnumbered; yet so completely are these objects of pity in the minority that they seem to be lost in the great masses of sun-burned, toiling peasantry, and active, crowding city folk. I will make one exception—Austria; and in Austria, particularly Vienna. Everywhere else, even in Poland, death is losing the contest. Life is forging doggedly ahead. Since the war there have been an enormous number of marriages. Everywhere the birth-rate is soaring. In Czecho-Slovakia, the death-rate, which had actually doubled during the war, has fallen now to below the pre-war level, and the number of children born exceeds the average of before the war. I cite this example because the Czechs are almost the only people who have succeeded as yet in collecting current vital statistics. From what I have observed, I suspect that similar phenomena are taking place in most of the other countries.

FAMINE

IN the matter of food shortage, as in the matter of epidemics, the crisis appears to have passed, and conditions are improving steadily, if slowly. The worst period was the two last years of the war, with the year 1919. Throughout Central and Eastern Europe, malnutrition was general, and in its train came the inevitable consequences—widespread tuberculosis among adults, tuberculosis and rickets among children. In Warsaw, in 1917, seven hundred and thirty-two persons out of every hundred thousand died of some form of tuberculosis, and in Cracow, nine hundred out of every hundred thousand. Fortunately, most of the numerous cases which still subsist have not reached an acute stage. With proper feeding, the victim, especially the child, recovers his strength. There is a lack of hospitals and sanatoria for the more advanced cases, but in the main, the problem is simply one of food.

At the present time, the peasants nearly everywhere, that is to say, the vast majority of the population, have enough to eat. It is the cities which suffer, partly from ill will on the part of peasants, partly from faulty transportation entailing faulty distribution, and partly from the faulty circulation of money. In the cities the rich need not complain. In even the worst moments, they have always been able to procure whatever they

liked by the contraband of speculators. Of the work-people, those who have employment have generally had substantial increases of wages and can get along; it is those who are jobless, and hence penniless, who go on short rations. The shop-keepers, exacting large profits, have in many cases become the wealthy class of this new era. The people who seem to have suffered most are the former middle-class—lawyers, doctors, teachers, musicians, artists, writers, army officers, officials in government bureaus. These are everywhere the new poor. Earning next to nothing, they sell their rugs, pictures, furniture, jewelry, clothing, to buy food; and their pride is such that until all their little capital is gone they hesitate to take advantage of the charity kitchens which every city now maintains for the needy. In every capital, men and women of eminent families are to be found entirely destitute, inuring themselves to the menial employment which is often the only work they can find. The resultant waste of educated ability is far too great.

An indication of the betterment of the general food situation is the way in which the Child-Feeding Fund of the American Relief Administration has recently restricted its activities. By the winter of 1919-1920 this organization, an outgrowth of Mr. Herbert Hoover's experience in revictualing Belgium and occupied France during the war, was feeding, with admirable skill and economy, hundreds of thousands of children in Finland, Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary, Jugo-Slavia and Austria. The work was suspended in the Baltic states in the spring of 1920. In June it was suspended in Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary and Jugo-Slavia. The only coun-

tries where it has seemed necessary to continue are Poland and Austria. Compared to this really remarkable organization, all other revictualment charities appear insignificant. Its judgment may therefore be taken as decidedly reassuring.

Glancing over the map of Balkanized Europe, and excepting Poland and Austria, of which I shall speak later, and also Russia, where there is said to be famine, but concerning which detailed information is lacking, one arrives at the following observations: Greece, though never self-sufficing, is unusually prosperous this year and well able to purchase its own food. Bulgaria has a big surplus of wheat, and Jugoslavia has both grain and live-stock to export. Roumania has enough wheat for its own needs, and an export of corn. Hungary has a grain surplus. Czechoslovakia lacks bread but abounds in other foods, and has a large enough sugar export to buy as much wheat as it likes. The child-feeding charts, kept by the American Relief Administration, show that in the last months of the extra meal régime, the children in certain parts of Bohemia were developing far above normal in both height and weight. As for the Baltic states, they seem now to be self-sufficing.

In several of the countries mentioned, there are certain inaccessible regions where the people are underfed. Eastern Slovakia and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, whose inhabitants for centuries have been accustomed to receive their food up the river valleys, from the Hungarian plains, are now cut off from this rich granary by an iron-bound frontier. Communications across mountains with Moravia and Bohemia being still very difficult, they do not receive enough to eat. Again, on

parts of the Dalmatian coast, in the mountains of Bosnia and of northern Macedonia, and in Montenegro, certain communities are so isolated that with transport conditions in Jugo-Slavia as disorganized as at present, it is hard for the government to revictual them. At the same time, it must be remembered that neither in Czecho-Slovakia, nor in Jugo-Slavia, is there a real shortage of food. The famine of these isolated communities is a problem of distribution, requiring not so much foreign aid as better administrative measures on the part of the governments concerned.

As with disease, so with famine; the danger is strictly limited. Poland and Austria are the only two countries which need stir the active pity of the foreigner. What with the long war and its continuation in hostilities with Russia, Poland at present is dependent, to a large extent, on imported food, and as the country has, for the time being, no money, and no produce to exchange, it must live on foreign credit. Thus Norway has given twenty-eight million crowns credit in the form of salt herrings, and the United States has made advances of flour and wheat. The American Relief Administration, or its successor, is still, I believe, providing one substantial meal a day for over a million children, and there are other charitable agencies which are active. However, if peace could be made permanent, and the land reform settled, and efficient administration developed, Poland would soon, no doubt, be able to feed itself. Galicia and the so-called "Eastern" districts are normally self-sufficing. Congress, or former Russian, Poland is not; but Posnanian, former German Poland, is one of the richest agricultural regions in Europe. Its surplus ought normally to fill

the deficit of Congress Poland. Both in the latter provinces, and in Galicia, a gradual improvement in the methods of farming ought very nearly to double the present production. In respect of food, the first necessity for Poland is therefore to make a satisfactory peace with Russia, and to get to work at interior reconstruction.

The only state in Europe which can really be said to be overwhelmed by famine is Austria. Even here the country people have enough, but the plight of the cities, and especially of Vienna, with its two million population, is truly heart-rending. Diplomats are not noted, as a rule, for sentimentality, but I know one who told me that if he thought he would have to witness such sights of misery this winter as last he would resign his post. No visitor, I think, could penetrate a little into the life of this unhappy city without being appalled. For six years now the people have been gradually cutting down their rations until they seem actually to have lost their appetites. They are no longer hungry. They seem to arise satisfied from a meal which would not fill half the modest requirements of a normal person. And their half-starved condition expresses itself, not in food-riots—they have not enough energy for that—but in the kind of listlessness and despair which seems to leave them all but indifferent to their own fate. Considering three units as the normal daily food requirement of a normal person, the government provides the equivalent of one and a half units to all citizens at a low price. For the other unit and a half, the Viennese must devise as best they can. There is no doubt that the children have been absolutely saved by the American Relief Administra-

tion. Estimating that there were 240,000 school children in Vienna before the war, it may be said that 40,000 have been moved away, and 40,000 more have been given temporary hospitality in Italy and other charitable countries. Of the remaining 160,000, there are perhaps 10,000 which do not need aid. The other 150,000 are all being fed by the American Relief Administration, or by its recent successor, which was to have been the Society of Friends.

If you ask the Austrians what is the cause of the famine, they will tell you that it is due to the peace treaty, which cuts them off from their natural food supplies in Hungary and Jugo-Slavia, and condemns them to death by slow starvation. I am glad to say that I cannot entirely accept this bitter explanation. The truth seems to be that Austria, even as now constituted, could come very near to feeding itself if it would. Austria, unfortunately, is at present in complete dissolution. Its people are listless and hopeless, its government is inefficient. There is perhaps even more food in the country than there is thought to be; for so bitter is the opposition of the conservative Roman Catholic peasants to the socialist government that they refuse to send in food to "red" Vienna, preferring to hide it away. Moreover, the government, in requisitioning their grain, pays them so low a price that they are angry and discouraged and inclined to cease producing. A competent American official has proved to me, on a basis of pre-war statistics, that Austria, instead of supplying barely forty per cent. of its own food, as at present, could, if it only would, produce eighty to ninety per cent. The remainder could be purchased in exchange for the products of its fac-

tories. In short, even the present Austria can live if it really wants to. It must indeed be fed on credit, or charity, for some time to come. But the principal thing is to persuade it, and help it, to establish a stable government which has the confidence of all the people. The peasants must be paid properly for their food stuffs, and encouraged to produce. And the factories must be put in a way to obtain raw materials. But even these measures will remain without effect, so long as the people themselves remain convinced, as now, that whatever their effort, it will prove to be vain. The first necessity is the restoration of confidence.

The observations which apply to Poland and Austria in particular apply as well to "Balkanized Europe" as a whole. Some of the countries are not and never will be self-feeding, others ought to produce a surplus; and the surplus of the latter ought easily to equal the deficit of the former. If all goes well, Poland and the Baltic States gradually should be able to supply their own needs. Czecho-Slovakia will have to exchange sugar, Austria will have to exchange manufactured goods, and Greece will have to exchange shipping facilities, for grain. Hungary, Roumania, Jugo-Slavia and Bulgaria should be able to export considerable quantities of food. At the present time the existing surpluses—amounting to many thousands of carloads of grain in Hungary, Jugo-Slavia and Bulgaria—cannot be fully utilized, owing to administrative inefficiency and the lack of rolling-stock. Once more, it is clear that a general political solution must precede the specific economic solution.

3

THE AMERICAN ERROR

WHEN American representatives, soon after the armistice, made their way into Central Europe, and reported their findings, it was quickly realized that the task of reconstruction was so enormous that without allied help it might drag interminably, thereby delaying the return of that genuine peace for which the world was sighing. The American who showed most vision in the matter was Mr. Herbert Hoover, though it must be said that he had the sympathetic support of the President, and of the President's chief adviser, Col. E. M. House. Mr. Hoover organized the Child-Feeding Fund of the American Relief Administration. He furthermore persuaded the Czech, Polish, Jugo-Slav and Austrian governments to allow the American government unofficially to place missions of American railroad experts at their disposition. The places which fell to the United States on the various allied plebiscite and surveillance commissions were filled largely by technicians. A special American army typhus mission was sent to Poland. Col. House had the Navy organize a system of private telegraph wires from various Central European capitals to Paris, thereby restoring transcontinental communications. Finally, on the initiative, I believe, of Mr. H. P. Davison, the American Red Cross organized and even financed the allied League of Red Cross Societies, in conjunction with the

League of Nations, and its agents invaded every region of Europe, reporting conditions and distributing food, clothing and medical supplies. On the whole, it is a record of generous effort to be proud of; no other nation could have done so much; no other nation even attempted such vast programmes.

If I have analyzed correctly the mind of the administration and its advisers, this American effort may be said to have had three purposes: The first was humanitarian. A large part of Europe was perishing of famine and disease. The war being over, these miserable populations, especially the children, made dumb but eloquent appeal to the responsive American heart, which felt that they must be cared for whatever the cost. The second purpose was technical. Fresh from their brilliant achievement in the war, our administrators and engineers felt confident of their ability to restore the arteries of exchange, on which peace, and the health of Europe, may be said to depend. The third purpose was psychological. The administration saw correctly that the great obstacle to reconstruction was the prolongation, after the end of hostilities, of the war mentality. It was felt that by a display of responsive and whole-hearted kindness to the vanquished this morbid mentality could be allayed, and the way opened to a spirit of genuine peace.

In the light of the diagnosis of Europe's ills which I have tried to give in the foregoing pages, it is both interesting and instructive to inquire how far the three purposes envisaged by the American government were actually achieved. The humanitarian effort was a magnificent success, which has moved and has aroused the admiration of all competent foreign observers. "Your

country," said a French diplomat to me, "has literally saved the city of Vienna. It is one of the finest achievements in history." Sincere panegyrics have poured in from every side. One could give a long list of them. But the essential fact is that in its humanitarian aspect the American effort left nothing to be desired.

The success of our technical programme is more dubious. On the material side our experts were quick to grasp the fundamentals of the situation, and their specific recommendations were undoubtedly excellent. In many ways, they have probably accomplished much good. Nevertheless, I am afraid that in their main purpose they have been a failure. In the face of merely material obstacles the American mind is in its element. But fully as important as the material obstacles which our missions encountered were the political obstacles. And here the American mind showed itself to be almost wholly at sea. Whether in Jugoslavia, or in Siberia, the story is the same. The aims of our engineers were largely frustrated by purely political interventions which they themselves had never expected, and with which they were not trained to deal. Even the Navy's wire service was continually hampered by jealous or sinister political interference.

As for our psychological effort, it has probably been the least successful of all. When one hears the children of Vienna or Warsaw cheering America's name, one's breast fills with pride. But it is to be feared that the impulsive gratitude of the children by no means expresses the complex sentiment of Pole or Austrian regarding America. Not only has American generosity failed in the perhaps impossible task of reconciling the various peoples among themselves; it has not

even, so far as I have been able to judge, increased the popular prestige of America. I found many American relief workers disillusioned and somewhat bitter because of the lack of appreciation which they seemed to sense in their foreign environment. Too often, this atmosphere may have been due largely to a certain lack of tact on the part of some Americans. At the same time, the question arises imperiously whether the average European really looks upon life in the same way the average American does. Of our standard of comfort and general well-being, the European has no conception. He seems to be less affected by material misery. It is difficult to interest him in material reforms. On the other hand, he responds far more quickly than does the American to purely political considerations, which, in some countries at least, are as the breath of his life. I feel absolutely sure, for example, that there are peoples in "Balkanized Europe" who have not had so much as an inkling of understanding of what American charity is really about. Unable, in most cases, to assign to it a hidden political motive, they have apparently put it down as a kind of strange but probably harmless mania. "If America," they seem to say with a shrug of the shoulders, "wants to go on feeding and doctoring all these poor folks and refugees, why should we make objections?" Yet at bottom, in almost every event, I am convinced that they would far rather have had our political support than our material aid. The defeated states have not entirely forgiven America for not having insisted upon the kind of peace which they had been led to expect would be accorded them. Even in Austria, which owes us so much, there is a sentiment among more intelligent people that if the same amount

of money that has been spent on food had been given the country in the form of fuel and raw stuffs for its industries, it might now have become almost self-supporting, instead of having still to be "spoon-fed." The smaller allies, as well, with the possible exception of Czecho-Slovakia, all have their petty grievances against us. The Greeks and Jugo-Slavs suspect us of being "Bulgarophile"—in their eyes just cause for every sort of suspicion. The Roumanians feel that we were most unsympathetic with them in their invasion of Hungary in the spring of 1919, and they are surely against the American oil interests which are installed in their country. The Poles, while they are no doubt grateful for our food, cannot understand why we should be, as they think, "pro-Jewish," or why we have never given them greater material aid in what they regard as their noble and chivalrous crusade against the world-danger of bolshevism. As for our excitement over the typhus epidemic, it perplexes, and I sometimes think, annoys them a little. These are of course not sufficient reasons to make us regret our effort, whose humane accomplishment is properly its own reward; nevertheless they may well give us pause.

I attended a luncheon in Paris last spring at which I heard Mr. Henry P. Davison say, in the course of a speech on the work of the Red Cross, that this work must be kept clear of all political considerations, and must be carried on for its own sake; there is too much politics in Europe, he said; and added that peace will come, not through politics, but through the eradication of epidemics and famine, and the restoration of normal economic relations. This attitude betrays what seems to me a serious error in American thinking. We

are prone to regard "European politics" as a futile, complicated, troublesome kind of nonsense by which large numbers of otherwise sensible people are incomprehensibly obsessed. If they would only forget politics and go to work, we feel, then all would be well. But European politics—unfortunately, it may be—can no more be obliterated by a mere impatient wave of the hand than can American politics. Our prejudice seems not so much to extend to domestic politics, in which we have had ample experience, as to international politics, into whose mysteries our happy circumstances have not heretofore driven us to initiate ourselves. Our incomprehension of European politics is the real explanation of our lack of success in two of the three aims of our European reconstruction programme. It is no use proposing an exchange of rolling-stock between countries which hate each other. However clearly the material benefit in such an exchange may be proved to them, they will still refuse, from psychological impulses. What must first be found is a formula which will mollify their hate. In the same way, while it is a laudable thing to extend assistance to typhus ridden refugees, how much more charitable to strive to find that political solution which would stop the flow of refugees altogether, by removing the causes which make them leave their homes. Those Austrians are doubtless right who argue that the only sure stay for the famine which is sapping their country's strength would be a decision settling once for all the country's political future, instead of leaving it indefinitely in suspense as at present. The true relief-worker, then, is that statesman who will devise means of curing these peoples of their morbid mentality. Only when their minds have

been cleared of the fumes of war will they be really receptive to ideas of economic and sanitary reconstruction. And so long as Americans, indifferent to, or impatient of, what they hold to be "minor political considerations," continue to make to Europeans proposals which, however excellent in themselves, are nevertheless psychologically, that is politically, impossible, just so long will the American seem to the European a being good-hearted, no doubt, and well-intentioned, but naïve—an ardent, impulsive and idealistic youth among sober and disillusioned men of the world.

BOLSHEVISM

THE latest synonym for revolution and internal disorder is Bolshevism. Of all the various social transformations which are being urged, this is the most violent and the most extreme. It is, in a sense, the pacemaker for other advanced reforms. An inquiry into its real nature seems therefore indicated, before attempting to answer the question of how far it may be expected to spread.

There is no longer any mystery about Bolshevism. A good many journalists, a good many foreign delegations and more or less disinterested individuals have visited soviet Russia. Besides, the mass of soviet literature at the disposition of the foreign student has been continually increasing, and while there is profound disagreement as to the significance of the facts, these facts themselves are no longer greatly disputed.

The Kerensky, or democratic, revolution in Russia, made possible by war fatigue and the consequent defeat and disintegration of the army, failed to remain in power because the country was obviously not ready for democracy. What was needed was a strong hand, and this is precisely what was supplied by the Bolshevik leaders. But instead of using their power for the immediate good of the entire commonwealth, they exercised it solely in the interest of the workmen. The town and city populations looked on apathetically while the Bolsheviks were organizing their forces.

The peasants, intent solely on gaining possession of the land, began by supporting the soviets. But by the time the great bulk of the people, both rural and urban, awakened to what had really happened, it was too late. The "dictatorship of the proletariat" was firmly established, and was showing every intention of maintaining itself by force.

The soviet leaders were doctrinaire to the core. Their original intention was to institute a régime of complete communism, wherein all private commerce should be suppressed, and the state itself should be direct purveyor to the wants of every individual. To prevent any possible reaction, they set out cold-bloodedly to destroy the last shadow of intellectual and aristocratic Russia, suppressing free speech, grinding down the upper class and coddling their own supporters. The administration and operation of such industries as subsisted fell into the hands of the councils of workmen. On its destructive side, the Bolshevik programme has proved a triumph. Intellectual and aristocratic Russia is almost completely scattered, in exile or in death. But in its constructive aspects, being discordant with some of the deepest human instincts, it has collapsed totally. The peasants, after securing possession of the land, refused to surrender it again for communistic or any other purposes. The attempt to overcome this resistance by setting the poorer against the richer peasants was abortive. The effort of ignorant workmen to preside over the complex factory organisms ended farcically, tragically, in the paralysis of industrial life. The retail shops remained closed, but the people continued nevertheless to trade

clandestinely. Shameless speculation replaced the ordinary food traffic, and the government, finding itself incapable of supplying the townspeople with even a third of the normal ration, could not but close an eye to the efforts of the starving people to find their food by forbidden devices. Forced thus to adopt a spirit of practical opportunism, the leaders were gradually obliged to postpone the pure application of doctrine. In order to defend the régime against its enemies, it was necessary to keep the railways going, and to start up the munition factories. The technicians essential to these enterprises were enticed back into service by the promise of large emoluments of goods and privileges. As the workmen proved reluctant to accept the return of the old system, they were mobilized by force on the pretext that the revolution was in danger, and made to work willy-nilly. Against the growing opposition of the peasants, who form over eighty per cent. of the population, and of the workmen themselves, who objected to the iron discipline imposed upon them, the leaders turned to the ruthless mechanism of an iron terror. The old Czarist secret police have entered the employ of the new régime. The spy system is even more extensive than under the empire. Whoever is suspected of opposing Bolshevism is imprisoned or executed. The world has seldom witnessed a more complete autocracy. Aside from a few fanatics and opportunist profiteers, almost the only popular support the régime has been able to enlist, outside its police and its regiments of mercenaries, is that of a few Russian patriots, who feel that much as they may dislike Bolshevism, it is nevertheless performing a

useful service in defending Russia's territorial integrity against foreign encroachments.

Even the Bolsheviks now admit these things. I have before me the text of an interview dated Prague, October 1, 1920, between my careful and reliable friend, L. Weiss, editor of a liberal French review, and Mr. Gillerson, chief of the Russian soviet propaganda for Central Europe.

"According to my information," my friend began, "the Russian peasants who, since the decline of the towns, represent ninety-five per cent. of the population of your country, are absolutely anti-communist in tendency, and are opposed to the present Moscow régime."

"That is so," admitted Gillerson. "The peasants have shown themselves to be blackly ungrateful. We gave them the land, and now that they have it they no longer wish to make any sacrifice for the triumph of the ideas to which they owe their well-being."

"But how can you go on governing without their support?"

"We will force them to accept our doctrine."

"You will not succeed."

"Yes, we will."

"There is no sign of it."

"Not yet. But the peasants will soon understand."

"That is your faith?"

"Yes; that is our faith."

"If I am correctly informed," continued my friend, "neither the freedom of the press nor any other freedom now exists in Russia. The only opposition organ which appears is an anarchist sheet which is even more extreme than Lenin, and which is very useful to

you, as a kind of bugaboo. Therefore, interdiction of free criticism, interdiction of personal judgment, prison, an intellectual prison for everybody!"

"That is so," said Gillerson.

"But is not this singularly opposed to the doctrines of Marx?"

"I do not deny it."

"Well, then?"

"To attain the ideal aim which we have set ourselves, by means of revolution—the only means which conform to present necessities—we have been obliged to adopt war measures. The present period is one of transition during which all measures, even the most draconian, are justified, like martial law during a state of siege."

"If I, or an inhabitant of Moscow, should venture to express a contrary opinion?"

"We would not tolerate it."

"By what right?"

"By right of our convictions."

"And pending the realization of the paradise which you promise, the Russian proletariat are dying of poverty and disease."

"That is so," admitted Gillerson again. "The birth of our revolution will have taken place under the most frightful material conditions. Corruption is rife. Famine continues its ravages. But we are only at the beginning of our experiments. Soon things will change. Some credit must be opened for the future happiness of humanity."

"The death of thousands of your people is a terrible responsibility."

"Responsibility does not frighten us. We shall tri-

umph, because we stand for justice and happiness for the greater number."

If I have properly understood the official doctrine, as now modified, it is that while pure communism is the ideal, its realization must be postponed temporarily, partly because of foreign military attacks, partly because the proletariat itself does not seem to understand its own interests. With the present generation there is little to be done. The hope of communism is in the children. But pending the period of one generation necessary to raise up a new young Russia steeped in the true doctrine, a dictatorship, in the strict sense of the word, must be maintained, which will govern by force, and in trust, as it were, for the communists of the future, who will no longer be a small minority, but the entire population; and in that day, Bolshevism will have become as completely democratic as it is now undemocratic.

At the same time, it is felt that soviet Russia, being the avowed enemy of private property, all states in which the property ideal subsists will necessarily be the enemies of Russian bolshevism. Accepting this as inevitable, the Bolshevik leaders from the first have preferred boldly to carry the war into the enemy's camp by means of propaganda, declaring that only by world revolution can capitalism be destroyed and the emancipation of the proletariat be realized, and calling upon the workers to follow the Russian example. They are recommended to seize the power by force, and to have no fear of bloodshed in so good a cause; to arm the proletariat and to disarm everybody else; to establish a dictatorship on the Russian model, and begin the education of the new generation in the com-

munist ideal. The propaganda offensive, financed from the old Russian and Roumanian gold reserve, and by the sale of confiscated jewels, has been, on the whole, amazingly effective. While it had in its favor the upheaval and mental disturbance caused by the war, nevertheless the odds of common sense against it were tremendous. Yet it has succeeded in troubling the whole world.

Such, summarily described, is Bolshevism. With something like nine-tenths of the population opposed to it, it nevertheless subsists, thanks to what the Italian socialist, Serrati, has euphemistically called "the Russian's natural inclination for the contemplative life"—in other words, his lack of organizing ability, and his extraordinary apathy. But it will not, cannot, in my opinion, last indefinitely. Sooner or later, if not this year, then next year, or in five years, by one means or another, it will be brought to an end, and one more of man's fond impossible dreams will have been shattered under the pressure of realities. There are three possibilities. Pursuing the policy of opportunism, already begun, Bolshevism may gradually evolve into an ordinary democratic government, remaining communistic in name only. Or, developing rather in the nationalistic sense, it may grow into a kind of Napoleonic militarist empire. Or, finally, it may be overthrown by force—a revolt in the army, a strong regional uprising, the hand of the assassin—who knows? I myself consider its overthrow by force to be the most probable.

In any case, it will be immensely interesting, after the dust and the blood and the glamor have cleared away, to observe just what are the real transformations which Bolshevism has wrought in Russian society.

For with this, as with other great revolutionary movements, it may well be that the actual results will bear little or no resemblance to the avowed intentions. Even now it may perhaps be permitted to indulge in speculations on this fascinating theme. Before the revolution, Russia was a country consisting roughly of only two classes, an aristocracy of nobles, landed proprietors, government officials, intellectuals; and a lower class of disinherited peasants and of workmen who were themselves half peasant. The peasants lived in communities still under the influence of a kind of tribal communism. At the present time, all this has changed. The aristocracy has been destroyed, root and branch. The peasants, abandoning their primitive communism, have divided the land between them and each is jealously defending his own holdings, sometimes even by force of arms. This newly quickened instinct of property, coupled with the terror under its various forms, has called out, seemingly, in the Russian character, a sense of initiative and self-reliance hitherto latent. At the same time, workmen, deserting the factories and taking their tools with them, have set up small shops for themselves, back in their own villages. In a word, for the first time in Russian history, one sees the germs appear of a genuine middle-class. What a curious paradox, if it should turn out in the end that the Bolsheviks, intending to establish communism, have destroyed its last vestiges; intending to destroy the sense of property, have established it; and by destroying the aristocracy at the same time that they awaken in the masses a sentiment of individualism and ambition, have opened the way for the rise of a true middle-class, in the western sense of the word!

THE NIGHTMARE

A DISTURBANCE of the magnitude of the war could not but have shaken the social structure of western civilization. Long after the storm has passed, the awakened waves growl and thunder on the beach. There is profound discontent, both of individuals and of groups. Having put in five years acquiring the art of butchery and the comradeship of death, men no longer hesitate as before at the thought of violence. Except with a few strong natures, military life tends to lower moral standards. In particular, the soldier is apt to lose the sense of property, the sense of other's rights, and the habit of industry. Even the ordinary chronic discontent of the ordinary individual is therefore more dangerous than heretofore. In the course of hostilities, governments, desiring to strengthen the morale of the civil and military population, indulged in much fine rhetoric, and made vast vague promises of a better world to come. The governments, engrossed in more immediate affairs, have forgotten these promises, whose purpose has now been served; but the people have not. Finding life to be harder instead of easier than before, their confidence in those who lead them is perilously strained. Moreover, when the struggle was at its height, and the supreme sacrifice was demanded continually of all classes in concert, each class consoled itself by the thought that this

sacrifice would justify it in demanding the realization of its own particular political program as soon as the war should be over. "Our dead cry out!" they say. But even the dead are human, and seem not to agree among themselves. The great and brutal god of circumstance, impoverishing and ruining thousands through no fault of their own, has raised other thousands almost without their personal effort to a new affluence; thus still another factor is introduced of jealousy and hatred. Finally, having passed unscathed through the valley of death, men have emerged at last, not purified, as some might have supposed, but energized by a ruthless individualism. The time has come, each seems to think, to reap the reward of his sufferings and sacrifices. Cash in! cash in! And devil take the hindermost!

To this individual anarchy must be added, so far, at least, as a large part of "Balkanized Europe" is concerned, a kind of political anarchy. Bulgaria, where the peasants have seized the power, is the only state whose government is solidly based upon the support of an absolute majority. In all the others, no single party being effectively predominant, "coalition" or "concentration" ministries have been formed, whose chief concern is to keep the support of numerous shifting groups, and which, in most instances, are about as instable as clouds, one combination following another with perplexing rapidity. The cohesion of conflicting groups into two or three well organized parties is a sign of political maturity not yet revealed in these regions. On the contrary, even the numerous existing groups seem to be continually splitting apart, under the impulse of bitter struggles for party-leadership which

tend even, at times, to place questions of personality above questions of national interest. In Poland, all the old pre-war parties of German, Austrian and Russian Poland still exist, and still others have sprung up—about twenty in all. In Czecho-Slovakia there are almost as many. Austria boasts about a dozen, Jugoslavia fifteen, and Hungary six or eight. The so-called "people's treaty," led by General Avarescu, has indeed an absolute majority among the ten or twelve Roumanian parties, but it is so new, so inchoate, that in the interests of the country, the leaders of the two chief opposition parties, Take Jonesco and Jean Brătianu, have consented to participate in the ministry, which thus acquires at least a temporary stability. In Greece, party politics may almost be said to be the national sport. All this internal confusion is ill calculated to develop social strength.

Sown in this harrowed soil, the propaganda of Bolshevik revolution seemed destined, not long since, to germinate with fierce energy. The fact that governments were against it was sufficient reason for many people, workmen and intellectuals alike, to give it their favor, before they had even so much as tried to analyze what it might mean. In consequence, there spread through the circles of power and responsibility a great fear. The peace conference itself was chilled and enervated by the fear of Bolshevism, and this fear is not yet dead.

But in my opinion, Bolshevism is not going to spread. Conditions have changed within the last year. The worst of the unrest and indolence is over; people are gradually settling down, even in the countries ruined by defeat. Moreover, much to its disad-

vantage, Bolshevism has lost its glamor of mystery. Men have begun to consider it not as at first, in its merely destructive aspect, as the easiest instrument of menace and opposition to established power which came to hand, but in its constructive pretensions. And many there are now who ask themselves if, after all, even the present régime, with all its faults, is not preferable to the bloodshed and utter destruction which seem the necessary prelude to the soviet utopia. For the present generation, it is small consolation to be told that those who shall come after will be happier. What they want is to be happy themselves, and besides, that song about the happy future no longer thrills the auditor. It has an old familiar ring. Even the socialists and labor delegates who have lately visited Russia have returned more or less disillusioned, some frankly hostile to Bolshevism, which they say is the negation of true socialism; some as its apologists, though as such, lame enough. The recent effort of the Russian leaders, under cover of the so-called third, or Moscow, Internationale, to dictate to the labor federations of the world how they shall act, and under what conditions, has pretty well succeeded in turning even the workpeople away from the Moscow mirage. There remains as its apostles only the smaller number of fanatics and fiery visionaries who in each country are banded together under the name of "communist party," and who form, in most cases, a noisy but impotent majority.

But even in Russia, it may be pointed out, the communists have never been more than a handful, yet they are firmly ensconced in power. To this I would reply that the conditions in Russia—anarchy, indif-

ference, absence of organized opposition—which enabled the communists to seize and consolidate the power of government, were entirely exceptional, and will not recur elsewhere. The apathy of the Russian masses is not comparable to the spirit of the more truly occidental peoples. Suppose that among these peoples the communist minority should attempt a coup d'état. The defenders of the existing régime would instantly rally their forces. There would be civil war, which in every case, as nearly as I am able to judge, would end in the defeat of the communists.

Survey the countries of Europe. There is still great unrest. There is a wave of true social and political reform of which I shall have occasion to speak all in good time. But it is difficult to descry a single state which offers elements promising durable success to Bolshevik tentatives—that is, to the forcible seizure of power, the arming of the proletariat, the disarming of everyone else, the destruction of the upper and middle classes, and the exercise of a dictatorship of terror pending the conversion of a majority to the communist doctrine.

Consider first Poland. The proletariat here consists of workmen and the poorer Jewish element. There are a few communists among the former, but on the whole, the Polish workman may be reckoned among the most docile in Europe. As for the Jews their sympathies may well be Bolshevik. Obligated under Czarism to dwell outside the pale, that is, west of the river Dnieper, intelligent, visionary, unhappy and oppressed, they absorbed extreme ideas out of Germany like so much blotting paper. Indeed, it may be said that it was through the Jews, living as they did near

the German border, that socialism first penetrated into Russia. The "eastern front," again, lay beyond the pale, in the midst of the Jewish districts, and the Jews, by this environment, may have contributed to the moral collapse of the Russian armies. But even if the Jews desired to attempt communism in Poland, they would be crushed, for the entire country is bitterly hostile to them, and the very fact that the Jews are suspected of favoring it is sufficient to render it repugnant to the Poles. The tenets of the Roman Catholic religion are incompatible with Bolshevism. The Poles are not only fervent Catholics, they are ardent patriots. Bolshevism to them means simply a Russian army which tried to overwhelm them, and very nearly succeeded. It is the "hereditary enemy" disguised in a social formula. Seventy-five per cent. of the Polish people are peasants, and the delay in effecting the much-needed, oft-promised land reform has disaffected them to a certain extent. But their patriotism, their religion, their distrust of the Jews, and their hatred of the Russians, are stronger than their temporary disaffection. Socially, Poland is safe.

To Roumania, as to Poland, Bolshevism signifies two dangers—one, an internal disturbance; the other, an external attack by an army of Russians desiring, as the Roumanians imagine, to reconquer Bessarabia. In both these forms, Bolshevism may be said to be at present the government's chief preoccupation. Broadly speaking, there are only two classes in Roumania, the wealthy landowners and the peasants. The former are of course conservative. The latter, under the influence of soviet propaganda, might have become menacing, though they are an easy-going people; but

the land-reform, which is now being carried out, has effectively precluded this eventuality. There remains only the small group of genuine communists who continue to agitate in Bucharest. The police are vigilant. They have caught numerous Bolshevist agents carrying both gold and propaganda. Some of this latter was printed in Seventh Avenue, New York, and was brought over by returning emigrants. Raids on communist headquarters have discovered a considerable correspondence with Moscow, and, ironically enough, a store of that same gold reserve which the Roumanians, during the war, at the allies' suggestion, had sent to Russia for safety. In short, there is sufficient evidence of conspiracy to arouse the whole country; and a good part of the Roumanian army is still mobilized along the eastern frontier, in case of an armed attack by the soviets. Roumania, like Poland, might possibly go Bolshevist by conquest, but never otherwise, and not without a hard fight.

As for Germany, it may truthfully pose as the real instigator of Bolshevism in Russia. The veteran Russian socialist, Bourtseff, who is something of an expert in matters of the kind, declares that from 1914 on, the Kaiser's imperial government paid Lenin personally more than seventy million marks to make Bolshevist propaganda in Switzerland and Russia for the purpose of sapping the Russian morale. When the Russian revolution came, the German government sent him from Switzerland to Russia in a special train. And Ludendorff, who knows full well his country's part in the affair, wrote in his memoirs not long after: "Although the soviet government exists only thanks to us, we can expect nothing from it. . . . The Bolsheviks

must recognize in us now, as before, their absolute master, and must do our bidding." But Lenin and his fellow-dictators are no longer under German tutelage. The reich, at the present time, is in the anomalous position of having to struggle vigorously against internal Bolshevism while remaining friendly with external, and particularly with Russian, Bolshevism. In Germany's highly developed industrial regions like the Ruhr basin, there are many communist groups whose activities are facilitated by the prevalent conditions of poverty and want. Opposed to these are the conservative agriculturists of Bavaria and East Prussia. Both factions are militant, both determined; but though the present evolution seems to be away from the moderate middle position toward one or the other of the extremes, there are still apparently enough moderates to keep the balance, and prevent either faction from seizing complete control. The combination of conservatives and moderates was sufficient to put down the Ruhr communist uprising of April, 1920, without great difficulty; and a possible combination of communists and moderates seems to be a sufficient guarantee against tentatives of violent junker reaction. It is possible that, as time goes on, if Germany's economic situation continues critical, the moderates will incline more and more to take sides, until there remain only the two extremist parties, who would sooner or later have to fight out the issue between themselves. But as a communist success would almost certainly mean the secession of Bavaria, and after Bavaria, of the Rhineland, entailing thus the disintegration of the reich, it seems likely that the good sense of all the leaders will restrain them from precipitating this redoubtable contest.

There may be, there probably will be, further outbreaks of both sorts of extremists; but the chances are that they will be localized and will quickly burn themselves out.

The question is complicated, however, by Germany's foreign policy. Russia is Germany's one great hope—any Russia, soviet or reactionary, so long, that is, as this Russia remains aloof from, or inimical to, the Entente. For Germany, Russia is at once a vast and much-needed market, a field for future emigration and colonization, and a natural political support against the whole Versailles Treaty, and particularly against Poland. When the Reds were at the gates of Warsaw, in August, 1920, the German government actually considered, and has admitted that it considered, throwing in its lot, militarily, with the Russians. Counsels of prudence, luckily for the reich, carried the day. But the idea of essaying a period of temporary Bolshevism, in the hope of provoking internal disorders in the countries of the Entente, and thus forcing a revision of the Treaty, still haunts the minds even of the junkers. If they could be sure of folding up their false Bolshevism and putting it away after it had served its purpose, doubtless they would try it. But nothing is less sure. There are enough real communists in Germany to make it exceedingly difficult to dislodge them, once they had got into power. The whole country might be ruined in the course of this dangerous gamble. And if still further argument against attempting it be needed, there is the example of Hungary.

In order to escape from the fatal dismemberment looming before the country, and thinking perhaps, that

in conservative Hungary a spell of Bolshevism would be harmless enough, the interim government of Count Michael Karolyi naïvely turned over the state, in the spring of 1919, to a group of Hungarian communists, the chief of whom, Bela Kun, had been trained in Russia, under Lenin. They armed the proletariat, disarmed all other people, nationalized the banks, factories, and even the retail stores, imprisoned or executed their political opponents, and organized a "terror" on the Russian model. Hungary was perhaps the belligerent state which had suffered least during the war. The people still had plenty of food. But under Bolshevism everything went swiftly to pieces. Famine pinched the city populations, and the peasants lapsed into sullen resistance. The war had cost Hungary eight million crowns a day; the Bolsheviks soon ran up expenses to sixty-eight million crowns a day. The Roumanians, seeking to avenge the invasion of their territory by the Germans, Austrians and Hungarians during the war, attacked the Hungarian communists, defeated the undisciplined "red" army, entered Budapest, overthrew the régime and sacked the whole country. One hundred and thirty-two days of communism cost Hungary ten billion crowns, of which the "red guards" had received five hundred and fourteen millions, and the "red army" three thousand three hundred and seven millions. Where the present government spends forty-eight millions a month, the soviets had been spending one hundred and forty-four millions. From a condition of relative affluence, Hungary had plunged with dizzying speed into a condition of utter misery. Without communism, the Roumanian invasion would have been impossible. What the one

began, the other finished. Count Michael Karolyi's ingenuous expedient not only failed to stave off the dismemberment, it completely ruined the country. There is not one Hungarian who does not realize this fact. In consequence, Hungary is to-day, without any doubt, the most reactionary country in Europe. Ninetenths of the people are royalists. Even the small group of Hungarian socialists have hastily switched back out of the Third, or Moscow, Internationale, into the moderate Second, or Amsterdam, Internationale. So strong is the feeling of the Hungarians in the matter that they would ask nothing better than an opportunity to fight any communists they might happen to find, Russian or otherwise. Karolyi is hated in Hungary almost as much as Bela Kun. Both are now refugees living in exile.

In sharp contrast with Hungary is Austria, which immediately after the armistice set up a half communistic government which was only partially modified after the recent election. But this government never had any real authority. Its edicts were simply ignored. There was a "minister of socialization," but nothing much was "socialized." In the Vienna region, it is true, every industrial plant with more than twenty workmen had a shop council, which elected a delegate to the central workmen's council, which in turn was very influential with the government. But the provinces refused to permit the establishment of shop councils or to obey Vienna in any respect. All the peasants and the majority of the townspeople were opposed to the quasi-communist régime. They tolerated it from apathy induced by famine and despair, and their present trend is away from this vague radicalism. Mean-

while the Austrian government is to all intents helpless, apparently, for either good or evil.

Czecho-Slovakia, liberal, socialistic and democratic, sympathizes warmly with Russia, but for reasons of race affinity and foreign policy rather than for social reasons. There is in the country a small and noisy group of communists, but as there is no aristocracy, and almost no reaction, and as the government and the majority of the people are already strongly committed to revolutionary socialism, these communists have, so to speak, no fulcrum for their lever. The Czechs are not a revolutionary people. Their minds are steady, slow and cautious. Their resources are rich, they are visibly prospering and I do not expect to see them tempted into hazardous experiments of any kind.

Jugo-Slavia is a peasant democracy. Strictly speaking, there is here no "proletariat." The peasants, who form eighty per cent. of the population, are nearly all land-owners. It is true that in the recent elections the "communist" party carried several cities, including Belgrade; but these "communists" are simply government employees—railwaymen, postmen, clerks—who seek thus to express their resentment against an administration which does not pay them a living wage. The movement is protestatory, not revolutionary. Increase their stipend to a reasonable figure and their "communism" will vanish. The new "peasants' party," organized by Mr. Mika Avramovitch, after the Bulgarian model, is perhaps more significant, but as the peasants here are not as yet class-conscious, it has made little headway.

In Bulgaria, which is also a democracy of small land-owners, the peasants, exasperated at their defeat in

two wars under the leadership of a czar and of professional statesmen, have taken things into their own hands, and have formed a government of their own, without, however, expelling their figurehead of a young new czar. The Russian soviet leaders had been confident that Bulgaria, in the bitterness of its defeat and amputation, would go communist. A communist party, consisting of poor peasants, poor or discharged government employees, and other malcontents, was encouraged and subsidized. The party felt itself to be strong, but instead of attempting a coup d'état in the prescribed Bolshevist manner, it presented itself at the elections last spring, and seated forty-two deputies in the sobranje, the national parliament, out of a total of about two hundred and ten. Such communists, who consent to sit as a powerless minority in a regular parliament, are obviously not very dangerous. It is, as I have said, the peasants' party which has the absolute majority. This party is initiating a number of rather socialistic experiments, but the peasants' pride in land-ownership is so deep that the principle of private property in Bulgaria may be considered relatively safe.

Greece, the remaining Balkan state, is socially as sound as a bell. If there is to be any serious internal trouble here, which is not likely, it will be of a strictly political character.

To complete this rapid survey, the relation of France, Britain and Italy to a possible Bolshevist uprising should perhaps now be considered, for a revolution in any one of these states would exert a disturbing influence throughout Europe.

The French socialist party is revolutionary and communistic, but in becoming so it has lost all its former

prestige. It used to lead the labor movement. But since the war this movement has detached itself from socialism as being a political rather than an economic doctrine, and hence unacceptable for the trades unions. Without the support of labor, the socialists can do nothing, and labor, in its last annual congress, October, 1920, has again pronounced itself, by a three-fourths majority, in favor of evolutionary rather than revolutionary methods, and against the Moscow "Internationale." Not only is the French middle-class strong and combative, but the rural population, which forms from sixty to seventy per cent. of the total, is in the main conservative and ardently devoted to the principle of private property. In short, France, solidly settled in its liberal democratic republicanism, appears as a citadel of social strength.

The one country where labor can boast a clear majority of the population is industrial Britain. This alone is sufficient reason for labor here to seek to realize its ends by democratic methods. The British people are not revolutionary in spirit. They are practical. They have had a long political education, and they know that there is more to be gained on both sides by transactions of concession and compromise than by resorts to violence. The sense of law and order is strongly rooted in the middle and upper classes. If necessary, the government would not hesitate to meet violence with repression. Civil war at home would shake the foundations of an already unstable empire. Every Britisher knows what that means. Therefore, though labor may bluster and threaten, I do not expect it to carry the issue to the barricades. Britain's safeguard is its practical common-sense, extending through all classes.

Finally, there is Italy, which has lately passed through a series of significant social convulsions—August and September, 1920—and which appears, outwardly, to be involved in a dangerous turmoil. Italian labor is nominally led by the socialist party, which has accepted the dictation of Moscow. The doctrine of the Italian radicals is that the industries, like the land, really belong to the nation, and are merely delegated to the proprietors, who, if they cease to work the land or to operate the factories, automatically surrender their rights. Following a dispute over wages, the Italian metalworkers, early in August, began a form of tactics new in class warfare. They call it "obstructionism." They did not strike. They simply began to dawdle systematically, and while on the one hand production fell almost to zero, on the other, the workers passed before the pay-windows at the week's end as regularly as ever. After a couple of weeks of this, the employers retaliated with a lockout. This, according to the workers' doctrine, amounted to a surrender of proprietorship. It was what they had expected and desired. They invaded the factories by force, kidnaped a few engineers and managers, whom they forced to work, and thus began to operate the factories themselves. The government, instead of enforcing the law and evicting the workers, declared itself "neutral." No doubt M. Giolitti, fearing a Jugo-Slav attack following the declaration of Fiume's independence, and knowing the army to be honeycombed with disaffection, dreaded an internal conflict. The workers' attempt to operate the factories was of course unsuccessful, but the negative support given them by the government proved sufficient to en-

able them to wrest an important salary concession from the employers. The extremists even urged a Bolshevik coup d'état, but the majority very sensibly rejected this idea. At the same time, if the history of previous labor troubles is a criterion, the workers' success on this occasion will soon lead them to try something else. If they do, I myself expect blood to flow. The Italian nationalists and conservatives are furious at the government's abdication before the workers' invasion of the factories. If the thing happens again, they will take the enforcement of the law into their own hands. The police, the gendarmerie, a part of the army and most of the navy would follow them. The workers would be crushed, and there might even be a conservative coup d'état. Italy, itself a poor country, exhausted by the war, has no doubt a troublous period ahead of it. Despite the liberal professions of the government, Italy is far behind France and Britain in social organization. It has overdeveloped its metallurgical industry during the war. Having neither coal nor iron, it must buy them at usurious prices from abroad. To compete under these conditions with other countries, the manufacturers have to keep down salaries, or else go out of business. Moreover, a large part of the land is in great estates, and there is an increasing agitation for a genuine land reform. The upshot of all the disorder will doubtless be, not Bolshevism, but the collapse of certain industries, better conditions for the workers in the others, and a more equable distribution of the land. The Italians are among the most individualistic people in Europe. They could never endure the enforced discipline of communism.

THE NEW FORMULA

BUT if Europe is not going to be overrun by Bolshevism, neither is it going to return to the era of 1914. That the world steadily progresses is debatable; but that it steadily changes is apparent to every one. Out of the shock and turmoil, material and mental, of the war, new régimes are beginning to emerge. A wave of vast social and political reforms is sweeping the continent. The day is one of blind gropings, of bold initiatives, of radical experiments.

Politically, the outstanding feature is the triumph of democracy. There is now no country in Europe, I believe, which does not accept this principle, either under the form of a republic, or of a constitutional monarchy; and in so far as a people can be democratic without long political experience and a high level of education, they are all democratic. Full manhood suffrage, by direct and secret ballot, is now general; and if one except Russia, is effective in practice as well as in theory. Germany, Austria and Czecho-Slovakia and Hungary have extended the right of suffrage to women as well; and in Jugo-Slavia, widows and women of high education will doubtless be authorized to vote in communal elections. Systems of proportional representation are being adopted nearly everywhere. In Czecho-Slovakia, Roumania and Hungary the casting of a vote on election day is compulsory for all qualified

persons. The rights of racial minorities are in most cases guaranteed by the peace treaties, and liberalism is, as it were, in the air, so that abuses of its tenets are shamefacedly covered up, or are softened by apologetic explanations, as if the perpetrators suffered from a guilty conscience.

The constitutions which are being drawn up in the new countries, and the constitutional reforms which are the order of the day even in the older states, are all of a liberal tendency. Czecho-Slovakia already has its new national charter, a novel feature of which is that the government, on occasion, may decree a plebiscite with regard to any question. In Jugo-Slavia, a commission of jurists is now engaged in drafting a new constitution for submission to parliament; the great question here is whether the legislation shall consist of two chambers or of only one, as at present. There seems to be a feeling among the peasants that two chambers would be less democratic than one. In Poland, the constitutional debates are soon due; the nobility, no doubt, will be formally abolished, and the republic consecrated. Greece was to have convened a constitutional assembly this fall, to consider, among other things, the land reform, a reform of the election laws, and the women's suffrage issue. The present Hungarian parliament is in effect a constitutional assembly. It apparently intends to substitute a democratic senate for the old house of lords. Perhaps the most radical political reform, however, is that which has already been voted in Bulgaria, exacting two years' compulsory service from all men of twenty, and all women of eighteen, not for military purposes, but for various kinds of government labor, such as road-build-

ing, forestry and public construction, the women sewing, cooking and gardening for the needs of the men, and all subjected to a strict physical culture under a sort of segregated barracks régime. The progress of this very novel but very democratic experiment will be watched with critical interest throughout the world.

Not less significant politically than all these transformations is the firm hold which the idea of the acceptability of government control seems everywhere to have obtained upon the popular mind. The present exaggeration of control will doubtless result soon in a laxative reaction. Nevertheless, the old French revolution ideal—that of Jeffersonian democracy—the ideal of “the least possible government,” seems definitely to have been superseded by the principle that there are no private rights which can be maintained against the general well-being, and that the state, within the limits of expediency, may, in attempting to serve the general well-being, expropriate, seize and administer at will, and may command not only the property of every citizen, but his labor and his very life. Recent socialistic experiments would seem to raise a serious warning, however, against the expediency of carrying this idea too far, however democratic it may be in essence. No state can afford to excite the active discontent of powerful minorities without long and carefully weighed consideration. Experience alone will determine how far the idea of state control can be safely and efficiently put into effect. Throughout Europe the state owns and administers railroads, the post, the telegraph and the telephone. Czecho-Slovakia has nationalized its munition plants, and talks of nationalizing the mines. Bulgaria, in its effort to

overcome the housing crisis, has executed widespread expropriations, either in part or in full. And many other examples of the tendency might be given.

Of current social reforms, the most important are those appertaining to agriculture. The absolute ruler has become no more of an anachronism than the large estate. There is a general feeling that the people who work the land should, in the interests of order and stability, own the land. With the exception of Austria, where the peasants refuse to acknowledge the authority of Vienna, and of Albania, which as yet has scarcely assured its own existence, every state in "Balkanized Europe" is now making a land reform. A more equitable distribution of this general heritage of man is being sought no less in Bulgaria, where the peasants were already, for the most part, proprietors, than in Hungary, where it was possible for men like Count Pallavicini to own a 200,000-acre estate, or in Roumania, where one half of the total arable land was in the hands of some two thousand wealthy proprietors. In Hungary, all parties agree as to the necessity for a reform, though they still differ over its modalities. The same is true of Poland. In Roumania, the main outlines of the new law are already fixed. In Roumania proper, all surplus holdings over five hundred hectares have been confiscated, and are being cultivated—badly enough—by commissions, pending the redistribution to landless farm laborers. In the new provinces, such as Bessarabia and Transylvania, all over one hundred hectares have been seized, largely from German, Hungarian, Polish or Russian landlords, and given to Roumanians. Theoretically, the state places a nominal valuation on the land preëmpted, and

the new possessor pays for it at the rate of two per cent. a year for fifty years, plus an annual interest of five per cent.; but of the total burden, the government assumes thirty-five per cent., in order to help the peasants. Practically, it is doubtful if the peasants can be forced to pay even the remaining sixty-five per cent. In Bulgaria, each family is now supposed, in accordance with the old Henry George theory, to possess only so much land as it can actually till, that is to say, in general, from thirty to fifty hectares. In Jugoslavia, a "reform" not yet consecrated by act of legislation has been effectively carried out by the peasants themselves, especially in the new provinces of the Vojvodina, Croatia-Slavonia and Bosnia, where foreigners have been dispossessed in favor of Slavs; and the administration has had no recourse but to acquiesce. This "reform," however, distorted by every form of graft and corruption, and darkened by violent disorders, has left neither peasant nor landlord satisfied, and the whole question of indemnities is still to be studied. In Czecho-Slovakia, all over one hundred and fifty hectares of arable, or two hundred and fifty hectares of non-arable land has been confiscated, and is being redistributed by an all-potent Land Bureau. Even in Greece, particularly in Thessaly and southern Macedonia, Mr. Venizelos, looking to the future, had taken pains to effect a very radical reform, dispossessing large, or foreign or absentee landlords completely, taking one-fifth of the surplus of all other holdings above one hectare of arable or five of non-arable land, and giving it to communities or groups of families, who may either work it in common, or divide it between them. These allocations are untransferable and

unseizable. They descend intact to one child of each family, chosen either by agreement or by lot; but the heir must duly indemnify his brothers and sisters for their loss. In short, everywhere, the long-inhibited idea that he who works the land should own the land is being brusquely realized.

However, the corresponding idea that they who work in the factory should own the factory has not made the same progress, and will not, in my opinion, for it is based on false logic. A large estate can be parcelled out to individual farm laborers without any great loss of efficiency; a factory cannot; it cannot be parcelled out at all; it is an organized whole. Moreover, the land may be said to be the common heritage of all men; it has been there from the beginning, and no man created it. But a factory is essentially a realization of the human brain—a product of some man's inventive vision, and of some other man's skill in organization. It has been often said, but it remains nevertheless true, that without the incentive of personal reward, men of inventive or administrative talent would not take the trouble to put forward the great exertion demanded of them by their native gifts. To turn the factories over to the state or to the workmen, on any but the most limited scale, is to ensure the slow decline of all existing plants, and effectively to prevent the conception and development of new ones. All leaders of experience realize this truth, and even in Czecho-Slovakia, where advanced socialism rules, there is no immediate movement either to "nationalize" industry, or to take it out of the hands of individuals and turn it over to the workmen. The desirability of so doing is recognized by the Czech socialists as an ortho-

dox theory, but they know full well the danger of trying to put it into practice, at a time when, more than ever, the well-being of the country depends on increased production. Of all present-day reforms, those proposed in the field of industry seem to me the ones least likely to bear fruit. I suspect that out of all the industrial turmoil, nothing more will come than a series of compromises between employer and employees, establishing a means which, while improving the material and moral position of the latter, will leave the former sufficient profit and control to keep him interested. What this means may be in various cases can be ascertained only by the intelligent continuation of the negotiations and experiments which have already been going on for the last twenty years. From every point of view, the most successful régime will be that which guides and encourages private initiative, thereby enabling the community to profit by the endeavors of gifted individuals, yet keeps this initiative under sufficient restraint to prevent its abuse.

All in all, it seems obvious nevertheless—and personally I write these words with deep regret—that on the outbreak of the war, an era died—the era of individual liberty as opposed to state control. Politically, economically, and socially, throughout Europe, true statesmen are groping toward that new formula which all feel to be inevitable, but which none, as yet, is confident that he has grasped. The one thing which appears certain is that this new formula is not Bolshevism. The “dictatorship of the proletariat” has failed in Hungary and Austria, and is, in all likelihood, failing even in Russia. The hour has passed for minority rule of any description. Democracy, far from

having abdicated, is perhaps only now coming into its own, and the new formula will perhaps turn out to be not less democratic, but more so, than anything hitherto known.

The glamor which the Russian revolution has cast upon the minds of reformers and liberals in western countries is a curious psychological phenomenon. Cultured people who have never been in Russia and know little or nothing about it, have accepted almost as axiomatic that it is toward the east that civilization must look for the light. And as a cloud far off is glorified by the sun, but near is perceived to be only a dense fog, so men are lost in admiration before a distant social movement which, if they were in its midst, would fill them with repugnance. The Russian adventure is of course well worth observation; but the more one examines into it, the more obvious it becomes, I think, that for the west it can have little actual significance. For when all is said and done, the peoples of eastern Europe are backward peoples. With all their new liberal constitutions, they are only just beginning to apprehend the meaning of democracy. A long experience will be necessary, a long political education, before they can put into effect the spirit as well as the letter of their new charters. A nation can no more escape from the law of gradual growth than an individual. Russia's effort to create democracy in a day, without previous preparation, has resulted merely in twisting the top to the bottom and the bottom to the top—the establishment of a new privileged class, and a new autocracy. To omit whole phases of normal political evolution, and advance at one leap from the

darkness of absolutism to the clarity of liberal democracy is plainly impossible. And I would even go so far as to say that the invention and successful application of a new order which gave satisfaction and prosperity to the peoples of the east would be no assurance whatever that the same order could be applied with equal success to the peoples of the west. In the same way, neither would the adoption of advanced ideas by backward peoples be a fair criterion of the applicability of these same ideas to a more advanced society.

It is in the west that modern civilization has reached its highest development. In the west is concentrated the peculiar culture which gives its character to our age—the age of coal and iron. And just as surely as the nations of Western Europe and North America are still the patterns and pacemakers for all the others, who struggle and strain to imitate them, just so surely must these nations look to themselves, and not to some less developed society, for the germs of fresh endeavor, fresh advancements.

The sociologists, the economists and the political scientists of the west are not effete. Our intellectual atmosphere is throbbing with bold initiatives, precise analyses, and constructive criticisms. It is because we are so close to them, perhaps, and because we are bewildered by the clash of conflicting ideas, that we do not see the strength of our new thinkers. Yet it is in the middle of this very clash, this same bewilderment, that the immediate future, I am convinced, is taking form. Some day, as if a mist had fallen from it, the subtle and completed architecture of the New Idea will emerge against the sky right beside us, and we shall

stand astonished that in our preoccupation with the turmoils of the backward East we had not perceived it sooner.

I shall not attempt to discuss here the relative merits of the many proposals for constructive reforms which are being put forward at present in Italy, France, England and America. However, having ventured to profess so confidently my faith in the leadership of western thought, I can hardly in fairness refrain from indicating briefly which of these proposals seem to me just now to be the most significant. I may add that I am not the man of any group or any party. A protracted effort of objective observation, such as is, or should be, required in American journalism, tends perhaps to crush out those generous or combative impulses which lead one to give his full support to this political movement or that, tends, it may be, toward a certain calm disillusionment ill-calculated to make one an active participant in politics. There is an old French proverb which says that "*plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose*"—the more it changes, the more it stays the same—and I must confess that this is rather how I feel as regards most political and social reforms, in so far, at least, as they are to be judged by a standard of human happiness. But whether societies do or do not progress in happiness, they undoubtedly do change. And at the present time there is every indication, as I have said, of the imminence of a change. Considering, then, the various proposals of reform with what objectivity I can, it seems to me that the most promising among them is that which seeks to supplement the merely geographical political representation of the

present, by an economic or professional—in short, a guild—representation.

So far as I am aware, the idea, though susceptible of many variations, has been carried to its most concrete form by the leaders of the French labor movement, who call themselves syndicalists, but who have nothing in common with the older syndicalists of the "sabotage" days. These leaders know that French labor is not, and will not for many years be, strong enough to impose its will on the rest of the country. They have therefore adopted the principle of democracy in its fullest implications. They declare themselves to stand for the common and general good, against all privileges of class, whether the class be high or low. In the first place, they want the government to supplement the present legislature by a sort of third chamber, which they call an economic council, which should be composed of representatives of all the great economic organizations—the labor unions, the corporations, the manufacturers, the farmers, and so on, and whose advice should be sought, though not necessarily followed, on all economic questions. This suggestion is not inharmonious with the country's present social evolution, in which not only are capital and labor organizing to defend their interests, but every economic group in France, including even the artists and so-called "intellectuals." In the second place they demand the "industrial nationalization" of great natural resources, such as the mines, and of great public utilities, such as the railroads. But "nationalization" with them has a particular meaning. They hold that the railway workers, for example, have no more right to own the rail-

ways merely because they operate them, than the financiers have merely because they furnish the capital. The railways should belong to the commonwealth, and should be run, they maintain, in the commonwealth's interests. They consider, however, that previous experiments in state ownership and operation have proved the incompetence and indifference of the ordinary state bureaucracy. "We have not yet found the formula," said one of the French leaders to me, "which will make a man work as hard and conscientiously for the general good as he would work for himself." They have therefore drawn up a new plan for state operations, not by bureaucrats, but by guild-delegates. Specifically, they propose that each industry so "nationalized" shall be managed by an autonomous board of directors, composed of delegates of the state, the workers and the consumers, in the interests of neither the state, the workers nor the capitalists, but of the commonwealth. Their slogan is maximum production in minimum time, at a maximum wage; but it is equally fundamental with them that the workers must exert themselves even more when working for the general good than they do in the service of private employers. Among other things, they have drawn up a plan for "nationalizing" the railroads which, while not complete in its details, will nevertheless serve well as an example of their trend of mind. All lines are to be organized into a single system. Their actual value is to be determined by a commission of three representatives for the government, three for the companies, and three technicians chosen by the labor unions. On a basis of this evaluation, all shares will be called in, and a new issue made, guaranteed by the state, bearing

a fixed interest and redeemable at par, in series drawn by lot. They aim thus to eliminate all shares in a few years, without injustice to the present shareholders. Meanwhile, the administration of the entire system is to be placed in the hands of a commission of twelve: three government delegates, to wit, one for the ministry of war, one for the ministry of finance, and one for the ministry of public works; three labor delegates, all experts, one for rolling-stock, one for traction, one for despatching; and six delegates of the "consumers"—representing respectively the manufacturers' association, the farmers' association, the chambers of commerce, the touring clubs, the trades unions, and the coöperatives. The commission shall hold office for two years, shall be well remunerated, and shall have practically absolute administrative power. However, at the demand of four of its members, it may be dissolved by the government; and there shall be a state supervisory board composed of three financial experts. If there is a deficit, the state must meet it; if a profit, part shall go to the redemption of outstanding shares, part to the improvement of working conditions for employees, particularly as regards hygiene, and the residue to the state to build new lines and to initiate the exploitation of new sources of wealth.

To distinguish, in the complex play of imponderable psychological forces, those which are destined to prevail from those destined to die out, is a task perhaps requiring rather the gift of prophesy than a taste for analysis. Nevertheless, I am inclined to believe that this French guild idea, in a modified form at least, will make its way. The chief prerequisite—that of wide-

spread professional and economic association—is already being accomplished. And already, though such bodies as the national chamber of commerce or the bankers' association have no governmental standing, they are nevertheless frequently consulted by governments, as are also the labor federations. To take one step more and formalize their relation to the government, seems to me by no means beyond the realm of possibility; for as these guilds, or associations, grow in membership and experience, their power in the community is certain to increase. Moreover, unlike many other radical proposals, the guild idea is democratic, and in professing to aim at the general good rather than at the good of a single class, it tends to disarm opposition. In France, M. Millerand himself is known to favor the creation of a corporative, in addition to the present merely political, chamber in the legislature. "I should like the Senate," he is quoted as saying, "to be composed in part of representatives elected by the professional associations; so that besides the senators chosen directly, as now, by the municipal and general councils, there should be senators named by the chamber of commerce, the great employers' and workers' syndicates, both rural and urban, by the general labor confederation, and by the universities and academies. They would be qualified to defend authoritatively in the parliament the ideas which their respective corporations may esteem to be just and useful." Similar proposals are beginning to be made in Central and Eastern Europe. There is a serious suggestion in Hungary that with the abolition of the house of lords, the new senate shall be composed of representatives of the

counties, the universities, the churches, the chamber of commerce, the labor unions and the employers' and professional associations. In Poland the minority report on the formation of the senate recommends that this body be composed of fifty members chosen by the lower house, two by the supreme court, two by the universities and scientific institutions, two by the general councils, one by the chamber of commerce, one by the manufacturers' association, one by the labor unions, two by the bar association, one by the notaries public, and one by the journalists' association. Czecho-Slovakia has established a series of regional economic councils which elect delegates to a supreme national economic council.

As a corollary to the theory of biological evolution, there has arisen, in the last half century, a theory of political evolution which holds that a state, like an individual, has a life-history, passing regularly from youth to maturity, and from maturity into the decline of age. It was perhaps with this theory in mind that the venerable Japanese statesman, Count Okuma, expressed the opinion, after the war, that the decline of European civilization was at hand, and its end near. But while there is no doubt much truth in the theory of political evolution, it is apt to be misleading. For not only does history reveal remarkable resurrections, or reincarnations, such as that of Italy, twice crushed and twice rearisen, but a state can apparently prolong its period of maturity indefinitely if it will only adapt itself to changing circumstances. With regard to Europe, therefore, the question is, will its leading states be able to conform quickly and surely to the new con-

ditions imposed by the war and the peace settlements? I myself believe they will. Already, in most regions, the crisis of lassitude and indolence has passed. Both physically and socially Europe is manifesting strong vitality; health is conquering disease, and the spirit of reform is overcoming the spirit of revolution.

PART IV

NATIONAL PROBLEMS

I.

AUSTRIA

IN discussing general conditions in "Balkanized Europe," I have endeavored to indicate that the immediate hindrances to economic reconstruction being in large part psychological, the first solutions to be sought must of necessity be political; for until peoples' minds are well disposed by political understandings, all efforts to persuade them to undertake those collaborations which seem so essential are destined to impotence. But before attempting to describe and analyze the larger political movements which have already begun to develop in this sense, it will be prudent to consider the various countries individually, with respect, in particular, to their chief internal and external political problems. For each state, naturally enough, is pre-eminently engrossed with its own affairs; and it will listen to proposals of entente or alliance only when they take account of and give promise of furthering these affairs. The statesman, in his task of forming a new and harmonious European mosaic, has no other tiles to work with; he must therefore familiarize himself thoroughly with the peculiar color and outline, so to speak, of each country.

There are, in the region to which I am limiting myself, three "enemy" states—Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria; and five "allied" states—Czecho-Slovakia, Poland, Roumania, Jugo-Slavia, Greece. I shall deal

first with the enemy states, which have this in common, that all have suffered defeat and amputation, and all are living under the shadow of treaties holding them accountable for vast reparations; but otherwise, both in character and in attitude of mind they are strikingly different. Let me begin, then, with Austria.

This state, beyond any doubt, is the weakest, the most miserable, the most apathetic and the most helpless in Europe to-day. In Hungary and Bulgaria defeat has, if anything, strengthened the interior unity of the people, and stimulated national consciousness. But the present Austria does not even feel itself to be a nation. Indeed, the old Austrian Empire was never, strictly speaking, a nation; it was merely a state. The arbiters of peace, having carved out of this Empire a number of new nations, or parts of nations, found that there remained still a great city, Vienna, and a long strip of mountain valley reaching from Vienna westward to Switzerland, of which no satisfactory disposition could be made. This remnant is the present Austria—a monster, consisting, like a tad-pole, of a huge head attached to a kind of tail; for of the total population of six millions, a third—two millions—are crowded in Vienna, the head, and only four millions are left to form the tail-like body. Nor are the head and tail, strictly speaking, made of the same stuff. The people of the provinces—Upper Austria, Salzburg, Steiermark, Carinthia, the Tyrol and the Vorarlberg—are of an old and pure German stock, similar to the Bavarian. Vienna, on the contrary, is a cosmopolitan city, German in language, but having a tradition and culture distinctly its own. It was the cultural and

business capital for a large part of Central Eastern and Southeastern Europe. There was probably no portion of the Empire with which Vienna had fewer relations than with the provinces now left to it. Commercially, most of its dealings were with Bohemia and Galicia, where the Empire's principal industries were situated. Its inhabitants are a conglomeration of Germans, Czechs, Poles, Magyars, Italians, Jugo-Slavs and Jews. As the city of Haydn, Mozart, Beethoven and Schubert, it developed a high musical culture which drew students from all the neighboring countries, and its scientific institutions were scarcely less magnetic. In short, its roots were spread out far in all directions; but in its present provinces were less deeply embedded than elsewhere.

The first problem which the Austrians have to face, if their country is to continue its independent existence, is the achievement of interior unity and the development of a national consciousness. Without these there can be no concerted effort, and without concerted effort nothing can be accomplished.

The Viennese, like all the defeated peoples, complying with President Wilson's suggestions, in the hope of getting better peace terms, made a revolution after the armistice, and set up a socialist government of pronounced communist tendencies. But what with the easy-going nature of the people, and the widespread misery adduced by famine, this government, now destined, no doubt, to be somewhat modified, has never been able to enforce its decrees even in Vienna. As for the provinces, they refused absolutely to recognize its authority. The peasants, who are fervent Roman Catholics, called the capital "red" and "godless," and

withheld their food from it. The provincial towns accused it of extravagance and incompetence. The Vorarlberg wants to unite with Switzerland, the Tyrol leans toward Bavaria. All the provinces demand regional autonomy, and are not far from having taken it for themselves. Thus Linz and Salzburg declined to adopt even the "summer time" decreed by Vienna. Innsbruck endeavored to negotiate an understanding with Bavaria whereby German marks would pass current in that town. Several provincial cities forbid "strangers," particularly the Viennese, to remain within their precincts for more than three days without special permission.

All in all, it appeared impossible for Austria to pull itself together so long as the socialist government remained in power. With the exception of a few socialists in the towns, all the people in the provinces were against it. There was even doubt as to how far Vienna, itself a city not only of workmen but of small capitalists and merchants, was really "red." The social-Democrats were the largest single party, but they did not have an absolute majority. The moderate and conservative parties, chief of which are the so-called Christian-Socials, outnumbered them. The Christian-Socials even heretofore have collaborated in the government to a limited extent, holding such constructive posts as the ministers of finance, education and justice; and the probabilities were that when they judged the time to be ripe they would endeavor to take control of the administration. If they had not done so sooner it was partly, perhaps, from apathy, and partly from a disinclination to accept responsibility under conditions so adverse, so apparently hopeless, as those of

the day. The programme which they promise to put ultimately into effect aims to win back the provinces by a show of strong central authority, for which the country-people are supposed to be secretly longing; to repeal radical social legislation so as to attract foreign capital; to reorganize taxation; to stabilize the crown at its present value of about half a cent, thus greatly reducing the war debt which is reckoned in a fixed number of crowns without question as to their value; and, finally, to demand \$200,000,000 credit from the reparations commission, for three years, against such resources as the railways, customs, forests and art-works, for the purpose of purchasing raw-stuffs and putting the factories to work. Austria's chief lack is coal. There is a little in the Tyrol, but not nearly enough. Potential water-power is plentiful, but to develop it would require both time and capital. Wood is plentiful, and there is ore in Styria. The chief commodities needed are coal, iron, hides for the highly-developed leather industry, and hemp, which can be worked here in large quantities. The Austrian machine-shops are by no means negligible; France, for example, has ordered from them fifty locomotives. What is wanted is credit, and organization. The Christian-Social programme seems therefore well adapted to the country's real needs.

As was expected by all careful observers, this party, in the recent elections (October 17, 1920), made a considerable gain. The socialists, hitherto predominant, lost eight seats, returning only sixty-four deputies, whereas the Christian-Socials returned eighty-two—an increase of thirteen! Both the extremist parties lost ground, the communists failing to elect a single

deputy, and the pan-Germans, expecting to win forty or fifty, returning only twenty-one, a diminution of three. This result is the first serious sign which Austria has thus far given of a will to live. Nevertheless, it remains ambiguous; for the Christian-Socials, though they are now the strongest party, have not yet an absolute majority, and being unable to collaborate with the pan-Germans, will still have to share the ministry, to some extent, with the socialists. The next six months should show how far, thus hampered, they will be able to put their promising programme into effect.

The question of Austria's future is one of the most momentous in Europe, and I shall have occasion to discuss it fully, in all its far-reaching complications, when I come to treat of general political problems. There are two ultimate possibilities—alliance or federation with other small Central European states, which is that desired by France and, to a certain extent, by Britain; or union with Germany, which is that desired by Italy, and—for the time being, at least—by most of the Austrians themselves. But as the former would take perhaps several years to realize, and as the latter is forbidden by the peace treaty, there is every probability that Austria, willy-nilly, will be obliged, one way or another, to exist alone for several years to come. In so doing it will ascertain, beyond doubt, whether such an isolated existence is really impossible for it, as most people seem to think. This common thesis has not been proved. I have already indicated that, if agricultural production were brought up to the pre-war level, Austria could supply about eighty per cent. of its own food, instead of forty per

cent., as at present. If its factories would be started again, by giving it credit for raw-stuffs, it could exchange manufactured goods for the remainder of its alimentary requirements. But will the Austrians themselves, disheartened, disillusioned, miserable, make the necessary effort? This remains to be seen.

The strongest pro-German parties are the pan-Germans, for obvious reasons, and the socialists, who hope by union to win the support of the German socialists and thereby reinforce their weakening position. The gain of the Christian-Socials in the elections is in reality a blow to the idea of union; for although the majority of Christian-Socials have hitherto, by a kind of despite, favored this solution, they have done so only as a last resort. They realize, in any case, the necessity of at least a tentative independence. The history of Austria is long, and not inglorious. For the country to disappear—to be absorbed into a powerful German federation—would be, sentimentally at least, a serious loss to Europe, from several points of view. Vienna, in particular, is a city of peculiarly pleasing individuality, and of real cultural strength. Surely, for it to become merely one more provincial German town would be a pity! More than any other faction, the Christian-Socials are sensitive to these considerations. They will, I expect, make a genuine effort to save Austrian independence. Meanwhile, for my present purpose, it will be sufficient briefly to indicate the country's sentiment toward its various neighbors, as this sentiment may play an important part in future developments.

With both Switzerland and Germany, relations are cordial. With Czecho-Slovakia, they are officially

good, but in reality the Austrians despise the Czechs, whom they wrongly consider an inferior and stupid people, and they are devoured by jealousy at Czecho-Slovakia's sudden rise to relative affluence. Between Austria and Hungary, there is bad blood, partly because of the conservative reaction in Hungary, which alarms socialism, partly because of a quarrel over the territory known as West Hungary, which the Peace Conference gave to Austria as "compensation" for the South Tyrol, ceded to Italy. With Jugo-Slavia, relations are also bad. Austria's unexpected victory in the Klagenfurth basin plebiscite is ill-calculated to conciliate the Jugo-Slavs who, for a long time, refused to sell their surplus food to starving Austria, a fact which the Austrians will not forget. The Jugo-Slavs will not even let their rolling-stock enter Austria, and they have put a heavy tax on exports to Austria. With Italy, despite the annexation by this power of the South Tyrol, inhabited almost exclusively by Austrians, Austria is already on good terms again. Italy is supporting Austria's sentiment for union with Germany, and it has opened its frontiers and its port of Trieste to its northern neighbor in exchange for transit privileges across Austria to Germany. Despite their past enmity, Italy and Austria have now a number of common political and economic interests. In the worst days of the Viennese famine, the Italians, themselves short of food, did not hesitate to invite several thousand Austrian children to Italy, where they were sympathetically nourished and cared for.

HUNGARY

IN order to understand present-day Hungary, it is necessary to recall what Hungary was before the war—a great fertile plain bounded on the north, east and southeast by the Carpathian mountains, and on the south and southwest by the rivers Danube and Drave. Beyond these rivers lay the provinces of Slavonia and Croatia, across which Hungary reached the sea, at the port of Fiume; but excepting these two provinces, the remainder—the great plain ringed round by mountains—formed what geographers considered a perfect natural unity. All the rivers flowed inward. The thickly populated plain exchanged its food produce for the wood and minerals of the mountains, whose inhabitants came down in summer to help with the harvest. For stock-breeding the highlands furnished pasturage, and the lowlands fodder. The land was a unity, but the people were not. Within these borders dwelt seven distinct races. The Magyars, an Asiatic tribe of the Touranian family, akin, probably, to the Turks, Finns and Bulgars, had settled, early in the Tenth century, in the central plain, and in the course of time extended their sway over all the border races. “The peoples of the borderlands,” wrote Elise Reclus, the great French geographer, “must gravitate toward the predominant nationality by force of all their material interests.” The census of 1910 showed a

nucleus of 10,050,575 Magyars, around whom were grouped 2,949,032 Roumanians, 2,037,435 Germans, 1,967,970 Slovaks, 1,833,162 Croats, 1,106,477 Serbs, 477,587 Ruthenians, and 469,255 others. Magyars thus formed about half of a total population of twenty millions. Considering themselves a superior race, they ruled with a firm hand. They were peasants, soldiers, officials, landowners, but they had little taste for business, or the liberal professions, which they held in a kind of contempt, leaving these largely in the hands of Germans or Austrians, and of Magyarized Jews. In 1914, five per cent. of the total number of inhabitants were Jews, many of whom had been baptized. They furnished fifty-two per cent. of the doctors; forty-six per cent. of the lawyers, fifty per cent. of the journalists, nineteen per cent. of the large landowners, forty-eight per cent. of the owners of tracts of over one hundred acres. Most of the factories, banks and business houses were under their influence. It is estimated that they controlled ninety-eight per cent. of the country's free capital, and for Budapest the sneering name of "Judapest" was often substituted in conversation. The other races, excepting, of course, the Germans and Austrians, were by no means satisfied under the Magyar-Jewish régime, which aimed more and more openly at assimilating them altogether.

The peace treaties have reduced Hungary to one-third of its former size. From twenty millions, the population has been cut to eight and a half. All the borderlands, with their wood, their minerals and their pasturage, have been lopped away, leaving only the central plain, in which the Magyars can no longer control even the flood and irrigation system, the headwaters of

the streams being now beyond their boundaries. Of the lost population, the Roumanians have received six millions, the Czecho-Slovaks and Jugo-Slavs each two and a half millions, and Austria half a million. Unfortunately, owing to the mixture of races, these amputations include, according to Hungarian statistics, some three and a half million Magyars, and nearly two million Germans who would prefer Magyar sovereignty. Fifty-one and seven-tenths per cent. of the lost population, the Magyars claim, is even now under foreign rule, to wit: 3,658,995 Magyars, 1,179,808 Germans, 159,009 Slovaks, 1,894 Roumanians, 255,703 Ruthenians, 58,453 Croats, 21,735 Serbs, and 300,405 others. Within the present Hungary, ten per cent. of the population is Jewish; there are about 200,000 Slovaks, and 500,000 Germans; the rest are Magyars.

These Magyars are furious. They consider the partition an anomaly and an outrage. They declare that they will never accept their present situation. I have told elsewhere of the great campaign of propaganda which they have launched upon the world. For the present, they seem definitely to have abandoned Slavonia and Croatia, the provinces which lay beyond the Drave and Danube, and which have gone to Jugo-Slavia. Nor do they speak much of West Hungary, ceded to Austria, nor the fertile Banat, divided between Jugo-Slavia and Roumania. Their principal efforts are centered upon Slovakia, and upon Transylvania. In both these regions they are keeping up a seditious agitation, through the Magyar elements, against whom both Czecho-Slovaks and Roumanians are duly retaliating. With regard to Slovakia, the

Magyars say that its union with the Czechs is an economic impossibility. Slovakia lies on the south slope of the Carpathians. Its roads and streams run not across the ranges to Moravia, but straight down into Hungary. They profess to feel sure that Slovakia will of necessity ultimately come back to them, even leaving out of account that thirty per cent. of its population is Magyar. Of Transylvania they say that though it is itself a small geographical unity, a ring of mountains around an amphitheater of green valleys, it can communicate far more easily with Hungary than with Roumania. They claim, besides, that though fifty per cent. of the population is indeed Roumanian, thirty-four and a third per cent. is Magyar, of the oldest, finest stock, and eight and a seventh per cent. are Magyarophile Germans.

Just how they are going to regain their lost territories they do not profess to know. The one certainty is that they intend to regain them. Any means will be good means—alliances with no matter whom, federations, compromises, even war—provided there is a chance of success. Hating and harboring designs against all four of their neighbors, the only combination which they have been tempted to essay up to the present is an alliance with Italy and Poland, the idea being that if Italy could counterbalance the Jugo-Slavs, and Poland the Czecho-Slovaks, the Magyars might then be free to attack the Roumanians without having at the same time to defend their indefensible frontiers in the south, west and north. To this, the Czechs, Jugo-Slavs and Roumanians have replied by forming the so-called "Petite Entente," a defensive alliance against Hungary. The Magyars' contemptuous as-

sumption of the complete helplessness of Austria is significant. In addition to flirting with Italy and Poland, the Magyars have sought to win the sympathy first of Britain, then of France, but with what real success it is still difficult to estimate. Unless Central Europe should fall into a kind of general armed quarrel, which is altogether unlikely, I myself do not expect to see the Magyars take up arms—not for the present, at least. Despite their supposed individual military superiority over the Czechs and Roumanians, they are surrounded and hopelessly outnumbered. Their chances of success are inconsiderable. Their policy will probably be one of vigilant calm, supplemented by endless propaganda and intrigue for the purpose of annoying and weakening their neighbors.

There is one possibility which I may mention in passing. Much as the Magyars and Roumanians hate one another, both are strongly conscious of being non-Slav peoples, isolated in an ocean of Slavs. If the pan-Slav movement should grow, it is not at all unlikely that an entente would ensue between Hungary and Roumania, on a basis of some kind of transaction regarding Transylvania, as, for example, the bestowing of a kind of autonomy upon the province, under Roumanian sovereignty.

The Magyar propagandists have outdone themselves in the attempt to demonstrate that existence for the present Hungary is an impossibility; their arguments are inconclusive. It is true that the country has lost its forests, its upland pasturage, its iron, oil and natural gas, two-fifths of its coal mines, and a large proportion of its factories, becoming thus once more a strictly agricultural state. The attempt, however,

to prove that the loss, in addition, of their irrigation and flood control, through the cession of the headwaters, will ruin even agriculture, fails. Despite the disorders attending the talk of land reform, and despite the fact that, owing to the Roumanians having requisitioned the seed, twenty-five per cent. of the land was not cultivated this year, there is nevertheless even now a considerable grain surplus for export. After Minneapolis, Budapest is the largest milling center in the world, and the quality of its flour is unexcelled. By the exchange of grain and flour for other commodities, Hungary can satisfy its needs. The question of flood control has been laid before the League of Nations, and will doubtless be settled by international agreement.

The war, followed by the communist revolution, the Roumanian invasion, and the partition, has plunged Hungary's internal affairs into great confusion. There has arisen, for example, a violent sentiment against the Jews, the reasons for which are complex. In the first place, it is popularly believed to have been proved in the days of Bela Kun that the mainsprings of communism are Jewish. In the second place, there is the antagonism of the country-dwelling Magyars against the town-dwelling Israelites, who are accused of profiteering. Finally, there is the traditional resentment of the careless borrower against the hard-headed money lender when the date of foreclosure comes around. The Magyar, unable, seemingly, to keep from falling into the clutches of usurers, reacts with violence when he suddenly finds himself ruined. The feeling is particularly strong against recent immigrants. I was told of a Galician Jew who arrived in a

Magyar town ten years ago, with an umbrella as his sole baggage, and who, in the last year of the war, paid one million crowns in taxes alone. The anti-Semite extremists talk wildly of eliminating commerce from Hungary altogether, and the Jews with it. A more moderate party distinguishes between the Magyarized Jews and the "undesirable" new-comers. Sager heads, however, and among them most of the party leaders, will admit in private conversation that the country simply could not get along without the Jews, who, as I have said, practically monopolize business and finance. An alliance between the two races is essential to the nation's immediate efficiency. For this reason, if for no other, it seems likely that the quarrel will gradually subside.

Another source of social discontent is the superfluity of jobless functionaries, landlords, and army officers, occasioned by the reduction of the country's size; and their immigration out of the ceded provinces rather than swear fealty to new foreign administrations. These malcontents are the more dangerous as they are men of education and character. Having lost everything, they are ready for anything, and they can be tempted into the most unprofitable adventures. In Budapest, these immigrants are so numerous that they have nearly doubled the population; hundreds of them—people of culture, schoolteachers, former government officials from Slovakia or Transylvania—are still living with their families in boxcars at the edge of the city. In the rural districts, there are bands of officers who, disagreeing in some detail with the policy of the government, refuse to submit to its authority. This situation makes it easy for the first agitator—pro-

vided he is a conservative or a reactionary—to enlist a following. It is these unfortunates who are guilty of most of the outrages which have occurred against the Jews. Their presence in the country is a serious problem. A long time must doubtless elapse before they all can settle down again to new employ, new modes of life.

Hungary, at the present time, is a kingdom without a king. Temporarily, Admiral Miklos Horthy, former commander-in-chief of the Austro-Hungarian navy, is acting as governor. He lives in the "castle," and despite the modest simplicity of his personality, is accorded royal honors. Probably nine-tenths of the people are sincere royalists. They believe that a constitutional monarchy is the form of government best suited to their present needs, and they expect in time to choose a monarch from one of Europe's royal houses. There has been some talk of crowning Horthy, but this step is unlikely, as he is not of princely blood. At one time the Duke of Connaught was given to understand he could have the throne; an English sovereign would have been popular with all parties; but no doubt France and Italy would have opposed this choice, and the duke himself, moreover, showed no enthusiasm in the matter. It is therefore not unlikely that some member of the Hapsburg family will one day reign again. Admiral Horthy himself is anti-Hapsburg, but his influence is not sufficiently great to safeguard the throne against the influence of this historic dynasty, still powerful by its centuries of prestige. The large landowners favor Charles Hapsburg; the army and the malcontents incline toward Joseph. Italy, with its dread of a restoration of the old em-

pire, would oppose a Hapsburg reaccession with all its might, but certain French and British diplomats, intent on building up a Danube confederation, rather favor this solution as being a first step in such a construction. A Hapsburg coup d'état is by no means an impossibility.

All in all, Hungary's rôle in Central European affairs seems destined to be very important. Seated squarely midway the Danube, it occupies a strategic position of the first order. The energetic and warlike spirit of the people, long accustomed to consider themselves as natural rulers, is a continual threat to its enemies, and a factor of material strength to its friends. For at least several years to come, this country will be worthy of the closest observation.

BULGARIA

LIKE Hungary, Bulgaria is an agricultural country. It has practically no industries. It lies in the same latitude as Central Italy, but is considerably cooler. It consists of two valley plains and two mountain ranges, all running from east to west, and all parallel: first the south Danube plain, then the Balkan mountains, then the Maritza valley plain, then the Rhodope mountains. In this temperate and variegated climate nearly everything will grow—wheat, rye, cotton, rice, tobacco, opium, beets, pomegranates. The ex-Czar Ferdinand, who had a strong penchant for botany, raised successfully on his private estate, near Sofia, not only trees and plants from every part of the world—Siberia and the Amazon, Canada and Egypt—but also camels, elephants, wolves and llamas.

Its people, though still primitive, are in several respects notable, rivalling the Serbs in military valor, and the Greeks in education. Indeed, the Bulgars boast that they spend more money per capita on education, and have a larger number of students for each thousand inhabitants, than any other Balkan state. In 1880, two years after their liberation from Turkey, ninety-five per cent. of the men, and ninety-eight per cent. of the women were illiterate. Twenty-five years later, nearly sixty per cent. of the men, and twenty-six per cent. of the women could read and write. The

people are hard-headed and hard-working—"a race," says Bousquet, in his "History of the Balkan People," "patient and thorough, tenacious and rough, sober and laborious, proud and warlike." I have read that in the proportion of inhabitants actively employed, Bulgaria is surpassed by only one other country in the world—France, the figure given for Bulgaria being 52.5 per cent., and for France 53.3 per cent.

Though these are in themselves valuable qualities, I suspect that a good part of Bulgaria's remarkably rapid development is due to the ex-czar, Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg Gotha. It was he who gave the country a competent administration, who stimulated public instruction and road-building, and who made Sofia a neat, clean modern town with vitrified brick pavements, and pleasant parks and gardens. In organizing the Balkan alliance, which crushed Turkey in 1912, he played a part no less important than that of Venizelos. And if, through the unpardonable error which brought Bulgaria into the great war on the side of Germany, he is to-day an exile with no hope of return, his people are nevertheless still conscious, I think, of how much of practical good, as well as of political evil, they will always owe to this man's bold initiative. He was in every respect the most remarkable ruler in the Balkans.

The Bulgars, confident of their superiority over their neighbors in both war and peace, have twice, in recent years, dreamed of hegemony, once in 1913, when they attacked their Greek and Serb allies in the quarrel over the partition of Macedonia, and again in 1916, when, with Germany's help, they crushed and overran Serbia. The peace terms which the Bulgar imperialists would have imposed in case of victory

would have left them the undisputed masters of the Balkans, with many subject peoples, west, south and north. But in their defeat it is they themselves who, in accordance with the firmly established Balkan tradition, have been trimmed and shorn. In consequence, their present preoccupation is first to reëstablish their interior strength by hard work and wise policies, and then to devise means of regaining the territories, more or less inhabited by Bulgars, to which they believe they have a preëminent right.

The present population is 4,337,500, of whom 3,500,000 are Bulgars, and the rest Turks, Pomaks, Gypsies, Roumanians, Greeks, Jews and Russians. Eighty-two per cent. of the people are peasants. There are indeed 500,000 families of independent farmers. These peasants, holding Ferdinand responsible for the country's defeat, immediately after the armistice forced him to abdicate, and seated in his stead his son Boris, whom they consider a good honest young man, but not yet experienced enough to influence affairs of state. Boris is said to resemble his Bourbon mother more than his Saxe-Coburg father. My personal impression of him was good. He received me simply, in a plain business suit, and asked me intelligent questions regarding the countries I had visited, seeming particularly interested in social problems. He spoke with feeling pity of humanity's present plight, and expressed a hope in salvation through work. He has admitted his willingness to abdicate at any time if he can be shown that he stands in the country's way, but the chances are Bulgaria will prefer to remain a constitutional monarchy. This seems to be the meaning of Stamboulisky's saying, that he con-

siders the czar to be "the best possible president of the republic." Stamboulisky, as premier, and as head of the all-powerful peasants' party, is the real chief-of-state. Like all his ministers, he is himself a peasant. It is a curious fact that at the present moment (November, 1920), there are two peasant premiers in Europe, one in Poland, one in Bulgaria; but while Witos, the Pole, who never wears a necktie, is really little more than a shrewd party leader, Stamboulisky shows signs of genuine statesmanship. Not only is he venerated by the peasants, but the older statesmen, now superseded, and the permanent government officials, whom he has had the good sense to maintain in their positions, all seem to think of him with respect. All political offices in Bulgaria are at present filled by inexperienced peasants. In Roushouk, a lively municipality of forty thousand inhabitants, I met the prefect, the chief-of-police and several members of the city council. All were rustics, from the neighboring villages. Even the Minister of Finance, Mr. Tourlakoff, is a peasant. This situation is not without its ludicrous sides; nor are these peasants, suddenly grown class-conscious, without a certain tendency to discriminate against the urban population by clapping disproportionate taxes on such objects as pianos, oil paintings and factory buildings. At the same time, it must be said that with all their mistakes and their ignorance, the peasants are shrewd and sensible. The old trained functionaries remain, of course, the backbone of the administration.

Stamboulisky is resolutely anti-communist. His interior policy envisages certain radical social reforms, such as obligatory industrial service for both sexes,

the stimulation of production, and the reëstablishment of the country's shattered finances. The outcome of the social reforms is still dubious. As for production, despite the fact that the peasants still use four wooden plows to one steel one, the country has this year some seven hundred thousand tons of grain for export, which is more than its depleted transport facilities will be able to carry; there is even a movement to lift the present export restrictions so as to give the peasants themselves the benefit of the full market price, and encourage them to cultivate still more intensively. At the same time, realizing that no efforts can avail so long as the reparations commission continues to hold an annual charge of one hundred and sixty million francs against the country (two and a half billion francs gold in ninety-seven years, beginning in 1921, at 5 per cent.), Stamboulisky is sparing no pains to win the friendship, so far as possible, of all the principal allies, in the hope of regaining their confidence by a show of repentance and sincere goodwill, and ultimately, of obtaining some kind of remission, without which it is considered that Bulgaria will have been reduced to perpetual servitude.

Bulgaria's "irredentism" is centered upon three regions, in which it is claimed that a third of the Bulgarian race is now living under foreign rule: the lower Doubroudja, now Roumanian, with 134,331 Bulgars; Macedonia, with 1,500,000 Bulgars, 300,000 of whom are in Greek territory, and the rest is Serbian; and Eastern and Western Thrace, both now Greek, where in 1912 there were 294,555 Bulgars, and 116,170 Moslem Bulgars, or Pomaks, but from which many Bulgars have since been driven out. The Lower Dou-

broudja is chiefly coveted because of its water front on the Danube and the Black Sea. Thrace, particularly Western Thrace, is claimed not so much because of the Bulgarian population (there are as many Greeks as Bulgarians) as because Bulgaria considers it has an inherent right to an outlet on the Ægean Sea. It did obtain Dedeagatch, in 1913, but it would have much preferred the superior port of Cavalla, which went to Greece in the same year. Now it has lost even Dedeagatch. The apple of Bulgaria's eye, however, its Alsace-Lorraine, the birth-place of many of its leading men, to win which it has fought and lost two wars, is Macedonia. The population of this mixed and violently contested region, according to Bulgarian statistics, is as follows: 1,500,000 Bulgars, 540,000 Turks, 253,000 Greeks, 184,000 Albanians, 117,000 Roumanians. To obtain this region, whose mountain valleys are the cradles of some of Bulgaria's purest patriotism, and where the Bulgars seem in reality to be the predominant race, they have built up a powerful propaganda and combat organization which has ramifications throughout Bulgaria, and is able, on occasion, to defy the government itself. There are tall, somber, fiery-eyed men south of the Balkan range, who live for nothing else than Macedonia, and who, if they thought all hope of freeing it were lost, would scarcely hesitate, like passionate and despairing lovers, to destroy themselves, life having lost for them its sole purpose.

It would be, however, a suicidal policy for Bulgaria to remain openly hostile to all three of its neighbors. A large part of the population, sick of war, or rather, of defeat in war, is getting tired of the continual agitation of the Macedonian organization, whose enmity

toward both the Serbs and the Greeks is apparently eternal. The formation of the powerful Jugo-Slav state in fact has changed the entire outlook in the Balkans. For the Bulgars to conquer Macedonia from the Serbs seemed not outside the realm of possibility; but to dream of conquering it from the Jugo-Slavs, who are three times as numerous as the Bulgars and are no less warlike, is madness. The Bulgars, after all, are Slavs. As against the Greeks and Roumanians, their affinities with the Serbs are deep and genuine. The Stamboulisky government, therefore, supported, with the possible exception of the Macedonian organization, by the entire country, has asked to be allowed to join the Jugo-Slav confederation, on equal terms with Croatia and Slovenia; for while the Bulgars hate the Serbs, they have, as they say, no quarrel with the Croats or Slovenes. The Jugo-Slavs have not, as yet, accepted Bulgaria's offer; they have more immediate problems to deal with. But the promise of power involved in forming a single Slav state which would reach from the Adriatic to the Black Sea, and would have nearly 20,000,000 inhabitants, is a formidable temptation, before which even the Serbs' deep hatred of the Bulgars will perhaps in time dissolve. Such a combination, holding all the hinterland of Macedonia and Western Thrace, would undoubtedly be a serious menace to Greece, which, occupying only a thin strip of coast, would have difficulty in keeping the Slavs away from the Ægean. Bulgaria's present foreign policy is therefore to seek the friendship of Roumania, and particularly of the Jugo-Slavs, and to center all its active resentment against the Greeks.

The French are becoming more popular in Bulgaria

because they are believed to be the friends of all the Slavs, and the British are losing popularity for the opposite reason. Through Roberts College and various American religious schools, the United States has probably a greater immediate influence in Bulgaria than in any other European country, though the fiasco of the Wilson peace programme was a stiff blow to American prestige. Italy's effort to involve Bulgaria in an intrigue against the Jugo-Slavs has been coldly repulsed. By all odds the most significant psychological factor in Bulgarian affairs at present is the strong revival of pan-Slav feeling manifest not only in the desire to federate with the Jugo-Slavs, but in the commercial treaty said to have been recently concluded between Bulgaria and Czecho-Slovakia, and particularly in the warm feeling of sympathy for the Russian people. Russia, in the war of 1878, freed the Bulgars from the Turks. The finest monument in Sofia is the great bronze equestrian statue of gratitude to Alexander II, "the Liberating Czar." The country is fully conscious that its present misery and shame are due solely to having taken arms on the opposite side from Russia in the last war; there is a strong feeling that this must never happen again and that, for better or for worse, Bulgaria's destiny is henceforth intimately bound up with that of all Slavdom. The Bulgarian Exarchate, though jealously independent, is none the less Greek Orthodox. Above the roofs and green treetops of Sofia bulge the domes of a cathedral which is said to be the largest Greek church outside of Russia. Its interior is a gorgeous wonder of marble and of rarely artistic iconography. It has stood completed now for some time, but it has never been in-

augurated. The Bulgarians are waiting. They are waiting with patient confidence for the fall of Bolshevism and the restoration of order in Russia. For the church is dedicated to the liberator, "Alexander Nevsky," and it is felt that to open it otherwise than in the presence of official representatives of the Russian government and church, would border on sacrilege.

CZECHO-SLOVAKIA

I COME now to the "lesser allies"—Czecho-Slovakia, Poland, Jugo-Slavia, Roumania and Greece. The first two have been resurrected by the general victory from a long death under foreign rule; the last three have been so enlarged by this same victory that they as well are to all intents new states: Jugo-Slavia has three times the population of pre-war Serbia; Roumania has doubled, and Greece (since 1912) has tripled, the number of its inhabitants. All five are therefore confronted with complex and difficult problems of administrative organization. And all, unfortunately, are burdened with large hostile racial minorities, to assimilate which will require the exercise of rare strength and tact. Externally, the "lesser allies" are left by the peace treaties in relatively strong positions; they are not oppressed by reparation debts, and they have large armies. Their chief weaknesses are internal, and have to do not only with questions of interior racial unity, but, in the case of Czecho-Slovakia and Greece, with an abnormal and difficult geographical constitution. The prudent mind will be disposed to wait a number of years before expressing a definite judgment as to the durability of states so constituted.

Czecho-Slovakia, a reincarnation of the ancient kingdom of Bohemia, is composed of three former Austrian

provinces—Bohemia, Moravia, a part of Silesia—and two former Hungarian provinces—Slovakia, and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia. Its peculiarly elongated shape, which the inhabitants proudly compare to that of Britain, lies east and west, across the middle of Europe, for a matter of some five hundred and fifty miles, though its average width, from north to south, is only a hundred and fifty miles. Its western extremity is thrust like a wedge into the southeastern flank of Germany; its eastern extremity touches the northern border of Roumania. Bohemia, the westernmost province, known once as “the pearl of Austria,” is not only the widest and most densely populated; it is the seat of the capital, Prague, and the country’s most vital part. Bohemia, with the adjoining provinces of Moravia and Silesia, forms geographical unity. They are inhabited by Czechs and Germans, with a high standard both of education and of efficiency. But east of Moravia begins the Carpathian mountain range. Slovakia and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, the one inhabited by Slovaks, a race close akin to the Czechs, and the other by Ruthenians, both poor and of a low standard of culture, lie side by side on the south slope of this great range, looking not westward toward Moravia and Bohemia, but south, into the plains of Hungary. It is important to remember this geographical anomaly, for upon it depend some of Czecho-Slovakia’s most urgent problems.

Within these frontiers dwell five different races. The total population is something over thirteen millions, divided, according to Czech statistics, roughly as follows: Czechs, 8,000,000; Slovaks, 2,500,000; Germans, 2,700,000; Magyars, 200,000; Ruthenians,

400,000. The Czechs and Slovaks, who, for most purposes, may be lumped together, form the dominant race; but the Germans and Magyars, who may also be considered together, are an exceedingly active minority, powerful in quality even more than in quantity. As for the Ruthenian mountaineers who inhabit the easternmost Carpathians, their province has been given autonomy under a governor, and they play little part in either the political or the economic life of the country.

Czecho-Slovakia has inherited over sixty per cent. of the industries of the former Austrian Empire. Bohemia is one of the most highly industrial regions of Europe. The great Skoda ironworks at Pilsen provided all Austria's war equipment, including the famous 42-centimeter howitzers. The Bohemian glassworks alone employ fifty thousand people. There is a well-developed textile industry and a great beet-sugar industry, which in 1913 purchased eighteen per cent. of the world's entire supply of beet-sugar. It is estimated that seventy-five per cent. of the country's manufactured goods should be available for export. There are coal and iron mines. There are great forests in Slovakia, and there is an intensive agriculture which is very nearly sufficient to feed the entire population. Altogether, theirs is a magnificent heritage, and the Czechs evidently intend to make the most of it. It is true that the country is far from salt-water; but the peace treaties have given it the important port of Pressburg on the Danube, and the freedom of the Elbe through Germany to Hamburg and the North Sea. Moreover, the reorganization of its railroads is proceeding rapidly. Economically it may already

be considered, both actually and potentially, as one of the strongest states in Europe.

Its political organization has also made great strides. A democratic republican constitution has been adopted and Professor Thomas G. Masaryk has been elected president for a term of seven years. There are innumerable political parties in Czecho-Slovakia, where the preoccupation with politics is such that it is said every family in the land reads at least two political journals a day. In Slovakia, the clericals, or Roman Catholic church party, predominate; but Bohemia and Moravia are given over to social-democrats, and it is they who lend the government its present socialistic color. Under President Masaryk's cultured and respected initiative, a number of moderate social reforms have been begun which, on the whole, are of commendable liberality.

The first great aim of the new government will doubtless be to amalgamate the still partially isolated Slovak element with the Czechs. These two peoples, as I have said, are closely related, both in race and in language. However, the Czechs, who were under Austrian rule, are culturally more advanced than the Slovaks, who were under Hungarian, and among whom the percentage of illiteracy is still high. Moreover, whereas the Czechs are socialists, and incline to indifference as regards the church, the Slovaks are devout clericals, and are strongly influenced by their priests. But the chief factors tending to separate the two races are geographical and economic. By every road and every valley the Slovaks are bound to the Hungarian plain, across which from their mountainsides they have looked out for many generations, and

from which they are now separated by a closed frontier. In summer, they were accustomed to go down into the plains to help with the harvest. In winter, they cut timber in the mountains, which they then hauled or floated down the valleys into Hungary. With the money they thus earned, they could buy the food-stuffs of the plains, to eke out the scanty produce of the mountains. Now all this ancient commerce of mountainside and plain is interrupted. There are two railroads connecting Slovakia with Moravia and Bohemia, but these are as yet inadequate to bind the two parts together. The Slovaks, unable to find as much work as before, unable to market their timber readily, lacking money and lacking food even when they have the money to buy it, have nevertheless cast in their lot whole-heartedly, for the time being, with the Czechs, their kinsmen, partly no doubt to be free of the hard hand of the Hungarian administration, but largely, perhaps, because the Czechs, by a land reform, have given them the land, held principally, heretofore, by the great Hungarian proprietors. The difference in culture between Czechs and Slovaks can in time be narrowed out by education; the political difference can be rendered innocuous if the Czech socialists will adopt a tolerant attitude toward Slovak religious convictions; but to overcome the geographic and economic differences is a far more complicated problem. So long as it remains impossible to turn the valleys around and make them run the other way, it is probable that, however much the government may strive to develop communications around and over the spurs and hill-tops, and into the mountain regions, it can never entirely succeed in breaking the natural bonds between

the Slovak highlands and the Hungarian plains. The only clear solution is the one which, while doubtless inexpedient for the moment, seems ultimately almost inevitable, namely, an agreement with Hungary which will reopen the frontier.

Grave as is the Slovak problem, that of the German minority is even more serious. The Germans form nearly a fourth of the total population and to them must be added a few hundred thousand Magyars of Slovakia and the Danube (Pressburg) region, who have rallied under German leadership. The stronghold of the German element is Bohemia, which is also the stronghold of the Czechs themselves. The German immigration, extending back over several centuries, has settled all the northern, western and southern outskirts of this province, framing thus a kind of half-moon around the Czech element. These outskirts, the site of most of the mines, are the site as well of most of the industries. The Germans of Bohemia were perhaps the most influential element in the Austrian Empire. As foremen, skilled workmen, managers, engineers or owners they controlled all the country's industries, looking down with scorn upon the Czechs, whom they considered stupid and inferior. But the Czechs, as a matter of fact, are on the whole the most advanced, both in national feeling and in culture, of all the former Austrian Slavs. The Slovenes, Croats and especially the Galician Poles compromised with Hapsburg rule; the Czechs, in their opposition to it, never wavered. Their powerful Sokols (Falcons), or gymnastic societies, aimed at cultivating not only their bodies, but their patriotism. In the years prior to the war, the struggle between the German and Czech cultures in

Bohemia had reached a bitter intensity. The two races lived side by side, yet absolutely apart. There were German theaters and Czech theaters; a German university and a Czech university; German shops, Czech shops; and so through all phases of life.

After being so long the masters, the feelings of the Germans at seeing the reins of government placed suddenly in the hands of the despised Czechs can readily be imagined. Their anger knows no bounds. Nationalists and socialists alike are banded in a stubborn political opposition to everything the Czechs attempt to do. The fact that the Czechs have given them full political rights, and the privilege of retaining German as an official language in all communities where the Germans number over twenty per cent, seems merely to have increased their fury. They demand local autonomy, like that accorded to the Sub-Carpathian Ruthenians. They demand to be reintegrated into Austria. They demand to be annexed to Germany—anything, in short, to escape from the Czechs. The latter, on the whole, have exhibited a commendable tolerance. However, if a German is thought to be insolent, he is liable to be beaten in the street. And though all Czechs of course know German, having been forced to learn it, they are still stubbornly loathe to speak it. Not until the foreigner, ignorant of Czech, has vainly tried to address them in French or English or Patagonian, will the people of Prague condescend to converse in German. In time this impractical prejudice will no doubt wear off, but for the present it continues to be very active.

As the Germans declare that nothing will satisfy them short of political independence, a solution of the

German problem is not easy to prescribe. The Germans declare that Czecho-Slovakia is an anomaly, that it cannot last. Meantime they will of course do what they can to break it up. If, however, contrary to their passionate predictions, the Czecho-Slovak state should not only live but prosper, it is not impossible that the force of their national interests will overcome their political discontent, and that to the state which brings them prosperity they will gradually accord their sufferance.

Feeling themselves to be dangerously isolated in a hostile Germanic world, the Slavs of Czecho-Slovakia went to the peace conference with two main purposes. They wanted a "corridor" of territory which, passing between Austria and Hungary, would connect them with their brothers, the Jugo-Slavs. This corridor was refused them; but they were given a port on the Danube, at Hungary's expense, which enables them to communicate by river across Hungary with Jugo-Slavia. In the second place, they wanted a corridor between Poland and Hungary to Roumania and Russia. This corridor was granted them; but the annexation of Eastern Galicia by Poland makes it at present a corridor, not to Russia, but merely to Roumania. Because of this, because also of temperamental differences and of the long-drawn-out dispute over the Teschen coalfields, the Czechs hate the Poles, whom they consider renegades to the pan-Slav cause. Almost the first act of the Czechs as regards foreign policy has been to form a defensive alliance with Jugo-Slavia against the supposed Hungarian menace, and at the same time, to declare that, come what may, the Czechs will never take arms against their Russian

brothers. Prague, indeed, has become more than ever one of the great centers of pan-Slav emotion.

The Czechs are afraid of Hungary because of the Magyars' repeated threats that some day, by one means or another, they mean to regain Slovakia. And they still hate Austria because it was the seat of the government which so long oppressed them, and of the business and industrial administrations which directed the Bohemian industries. This hate is not ungrounded; for despite their fervent efforts to free themselves from Vienna's subtle tentacles, they have not yet been able to do so. They now have possession of the industries, but Vienna still has the complicated selling organization, and most of Czecho-Slovakia's exports pass still of necessity through the hands of the Viennese middlemen. It is because they know so well the attractive power of the great Danubian city that the Czechs are so averse to any kind of "Danube Confederation" scheme which might increase this power. Their slogan, on the contrary, is "Vienna must fall." And the fact that there are something like 400,000 Czechs resident in Vienna leaves them unmoved.

With Germany, Czecho-Slovakia, without being exactly cordial, is on good terms, as indeed behooves a state whose principal outlet to the sea is the river Elbe. With Roumania, relations are amicable; though the Czechs well know that the Roumanians, not without reason, are suspicious of the Slav movement, and in general of all the Slavs.

From all that I have said it now becomes clear, I think, that more than any other state in Central Europe, Czecho-Slovakia has profound interest in

keeping the peace with all its neighbors. For in the first place, it is burdened with some three millions of Germans whose disloyalty, in case of war, is assured. In the second place, its shape is such that its frontiers are indefensible. A hostile army could cut the country in two almost before the Czechs could mobilize. In the third place, being an industrial, that is an exporting, state, having no sea coast, and being therefore at the mercy of its neighbors as regards the transit of its goods, it simply cannot afford to run the risk of trouble. A war with Germany would mean the closing of the Elbe; a war with Hungary, the closing of the Danube. If, like Switzerland, it could have its territorial integrity and its independence guaranteed in exchange for permanent neutrality this solution would no doubt suit it perfectly. But this being impossible, its only recourse, obviously, is to seek to associate itself in defensive alliances of such strength that its smaller enemies, at least, will not dare to attack it. This is the meaning of the "Petite Entente," the alliance of Czecho-Slovakia, Jugo-Slavia and Roumania, in the formation of which, M. Benès, the Czech foreign minister, has taken the initiative. But one alliance calls forth another; in assuring oneself of certain friendships, one inevitably loses certain others.

POLAND

So far as is known, the cradle of the Polish people was the Warta valley, in what is now Posnania. The Baltic to the north, the Carpathians to the south, form natural barriers to their expansion; but on the east and the west they have found no natural frontiers. Their history is one of ceaseless struggles with the Germans and the Moscovites. They lost Pomerania in 1140, and the order of Teutonic Knights took possession of East Prussia. But though repelled in the west, the Poles spread out rapidly eastward, and in the latter half of the XV Century, were the principal power in Eastern Europe. Then the Turks assailed them, and the Russians drove them in. The Moscovites recaptured Moscow, the Turks conquered the Ukraine and Podolia. In 1655, came the devastation and ruin of the Swedish invasion. The sun of Poland's glory was declining. In 1772, Prussia, Russia and Austria effected the first partition; in 1793, they trimmed down the helpless state still further; and in 1915, at the Congress of Vienna, they divided its last remnant between them.

At the time of its expiration, the Polish state was a unity. But a century of partition has not been without its effect. The reconstituted Poland of to-day consists of three distinct provinces which, though cemented firmly together by the strong bonds of a

common religion and a common patriotism, nevertheless differ profoundly in experience and in organization. Posnania, under German rule, became one of the granaries of Europe. Its yield of wheat per acre is double that of other parts of Poland. Its houses are neat and trim, its people can all read and write. And though the Poles here were oppressed in many ways—none of them for example were allowed to hold official positions, while shortly before the war the Germans even began evicting them in favor of German colonists,—they have nevertheless enjoyed real prosperity. Congress Poland, which was Russia's share in the last partition, is both the most miserable and the most densely populated province. The hand of imperial Russia lay heavy on this unfortunate people, who not only could take no part in the government but who were kept purposely in misery and ignorance. Illiteracy is here the rule. The villages are squalid, the farms poor. Galicia, Austria's part in the plunder, is not inhabited entirely by Poles. The peasants, particularly in Eastern Galicia, are Ruthenians, or Little Russians. The Poles here represent, on the whole, a superior caste—townspeople and rich landowners. For political reasons, Austria favored the Galician Poles, who were not only allowed to hold office, but who played a very important part in the affairs of the Empire. By way of precaution, however, the Hapsburgs took care to encourage by every possible means the national sentiment of the Ruthenians, so as to be able to play them off, in case of need, against the Poles; and at the present time Ruthenian (Little Russian or Ukrainian) national feeling is stronger in Eastern Galicia than in the Ukraine itself. Galicia, under

Austria, was fairly prosperous and fairly contented. Illiteracy is estimated at forty per cent, and affects chiefly, I believe, the Ruthenians. The population of Posnania is 7,500,000; of Congress Poland, 12,500,000 and of Galicia, 8,000,000.

East of Congress Poland and Galicia, between the rivers Bug and Dnieper, lies a great region of forest, lake and marshy plain which is claimed by both Poland and Russia. The population, which is scant, is mixed, about one-tenth being Polish, and the rest Ruthenian, White Russian, Lithuanian and Jewish. Prior to the first partition in 1772, all this territory belonged to Poland. It formed, in later times, what might be called the "back-woods" of modern Russia. Hither, west of the "pale," which followed roughly the line of the River Dnieper, the Russians drove the Jews, who now, in some of the towns, form over sixty per cent of the inhabitants. Here, too, in the great war, the eastern front was stabilized and added its devastation of barbed-wire, trench and shell-hole to an already half-barren waste. Being so thinly populated and economically so poor, this region seems admirably adapted to a compromise; and as I write it appears not unlikely that the future Polish-Russian frontier will follow approximately the line of the old Russian-German trenches. Perhaps the chief importance to Poland of these so-called Eastern Districts is as a field for future colonization. The density of population in Congress Poland is 270 inhabitants to the square mile, which is something like six times that of the United States. The birth-rate being high, emigration was inevitable. Between 1903 and 1912, over a million Poles went to the United States alone. Some 600,000 farm laborers

were accustomed to migrate temporarily every year. It is estimated that Poles living abroad sent home no less than forty million dollars annually. The assignment of a part of the Eastern Districts to Poland would enable the government to direct thither at least part of its formidable surplus and prevent to some extent the complication of what might otherwise become a serious problem.

When all questions of frontiers, including that of Upper Silesia, are finally decided, the total population of Poland will probably be about 30,000,000, and its area nearly equal to that of France. About thirty per cent of this population will be non-Polish,—to wit, 800,000 Germans, 3,000,000 Ruthenians, 5,000,000 Jews and a scattering of White Russians and Lithuanians. None of these racial minorities are likely to be a cause of serious trouble except the Jews, who form an unassimilated and utterly foreign body, in language, customs and religion no less than in sentiment. According to the estimates of 1910, there are in the entire world something over 11,000,000 Jews; of that total one-half are in Poland. No other explanation is needed of the friction which has manifested itself between the two races, both prolific, both intelligent, both religious and both stubborn. No doubt a large number of Jews will migrate; but many will remain. Assimilation, which is not impossible, may truly begin only when the Poles, on their part, will adopt a liberal policy, as indeed they now seem inclined to do, and when the Jews, on theirs, will frankly accept Polish sovereignty and cease their subtle agitations against the newly founded state.

The new Poland is a republic. The sovereign

authority is vested in the Sejm, or national diet, which, by resolution of February 20, 1919, appointed General Joseph Pilsudski chief-of-state, pending the drafting and adoption of a constitution. General Pilsudski is not only a popular hero; he is at the same time a socialist and an ardent nationalist, so that he attracts support from several shades of opinion. Political intrigue is developed to the point of vice in Poland, as in some other Eastern European countries. Pilsudski is not without opposition. There is a conservative faction grouped under the discreet and intelligent leadership of Roman Dumowski; there is a moderate liberal Paderewski faction. But on the whole, Pilsudski has shown himself to be the strongest man in the country. Given the weakness of the various ministries which have succeeded one another in power, he is perhaps virtually a dictator, for the time being, for he is head both of the civil administration and of the army. Some of his admirers, in their enthusiasm, call him the greatest man produced by the war, Foch being regarded by them as a mere technician. Politically, Poland is still in that stage of transition wherein old outworn parties subsist side by side with young new parties. Fusions and scissions succeed one another with dizzying complexity. The largest single party is that of the peasants, headed by Witos, himself a peasant. The elections to the Sejm, called soon after the armistice, were conducted under socialist inspiration in such a way that the peasants were perhaps unduly favored at the expense of the city populations, with the result that the business and industrial elements are slenderly represented, while there are perhaps sixty or seventy peasant deputies who can barely manage to

read and write. The peasants' party, however, has not an absolute majority. And doubtless the new constitution will redraft the election law so that the cities will assume in the future a more important rôle, as befits their higher standard of culture.

Up to the present, the war against Russia has completely absorbed Poland's young energies. To raise, equip and lead important armies, in a country newly formed and still disunited, is a feat of no small significance, and proves—if further proof were needed,—Poland's stern will to live. Each of the three provinces still has a separate administration; even the postal and railway systems are not yet entirely centralized. Each province is conscious of its own superiority, and somewhat jealous of the others. The only trained officials available for administrative posts were Galician Poles imbued with the traditions of the old Austrian bureaucracy, and the impression which they have made in other parts of the country has not always been of the best. At the same time, the fervent Roman Catholic religious feeling of the Poles, mingled with their no less fervent patriotism, forms a powerful cement. I myself have no doubts whatever as to the final unification of the country.

The war against Russia, which from the viewpoint of unification has perhaps been rather a good thing, from every other viewpoint has been deplorable. Pending the reorganization of taxation, public finance is in a disastrous condition. The railways, used only for the war, have not as yet been rendered available for ordinary commerce. Except for war purposes, there is neither import nor export, and industry stands paralyzed. However, there is every reason to believe that

with the conquest of genuine peace, an era of prosperity will open out before the country. Its agriculture, as I have shown in another place, is normally sufficient to feed the entire population, and is susceptible of great intensification. A few years of judicious development would furnish it with a good system of waterways, centering upon the broad artery of the Vistula and reaching the sea at the free port of Dantzic, easy access to which is absolutely essential to Poland's prosperity. It has zinc, iron, potash, lead and salt deposits. The Galician oil-fields are among the most productive in Europe. It has extensive forests, and it has coal. If it wins the Silesian plebiscite it will even have coal to export, as its total production will then reach 58,000,000 tons a year, instead of 14,000,000 without Silesia. There are moreover coal deposits in Galicia which as yet have never even been opened. Poland has considerable miscellaneous industries; but its great industrial asset is its textile mills, centering around the city of Lodz, known as the "Polish Manchester." These mills, four hundred and twenty-two in number, employed before the war some ninety-three thousand workmen, and attained an annual output of one hundred and seventeen million dollars. They are said to be the best on the Continent of Europe, and to produce some of the world's finest textiles. The value of certain mills is estimated at thirty million dollars each. The Germans, pursuing in Poland the same systematic plan of devastation carried out in France, stripped the Polish factories of their copper, their leather belting and parts of their machines; but with a very little effort they can be fully restored, and as soon as they are provided with coal and raw-stuffs, they can resume

operations. Labor in Poland is plentiful, cheap and still docile.

With Poland, the Catholic civilization of Rome leaves off, and the Greek orthodox civilization of Byzantium begins. The Poles consider that their special mission in Europe is to act as cultural interpreter and commercial agent between east and west. They particularly look forward to the time when the return of peace will enable them to utilize once more their extensive knowledge of the Russian language, character and institutions for the purpose of endeavoring to conquer a large share of the great Russian market. They believe that a large part of the hostility which Germany and particularly Britain have ceaselessly manifested toward them arises from fear of their competition in the Eastern European trade. They are confident that they will ultimately be able to produce more cheaply than any other European country. They hope for the assistance of French, Italian and American capital in the furtherance of their great commercial and industrial projects.

Now, as in centuries gone by, the main fact in determining Poland's foreign policy must be that the country lies between two powerful peoples, the Germans on the west and the Russians on the east, both of whom covet its territory, and with neither of whom it has any natural frontier. If these two peoples ally themselves permanently against it, its very existence will be rendered precarious. The question arises, therefore, whether it cannot succeed in conciliating either one or the other. There is indeed a faint possibility that Poland and Germany may one day combine for the purpose of invading the Russian market. On

the whole, however, the separation of East Prussia from the rest of Germany by the Polish "corridor" along the Vistula would seem to insure the undying hostility of Germany, especially if Poland, in addition, should win the Silesian plebiscite. There is a feeling among certain Poles, particularly the Galician military faction, that the friendship of Russia is equally chimerical, and that on the east, Poland's best policy would be to initiate the formation of a series of buffer states—Lithuania, White Russia, the Ukraine which, so far as possible should be brought under Polish influence. I believe that General Pilsudski himself rather favors this plan. Certainly, as long as Bolshevism continues to rule Russia, Poland must continue to be on its guard in the east. And almost as certainly, after Bolshevism falls, a decade or two at the least will necessarily elapse before a new Russian power can begin to make itself felt. Most educated Poles believe, however, that a day will come when Russia will once more rearise, strong and great. In that day, what will become of the little Baltic states, the Caucasian states, the Ukraine, a possible small White Russia? As a defense against Bolshevism they might serve a purpose, no doubt. But once a new régime, which wins the recognition of the western nations, is inaugurated, they will almost inevitably drift back under the powerful sway of Moscow. Is it better, therefore, for Poland to risk, not only the immediate but the permanent hostility of Russia, by attempting too wide an expansion toward the east; or should it not rather endeavor even now to prepare the way, if possible, for future friendship? On the answer which Poland finally makes to this question, much will depend.

The Poles are the only Slavs who are free from the present recrudescence of pan-Slav feeling. With "their brothers," the Czechs, indeed, their relations are frankly bad, not only because of the Teschen quarrel and settlement, which has left the Poles with an imaginary grievance, but because of Czecho-Slovakia's sympathy for Soviet Russia. The Poles believe that the Czechs stopped, in transit, munition trains destined for Poland, and accuse the Czechs of having thus "stabbed them in the back." A number of years will no doubt pass before these wounds of relationship can heal. With Roumania, on the contrary, which, like Poland, borders Russia, and fears not only the soviets but future Russian expansion, Poland has many political interests in common.

6

ROUMANIA

THE Kingdom of Roumania seems destined to play an important part in the new Europe. Not only does it control both banks of the lower Danube and the outlet of this great waterway into the Black Sea, but by its geographical position, it forms a kind of keystone, belonging at the same time to Central Europe, Eastern Europe and the Balkans. No alliances or federations in any of these regions can be projected without taking Roumania into account. Its population, 7,500,000 before the war, now verges close upon 16,000,000. Bastioned strongly on the north and west by the Carpathian mountains, protected by the Danube on the south, and by the Dniester on the east, its potential military strength has also more than doubled. The development, either by native effort, or by external aid, of a greater capacity for organization, would perhaps make it one of the chief military powers of Europe; though there are some critics who hold that the Roumanians, lacking a certain iron temper of mind and character, will never make such perfect soldiers as, say, their warlike neighbors, the Bulgars, Serbs and Magyars. The fact nevertheless remains that Roumania, within its new natural frontiers of mountain and broad river, is a fortress not lightly to be assaulted in the future.

The racial antecedents of the modern Roumanians

are obscure, for the country lay full in the pathway of the great east-to-west migrations, and was submerged by one after another! It is probable that they are a mixture of the Dacians, a people of Thracian stock who inhabited the country when it was first conquered by Rome; of Slavs, as shown by the number of Slav roots in their language; and of the soldier-colonists—Iberian, Gallic, Thracian and Roman—planted by Rome in Dacia. Their language, however, especially in its structure, is scarcely other than a Latin dialect, and the people proudly consider themselves to be Latins, which indeed, to all intents, they are—akin, vaguely to the Italians and French. This Latin nation, surrounded though not submerged by an ocean of Slavic peoples no less hardy and prolific than its own, feels itself to be terribly isolated; and the recent recrudescence of the pan-Slav movement has only increased the sense of continual danger in which it lives. Where look for friends? Russia, from whom it has just regained its old province of Bessarabia, is sure to be its enemy in the future. Czecho-Slovakia is Russia's warmest friend. Bulgaria, from whom it took the Doubroudja in 1913, is for Roumania a certain foe. With Jugoslavia, still nominally its ally, it has quarrelled bitterly over the partition of Banat; and moreover, the Jugoslavs are quick with pan-Slav sentiment which, if it were ever to become militant, might suddenly, like a wet sponge, wipe Roumania out. Poland, it is true, is hostile to Russia just now, and is hence Roumania's friend. But what is to guarantee that Poland, as well, may not ultimately be drawn into the swelling current of pan-Slavism? Hungary, Roumania's only non-Slav neighbor, was Roumania's enemy in the late war. The

Magyars devastated Roumania, and have in turn been invaded and plundered by them. The Magyars swear, moreover, that they will never, in spirit, relinquish the province of Transylvania, ceded to Roumania by the peace treaties, and where they are even now keeping up a fierce propaganda. With the exception of Russia and Hungary, every one of its neighbors is courting Roumania; but the isolated Latin nation has thus far met their overtures with a coy reserve not far removed from suspicion. To Poland, which invited it to join in the war against the Bolsheviks, it replied sympathetically but firmly, that it would remain on the defensive and would fight only in case it should again be attacked. To Czecho-Slovakia and Jugo-Slavia, which have invited it to join their "Petite Entente," against Hungary, it has answered, even while signing the alliance for a period of two years, that it sympathises with their attitude and that certainly, if Hungary takes up arms, it may be counted upon to help keep down the Magyar danger, but that it cannot, for the present, and pending other developments, press the alliance too far. Even in the midst of its hatred and fear of Hungary, it has allowed this fiery state to understand that a day may come when against Slav aggression a measure of common defense may become more vital than the prolongation of their private quarrel. And to Bulgaria's naïve proffers of loving kindness, it has pointedly answered: "Yes, but does this sudden amicability of yours include our friends, the Greeks?" Greece, indeed, is the one nearby nation with which the Roumanians feel they can whole-heartedly ally themselves. The Greeks too, by their recent expansion, have probably incurred the eternal enmity

of Russia. Both have every reason to be suspicious of the Slav movement, and both have a strong interest in keeping the Dardanelles, through which three-fourths of Roumania's export normally pass, out of Slav hands. The rapprochement of the two countries has recently been furthered by the conclusion of two important dynastic ties: Prince George, the eldest son of Constantine of Greece, has married Ferdinand's daughter; and the Roumanian crown prince, Carol, after having contracted an unpopular morganatic marriage with Miss Lambrino, a Roumanian girl, is now reported to be engaged to the Princess Helen of Greece. But Roumania having now realized to the full its "national aspirations," I do not believe that it could be drawn into an aggressive action even at the behest of Greece. Its whole policy has become one of cautious defense; those means, and those means only, which meet this one condition, will have its favor; and until the future attitude of Russia itself and of various other nations toward Russia, becomes more clear, it may be expected to maintain a position of exceeding prudence.

Roumania's isolation is further accentuated by disappointment in and suspicion of the great allies—even of France and Italy, although these two, especially the former, have at present a real influence in Bucharest. In particular, the Roumanians, who suffered invasion and pitiless devastation, are indignant at having been lumped by the allies with Portugal and Japan, among the nations who are to receive only three per cent of the war indemnities. Italy may be their blood relation; they nevertheless had the surprise of seeing it aid Hungary when they were fighting the Magyar com-

munists in the spring of 1919. Britain may be as anti-Slav as themselves, but it is not without a certain distrust that they look upon the obvious desire of the former to obtain control not only of the Danube, but of Constantinople and the Dardanelles. France at present may pose as their best friend; it may even, in its new rôle of conciliator in this part of the world, try some day to reconcile the Russians to the loss of Bessarabia; but it is no less true that a time may come when France will have to choose between the friendship of Roumania and that of Russia and the Slavs, in which event, for France's purpose, it is very doubtful if Roumania could tip the scales. In their complicated speculations, looking toward the guarantee of their own safety, the Roumanians are thus brought to the realization that to counter-balance the pan-Slav danger, they may ultimately have to seek the support of Germany itself. In general, under the stimulus of their new desire for economic self-sufficiency they are suspicious of the designs of all great capitalist states. But if they must have financial and technical help from somewhere, they would perhaps have an interest in accepting the offers of Germany which, with Austria, had pretty well conquered the Roumanian market before the war and which usually will make better terms and quicker deliveries than Britain, France, or the United States.

Moreover, Ferdinand, their king, is himself a Hohenzollern. This did not keep Roumania out of the war; it is nevertheless a consideration. One of the standard subjects of gossip in Bucharest is whether Ferdinand, though quiet and inconspicuous, is in reality a great statesman, or whether, as appears to be the

case, he is completely overshadowed by the active and charming personality of his queen, Marie, who, as is commonly said, "has a hand in everything."

The question is perhaps, after all, less important than it appears, for the real government of the country seems to be passing more and more surely into the power of certain experienced political leaders, such as Take Ionescu and the Brătianos. The war has completely overturned Roumania's political life. The conservatives, and Dr. Marghiloman, the Germanophile leader, have disappeared from the arena. In May, 1920, a new party, the "people's party," centering around the personality of General Averescu, who is credited among the peasants with supernatural power, because of his success in stopping the Germans, swept the field, seating two hundred out of a total of some three hundred and fifty deputies. However, not only is General Averescu himself a man of no governmental experience, but in this entire party, composed chiefly of peasants, with whom the ability to read and write is altogether exceptional, there are no real leaders. Places in the ministry were therefore offered to the veteran statesmen, Take Ionescu and Jean Brătiano, chiefs, respectively, of the democratic and liberal parties. General Averescu's popularity seems to give a certain stability to a government which is really conducted by two men whose combined force in the chamber does not exceed twenty deputies. The one weakness of this ministerial combination is that the Transylvanian mountaineers, who in education, in force of character and in energy are perhaps superior to their countrymen of the vast rich lazy grain-lands, are not represented. The leaders of the Transylva-

nians, who are perhaps destined ultimately to exercise considerable authority in the country, are Messrs. Vaida and Maniu.

With the integration of the Boukovine and Transylvania, the nation has acquired wide forests, and has added considerably to its mineral resources which, in addition to the government salt monopoly producing 150,000 tons a year, now include large quantities of black and brown lignite, some coal, a few gold, silver and iron mines, and undeveloped deposits of copper and manganese. There are few factories in Roumania. Both iron and coking coal are lacking. Its locomotives are fired by a mixture of brown lignite and oil. The country's real wealth lies almost wholly in two things: its oil, and its agriculture. Even before the war doubled its territory, Roumania was the richest country in the Balkans. Its foreign trade exceeded that of Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria together. In 1913, it had a favorable trade balance of 15,574,000 lei. Oil formed twenty per cent, and cereals sixty-seven per cent of its exports. At the present time, despite the fact that its mineral wealth has been increased, and that the reannexation of Bessarabia gives it another great tract of unexcelled grain lands, it is struggling in the grip of a grave economic crisis. Both oil and cereal exports have fallen almost to zero, and as imports continue, the public debt is piling up fast. This year's crops are estimated at only thirty per cent of normal. I have given elsewhere the reasons for the decline in production; they include the vast requisitions of horses and cattle by the enemy during the war, and above all, the uncertainties attendant upon the execution of the land reform. The oil question is more complicated.

In 1914, the Roumanian oilfields, located chiefly in the Carpathian foothills, around Prahova and Dombrovitz, were furnishing one per cent of the world's total oil supply. Half of this oil was available for export. Of the total capitalization of ten million five hundred thousand dollars, fifty-eight per cent was in German hands, twenty-eight per cent in British and fourteen per cent in American. Between Take Jonescu and the Brătianos, there is a difference of opinion with regard to the desirability of foreign capital in Roumania. The former fears that the country cannot develop without it. The latter, who seem in this respect to have public opinion entirely with them at the present time, are not only suspicious of all foreign investments, but they desire, if possible, to eliminate foreign money from Roumania altogether. Under their influence, the Roumanian government has simply expropriated the German oil interests, and in exchange, for a promise of twenty-five per cent of the profits, has turned them over to a group of Roumanian engineers, who have declared a capitalization of one hundred million lei, and who claim complete control. The next step is to eliminate the British and American interests; and this is not so easy, for both are pretty well able to look after themselves. However, the Roumanians, nothing daunted, have set out boldly upon a policy of interference and obstructionism, by which they hope, in the end, to wear out their adversaries and force them to yield. One expedient follows another. The government has established a consortium to control the interior market, and is attempting to set the export price. A decree has been issued forbidding drilling on new concessions, which means that in any case the British

and American interests can scarcely hold out longer than two years more. The latter protest that having developed this wealth solely by their own capital, initiative, machinery and engineers, they have a moral right to the profits for some time to come, but this argument leaves the Roumanians cold. It is therefore not so much the German destructions in the oil-fields as this economic battle between allies which has reduced Roumanian oil-production at the present time to such a point that as late as July, 1920, oil brought all the way from the United States was being marketed profitably in Black Sea ports.

In addition to doubling the country's population, the annexation of the new provinces of Transylvania, Bessarabia, the Boukovine and the Banat has brought within the country's frontier some vigorous and hostile racial minorities whose assimilation bids fair to remain a difficult matter. So far as I know, accurate statistics do not exist; but roughly, of a total of fifteen to sixteen millions, there are perhaps eleven million five hundred thousand Roumanians, one million five hundred thousand Magyars, five hundred thousand Germans, one million Ruthenians (Ukrainians), nine hundred thousand Jews and one hundred thousand Gypsies. All the new provinces except Bessarabia have nominally been united under one administration, but the change from the Hungarian laws and customs in the Banat and Transylvania, from the Austrian in the Boukovine, and from the Russian in Bessarabia must of necessity be gradual. In none of these regions is the Roumanian majority beyond challenge. In Transylvania it is only slightly over fifty per cent, with the Magyars and Germans forming a close second. In

Bessarabia there are supposed to be about fifty-three per cent Roumanians, twenty-eight per cent Ruthenians (Ukrainians) and the rest Jews and Germans. The estimates for the Banat show thirty-nine per cent Roumanian, thirteen per cent Magyar, twenty-five per cent German (Suabian), eighteen per cent Serbian; and for the Boukovine, thirty-five per cent Roumanian, thirty-nine per cent Ruthenian (Ukrainian), thirteen per cent Jews. All the new provinces are under military occupation, and in all a strong hand is being used. Minorities, on one pretext or another, are being expropriated in favor of Roumanians. New and incompetent officials are making a reputation for themselves similar to that earned by the northern "carpet-baggers" in the south, after the American civil war. Arrests, expulsions, and even disorders are not infrequent. However, except possibly in Transylvania, where the combined Magyar and German opposition to the new rule is very stubborn, and has by no means lost hope, I expect to see the Roumanians establish a tolerably stable order within a relatively short time. Agitators here need expect no mercy.

A word remains to be said concerning the often-raised Jewish question. There is indeed a certain amount of anti-semitism in Roumania, as in all Eastern European countries, where the gentiles stand in a kind of superstitious dread of Jewish financial and commercial prowess. However, so far as I am aware, there have never been any pogroms here. The great complaint of the Jews,—that the rights of citizenship were withheld from them,—have been met by the reform law of two years ago, giving the right to vote and to own property to all Jews who can prove they

were born in Roumania. This is well enough for the more highly cultured Sephardic Jews of the old Spanish-speaking stock. But the majority of Roumanian Jews are of the Ashkenazic, or Yiddish-speaking German strain, who have fled into Roumania out of Russia or Poland, and many of whom have no family papers. A generation will doubtless have to elapse before they can duly take advantage of this somewhat equivocal reform. The Roumanians, on the whole, are not indisposed to be tolerant as regards the country's nine hundred thousand Israelites; although some of the latter, especially in Bessarabia, are suspected of Bolshevik sympathies, and are being encouraged to emigrate.

7.

JUGO-SLAVIA

FOR far-reaching significance, all other questions, in this newly formed state, are overshadowed by that of its constitution, which is still in abeyance and promises to remain so for some time. If, in the end, the state should be constituted on a federation basis, as the Slovenes and Croats seem to desire, Bulgaria might then be welcomed into the federation, the age-long Macedonian controversy would enter a new phase, and the Slavs would dominate the Balkans.

If, on the other hand, the Serbs, as they desire to do, succeed in establishing a uniform administration on the Serbian model, and under Serbian hegemony, Bulgaria may be held aloof, Macedonia will continue to be divided in three, and the struggle for predominance in the Balkans will continue. What, then, it may be well to ask, are the essentials of this question of constitution?

The Jugo-Slav, or South-Slav states, known officially as the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, was formed after the armistice by combining the kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro with the former South-Slav possessions of Austria and Hungary. The result is a rugged mountainous country, filling the entire north-western part of the Balkan peninsula, with a population of over fourteen millions, divided among its seven provinces as follows: Serbia, 4,456,000; Montenegro,

435,000; Voivodina, 2,675,000; Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1,898,000; Dalmatia, 645,000; Croatia-Slavonia, 2,621,000; Slovenia, 1,610,000. Over seventy-five per cent of the inhabitants are Jugo-Slavs. There are several hundred thousand Roumanians in the Voivodina and northeastern Serbia, and several hundred thousand Albanians in Southwestern Serbia and Southern Montenegro, but neither of these races is likely to be a source of trouble. There are perhaps half a million each of Germans and Magyars in the former Austro-Hungarian provinces, but they, like the few thousand Italians of the Dalmatian coast, are too few and too scattered to be a serious menace. The Bulgars of Macedonia and the eastern Serbian frontier, in all perhaps 700,000, while of a surly and rebellious mind, may themselves claim, despite the Tartar strain in their blood, to be South-Slavs and only in the event that Bulgaria is kept out of the Jugo-Slav federation are they likely to foment rebellion; so that on the whole, it may be said that the problem of assimilating racial minorities is here by no means acute. The real difficulty is between the three branches of Jugo-Slavs themselves.

The Serbs, who not only inhabit Serbia and Montenegro, but are found in small communities in the Voivodina, in Dalmatia, in Croatia-Slavonia and in Bosnia-Herzegovina, are the predominant race, forming about forty per cent of the population. They are of a low standard of literacy, eighty per cent illiterate, but of great military virtue. They use the Cyrillic, or Russian alphabet, and profess the Greek orthodox faith. The Croats, fifty-five per cent illiterate, who number some twenty-five per cent of the population, acquired, under Austro-Hungarian rule, a somewhat higher culture

than the Serbs whom, however, they closely resemble in other ways. They were, for instance, the best soldiers in the Austrian army. They differ from the Serbs, however, in certain peculiarities of language, and in their use of the Latin instead of the Cyrillic alphabet. About one-fourth of them belong to the Greek orthodox church, the rest being Roman Catholic. They are found principally in Croatia-Slavonia, Dalmatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Slovenes, or Wendes, inhabiting principally Slovenia, the northernmost Jugo-Slav provinces, and forming perhaps ten per cent of the population, have been for centuries in intimate contact with the Austro-Germans, and boast the highest culture of any South-Slav people (fifteen per cent illiterate). Like the Croats, they employ the Latin alphabet, but their language forms still a third variation of the Jugo-Slav tongue. Their chief characteristic is the fervency of their religious sentiments. They are devout Roman Catholics.

The enemies of Jugo-Slavia, especially the Italians, have constantly averred that what with racial, cultural and religious differences this state will never succeed in welding itself firmly together. It was said, for example, that neither the Montenegrins nor the Croats and Slovenes would accept the Karageorgevitch dynasty of Serbia; that the Roman Catholics, being slightly in the majority, would rebel against the propagandist tentatives of the Greek orthodox clergy; and finally, that the better educated Croats and Slovenes, with their neat Germanized towns and public works, would never permit themselves to be dictated to by the cruder Serbians, with their clumsy sprawling capital and their shabby villages. But to this one may reply that the

superior culture of the Croats and Slovenes is perhaps largely external, and that the three peoples are really very much alike; that the Serbs, though holding patriotically to their church, are not aggressively religious, and will not attempt to interfere with the sectarian freedom of their Roman Catholic brothers; and finally, that the voyage of Alexander, the Prince Regent, to Zagreb and Ljubiana in June, 1920, which foreign critics had declared he would never dare to attempt for fear of assassination, was not only a success, but a triumph, and that no further proof is needed of the loyalty of the new provinces to the Serbian reigning house. I am personally of the opinion that this state, bound together by so many ties—of blood, of language, of material interest, of common aspiration, even of a kind of geographical unity,—will in time succeed in attaining a true political unity. A year ago, this outcome might have been considered doubtful. But the prolongation of the Fiume episode, and consequently of the danger of war with Italy, bore heavily upon the Slovenes, who are not only the loudest in their demand for autonomy, but who are closest to the Italian frontier, and therefore the most exposed. In short, it may be said that the Fiume dispute has done more than any other factor to cement the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes together.

The Serbs would like to establish a single administration throughout the whole territory, centering in Belgrade, and giving them a kind of hegemony over the other Jugo-Slavs. It was their action, they consider, which freed their compatriots from Austro-Hungarian domination. No one contests the high value of their military organization. The dynasty is theirs.

And the superior education of the Croats and Slovenes is more than compensated, in the Serbs' opinion, by the superior political and administrative experience of the latter.

The Croats and Slovenes, however, while they accept the dynasty, and the unification of the army under the Serbian general staff, are by no means enthusiastic over the Serbian administration, which seems to them, on the whole, decidedly inferior to that to which they had become accustomed under the Hapsburgs. They consider that Belgrade compares unfavorably with their local capitals, and they incline toward a federative constitution, which would leave them a large measure of regional autonomy. In Montenegro, as well, though there is no real movement in favor of the unseated king, Nicholas, the people, particularly in the south, seem to favor autonomy. It is to conciliate these South Montenegrins that the Serbs are so eager to take the town of Scutari from Albania. The inhabitants of Bosnia-Herzegovina, one-third of whom are Moslem Slavs, converted under Turkish rule, seem also to desire to preserve a certain local independence.

At the present time, King Peter having become feeble with age, his son, Alexander, reigns as Prince Regent, and seems to have been accepted by the entire country. The continuation of the constitutional monarchical form of government is practically assured. There have as yet been no elections. A provisional assembly has been brought together, consisting of the Serb deputies elected in 1912, and delegates appointed from the local councils of the new provinces. Though not really representative, the assembly is exercising national legislative authority. The ministry includes

Croat and Slovene leaders as well as Serbs, but until regular elections are held, which will reveal the actual strength of the various political parties, no ministry can long defend itself against the attacks of the ever-renewed opposition. Though the Serbs are endeavoring more and more to take the leadership, the provincial administrations are still largely autonomous. A commission is studying a possible re-districting of the country on economic rather than on racial lines, but its recommendations will doubtless be opposed by the provinces. Another commission is trying to draft a new constitution, and so far as I know, is still wrestling with the problem of whether there shall be one or two legislative chambers. As far as can be foreseen at present, the probable outcome of all this complicated play of racial and political forces will be a compromise between the ideas of federation and unification. The army and the diplomatic and consular service will be strongly centralized. There will be only one legislature, but the provinces will keep their local capitals, and under the guidance of a governor, will enjoy autonomy in most local questions. The spirit of the constitution will be free and democratic, as befits a nation of peasant proprietors. All religions, not only the Greek orthodox, representing fifty per cent of the population, and the Roman Catholic, representing thirty-five per cent, but the Israelite, representing something less than ten per cent, and the Moslem, five per cent, will be placed upon an equal basis. For if there is no Jewish question in Jugo-Slavia, the Jews here having been assimilated into a spirit of patriotism, there is a Moslem question. What with the Bosnian Slav Moslems (612,000), the Albanian Moslems and

the Turks of Macedonia, Jugo-Slavia has become the principal Moslem power of Europe (1,600,000), and must take account of the fact. Finally, education in both the Cyrillic and the Latin alphabets will be made obligatory. Of course, it is entirely possible that the Jugo-Slavs may behave foolishly, and make endless trouble for themselves by internal quarrels. Nobody knows, and I, myself, in taking the optimistic view, am only guessing. But I think I am guessing about right.

Jugo-Slavia is almost exclusively an agricultural country. At least ninety per cent of its exports consist of grain, fruit and cattle. Despite primitive methods, and the disturbances attendant upon a somewhat disorderly land reform, it should have exported, even this year, some fifty thousand 10-ton carloads of wheat, and a hundred and fifty thousand carloads of corn. Its industries at present are insignificant. It has, however, forests whose area is twice that of all Belgium, and some important mineral deposits. The Bor Copper mines, developed by French capital, are world-famous. There seem to be copper deposits no less important, awaiting exploitation, in the region of Novi-Bazar; there are partially opened iron deposits in Bosnia, said to be the largest in the world; and there is for the moment a sufficiency of coal.

The utilization of these resources, no less than the export of its agricultural surpluses, depends to a great extent on the improvement of transportation. At present, owing partly to material difficulties natural in a mountainous country, partly to the inefficiency of the state administration, the railways are entirely inadequate. The entire southern half of the country is de-

pendent on a single line running to the Greek port of Saloniki. The northern half could, it is true, utilize the Danube to a much greater extent than is done at present, but to reach salt water, it is dependent on Fiume, for the time being at least, and the free use of this port should have been given it, if only temporary. There is urgent need, however, to transform the Bosnian narrow-gauge railways into standard-gauge lines, and to open a double-track road from Belgrade to the Dalmatian port of Spalato. A second trans-mountain line from Belgrade to Cattaro might then profitably be undertaken. Only by the construction of these lines can Jugo-Slavia become really independent of Greece, on the one hand, and of Italy, on the other; for even if Fiume were given outright to Jugo-Slavia, it is so near the Italian frontier as to be placed immediately in danger in case of trouble.

It appears, then, that Jugo-Slavs, despite their tardiness in stabilizing their internal régime, and despite their somewhat chaotic administration, are a people possessing not only considerable economic strength, since they have copper and iron and a surplus of food, but of real military strength, both by the geographical configuration of their frontier, and by their hardy and warlike character. Fourteen millions to-day, they may well number seventeen or eighteen millions a few years hence, which would enable them to put into the field an army of at least two million bayonets. "It is not with politics," they say, "and with strategical policies that a nation defends itself, but with the breasts of its soldiers." Though they suffered in the war perhaps as heavily, in proportion, as any other people, and were invaded, massacred, exiled, the Serbs are still

fired with military ardor! Obviously, the Jugo-Slavs are to be seriously reckoned with.

The mainspring of the nation's foreign policy, on its positive side, at least, is here, as at Prague and Sofia, a renaissance of pan-Slav sentiment. Czechs and Jugo-Slavs, for years before the war, were united in their opposition in the Viennese parliament, and the peace treaties have drawn them more closely together than ever. Both are opposed to any sort of federation which would tend to restore, under another name, the Hapsburg Empire; both are distrustful of Austria and afraid of Hungary; both look toward Russia, soviet or otherwise, with a feeling of filial affection. Bulgaria, though Serbia's traditional and deeply hated enemy, is nevertheless also Slav, and mediative influences on the part of the Czechs, the French, and the thousands of Russian emigrés who have taken refuge in the Balkans, are at work to reconcile these two peoples. The Croats and Slovenes are favorable to Bulgaria's request to join the Jugo-Slav federation; only the Serbs, opposed to the idea of a federation and preferring a unified administration under their own control, remain hostile. And even they, or at least the more intelligent among the Serbian leaders, are frank to say that although it is too soon at present, the union of Bulgaria and Jugo-Slavia is in the future inevitable. All the Jugo-Slavs, indeed, are dreaming of grandeur. Their country, they believe, can easily support fifty million people. Their resources are rich, their people prolific and combative. The absorption of Bulgaria will give them a coast-to-coast control of the Balkan peninsula, and they will have become, they imagine, a world-power of the first rank.

One reason why they are still holding Bulgaria aloof, and thus postponing the realization of this bold programme, is that union with Bulgaria will doubtless alienate them from the Greeks; for a Jugo-Slav state, including the Bulgars, and holding all the hinterland of Macedonia and Thrace, could not fail in the long run to threaten Greek control of the coast, and particularly of the ports of Saloniki and Cavalla. Before arousing the suspicions of the Greeks, they would like, therefore, to be sure that the Adriatic question is really settled, in which they have always hoped to have Greece with them against Italy. In Albania, indeed, Greeks and Jugo-Slavs have a common interest; first, in keeping Italy out of Valona, which, mainly through the efforts of the Albanians themselves, they now seem to have accomplished; and second, in dividing Albania between them, a design in which they seem at present destined to fail, for Britain, France and Italy all now seem to favor an independent Albania. There are signs, however, that under the mediatory influence of Britain, the differences between Greece and Italy are slowly being ironed out. The day may well come when the Jugo-Slavs will find themselves alone on the Adriatic, facing a hostile and vigorous young Italy, having behind it the sympathies both of Britain and Greece. In that day, or even when it appears that such a day is approaching, the Serbs' last opposition to union with Bulgaria will, I think, fall.

Despite the conclusion, in November, 1920, of the Treaty of Rapallo, the question of the Adriatic bids fair to be of long duration. Fiume was only one symptom of a serious general situation. When two nations, both young, both strong, both ambitious, face

one another across a narrow body of water like the Adriatic, over which both aspire to hegemony, they may succeed in reaching a truce, but scarcely a real peace. A settlement which would presumably satisfy both parties is an impossibility. Britain, profoundly distrustful of the Slavs, tends more and more, as I have indicated, to range itself behind Italy, and hence is viewed with more and more suspicion in Jugo-Slavia. France, on the other hand, is being drawn slowly but surely more and more closely to the Slavs. The Jugo-Slavs, like all the younger peoples, are afflicted by radical xenophobia, and are suspicious of their friends; nevertheless, so far as they admit of any advice, they incline to listen to the French. They are, moreover, enthusiastic admirers of the man whom the peasants fondly call "Uncle Wilson,"—this, of course, because of the American president's famous pronunciamento in the Adriatic question. It cannot, however, be said that the United States has any particular interest in, or influence over the Jugo-Slavs.

After having quarrelled fiercely with Roumania over the partition of the Banat of Temesvar, which the Serbs claimed less on racial grounds than on strategical—as a sort of glacis to protect Belgrade—the Jugo-Slavs are now inclined to establish friendly relations with this Latin neighbor of theirs; but there are too many elements of uncertainty in this friendship for one to attempt to predict how long it may last.

The question has often been raised—though it is perhaps no longer apropos—whether a war is not imminent between the Italians and the Jugo-Slavs. The former, in their present state of social disorder would scarcely dare provoke it. As for the latter, though

they are confident that they could take not only Fiume but even Venice, almost at one blow, especially with the Italian army demoralized as at present, they will not, I think, precipitate hostilities. The support given them by public opinion in western Europe and in America, in the Fiume dispute has been a great sense of pride to them; they would not like to turn opinion against them by starting a new war—not just now, at any rate. The struggle for the supremacy of the Adriatic is a struggle deferred—indefinitely, one may hope.

GREECE

THE almost miraculous apotheosis of Greece in the Balkan war and the recent peace settlements is due no doubt in large part to the extraordinary personal skill of the lawyer from Crete, Eleutherios Venizelos, whom his many admirers consider to be the greatest statesman of modern times; and certainly, considering that in the negotiations, Greece has obtained, generally speaking, not only all it asked for, but more, there is no one who would deny the high ability of this gifted descendant of a race traditionally famous for being deeply versed in political psychology. However, it must be admitted that circumstances—particularly those circumstances which have made it the trusted agent and ally of Britain in the Eastern Mediterranean, have aided Greece. And finally, it must be said that Venizelos himself could have done nothing, had it not been for the extraordinary adaptability and expansive force of the Greek people.

This breed of sailors and traders, sons of a barren, rocky soil, have shown themselves, particularly in modern times, to be one of the most powerful races of the Mediterranean. They have spread in every direction around the shores of this great tideless sea, and a large part of its commerce and small shipping, especially in its more easternly waters, is in their hands. Patriotic, pliable, shrewd, they have penetrated even

into the inland towns of Asia Minor. They were the businessmen and technicians of Turkey; and would in time, by solely pacific means, have conquered it completely. But the consciousness of their own strength gave birth to the Pan-Hellenic movement, which in turn has made possible the country's present wide-flung frontiers, and it is not at all improbable that in securing their political expansion, the Greeks have paralyzed the progress of their vast economic penetration.

There are supposed, by Greek propagandists, to be, in the entire world, some 8,464,000 Greeks scattered as follows: 4,500,000 in the Greece of 1913; 123,000 in Northern Epirus; 436,000 in Thrace; 355,000 in the region of Tchetalджа and Constantinople; 1,700,000 in Asia Minor; 350,000 in Cyprus and the Dodecanesus; 200,000 in Egypt; 400,000 in such Western Mediterranean ports as Genoa and Marseilles, and in the United States; 400,000 in South Russia and the Caucasus. The new Greece, as formed by the diplomacy of Venizelos and the British foreign office, includes most of these widespread groups. It is a country drawn round about a sea, a country of mountainous coasts and jagged islands; the Aegean has become once more a Grecian lake. Although its exact frontiers, especially in Asia Minor, are still in doubt, its total population is probably about 7,500,000; 4,632,000 in the Greece of 1914; 2,500,000 in Thrace and Asia Minor; 150,000 in the Dodecanesus archipelago; 250,000 in Northern Epirus. The principal racial minorities are the Albanians of Northern Epirus; the Turks and Bulgars of Macedonia and Thrace; the Jews of Saloniki; the Turks of Asia Minor. Exact statistics are not available, but there must be several hundred thousand Alban-

ians; half a million Bulgars and nearly a million Turks, depending on how far into Asia Minor the Greeks finally penetrate. These minorities are scarcely strong enough to be troublesome, except in the event of war, in which case their presence in the neighborhood of the frontiers might constitute a serious menace.

The reoccupation by Greece of the lands with which its ancient history is so intimately associated is in many respects a magnificent representation of poetic justice. The mountaineers of Northern Greece and those of Southern Albania are no doubt among the oldest races of Europe, and may boast a kind of kinship. In Thrace, Greek influence preceded that of Rome, and prevailed again under Byzance. As for Smyrna, Homer is said to have been born in its valley; it sent an annual prize to the Olympic games. Pindar glorified, and Alexander reconquered it; it is one of the oldest Greek cities. Once more, at Smyrna and on the Dardanelles, Greece, which fought Europe's fight and won Europe's victories at Marathon and Salamis, is posted as Europe's sentinel against Asia.

At the same time, there are many good friends of Greece who are uneasy. The situation is no longer what it was in the beginning of history. The Albanians have developed of late a strong national consciousness. Jugo-Slavs and Bulgars, Greece's northern neighbors, are young, warlike and ambitious, Russia, now helpless, bids fair one day to cast its lustful eyes once more on Constantinople, Eastern Thrace and the Dardanelles. As for Asia Minor, it is the citadel of Turkish nationalism. The Greeks, though they have of late greatly improved their army, are not really a military people. Their new frontiers, giving them

an inner coast while leaving the hinterlands to other peoples, are very difficult to defend. A strong push by the Serbs or Bulgars, or perhaps eventually even by the Turks, might throw them into the Aegean almost before they could mobilize. Their possession of ports—Saloniki, Cavalla, Dedeagatch, Rodosto, Smyrna,—which are essential to the trade of Jugo-Slavia, Bulgaria and Turkey, and which without this trade would merely stagnate, is almost sure to involve them sooner or later in serious trouble with these peoples. Their nearness to and their designs upon Constantinople itself ensures the enmity of Russia. And the enmity of Russia and Turkey will pretty effectively arrest, I think, their peaceful penetration of the Black Sea coast and of Asia Minor. These are grave considerations, which may well give pause.

Assured of the immediate and probably enduring enmity of Albania, Bulgaria and Turkey, and perhaps of the ultimate enmity of Russia and Jugo-Slavia, what friends has Greece to depend upon? France, inclined more and more to cast its lot with the Slavs, and chagrined at Greece's close understanding with Britain, is doubtful. With Italy, which considers Greece its commercial rival in the Eastern Mediterranean, relations, lately strained, are already better, and under the mediative influence of Britain, are destined, in my opinion, to improve continually. In the first place, Italy's withdrawal from Albania, the southern part of which Greece itself covets, is a gratification to Greece. In the second place, an understanding has been reached both regarding the delimitation of the respective Greek and Italian zones in Asia-Minor, and regarding the Dodecanesus, which Italy has ceded to Greece, with

the exception of the Island of Rhodes, whose cession is made conditional on the cession of Cyprus to Greece by the British. In effecting a rapprochement with Italy, Greece is of course gradually alienating its old ally, Jugo-Slavia. Of true friends, Greece appears now to have only two—Roumania and Britain. Of these, by far the more important is of course Britain, whose close alliance has indeed become the cornerstone of Greek foreign policy. Without Britain, Greece's chances of keeping the territory it has gained would appear slight indeed. With Britain, the success of Greece, for the time being at least, is not only possible but probable.

The factors which have led Britain to make of Greece its agent and ally in the Near East, and which have led Greece to seek and cherish this partnership, are not hard to discover. Greece, consisting entirely of coasts, peninsulas and islands, is the only near-eastern country which, as shown in the expulsion of Constantine by the allies during the war, is completely controllable from the sea, and which could therefore never turn against Britain, even if it desired to do so. The Greeks' skill in business, their profound knowledge of oriental psychology, and their widespread penetration will make them admirable distributing agents for British trade and British investments. In return for these expected services, Britain has supported Greek expansion and made Greece great. As it can scarcely hope to keep Constantinople itself, which it now holds under military occupation, Britain, to keep this city from falling later into other, perhaps Russian hands, is even disposed to give this prize to the eager Greeks, and would do so, I suspect, in one way or another, if

it were not for the firm opposition of France. Greece would thus become more closely than ever associated with Britain in a common defense against Slav expansion. These are bold policies; both Britain and Greece are gambling with heavy odds; that is not to say, however, that they will not win out in the end.

Agriculturally, Greece is poor. Its soil is rocky and dry. It has no considerable industries. It has neither forests nor rich mineral deposits. Its wealth is in the highly developed commercial and financial sagacity of its people, who, in the Eastern Mediterranean, are considered superior in this respect to even the Armenians and the Jews, and in its shipping. The Greeks not only operate a host of small sailing vessels; they will buy and operate profitably for years, on the calm Mediterranean, steamers which in other countries have been condemned. In the art of extracting the last league of serviceability out of an old broken-down hulk, they are unsurpassed. This of course does not mean that they have not also a number of staunch new steamers. There is not a port of the Mediterranean or the Black Sea which does not behold the blue and white banners of Greece going and coming continually over the waters of the harbor. To its shipping revenues, Greece adds the profits on a tourist trade which seem susceptible of far greater development; the profits of its exports of olive-oil, tobacco and fruit; and the large sums which are sent back home annually by patriotic and prosperous Greeks residing abroad. It hopes ultimately to compensate its present food deficit by a more intensive cultivation of wheat in Macedonia and Ionia (Asia Minor).

At the present moment, not only the political sit-

uation but the future status of the government itself, is much confused. Legally, Greece is a constitutional monarchy, but the king has the right to dissolve the parliament, to replace the members of the government at will, to declare war and make treaties. He is moreover the absolute chief of the civil administration and the army. Exercising the royal prerogative, the pro-German Constantine, influenced perhaps by his wife, who is the sister of William II of Germany, dissolved the Venizelist parliament early in the war, because Venizelos favored the Entente, and established another which would be more servile to his personal views. Greece had made a treaty of defensive alliance with Serbia only a couple of years before; but Constantine was resolved not to keep it. Venizelos, conspiring with the allies, led a successful regional revolution at Saloniki, under protection of which it became possible for the allies to land at this port without—technically—violating Greek neutrality. After some months of friction with the Greek government, the allies, following an assault on a squad of French marines, occupied Athens by force of arms, and expelled both Constantine and the Crown Prince George from the country. From that time on, Eleutherios Venizelos was virtually dictator of Greece. He dissolved the Constantinist parliament, reconvened the Venizelist parliament, which had been regularly elected but which Constantine had dissolved, placed Constantine's young second son, Alexander, on the throne and brought Greece into the war on the side of the allies. He decreed an important land reform and projected a constitutional reform which would limit the royal powers henceforth to those of a mere figure-head, and would place the real

authority with the parliament and a responsible ministry. Finally, representing his country in person at the peace conference, he displayed such remarkable diplomatic skill that whereas every other allied country was pressed into compromises, Greece actually received more than it had originally asked for, doubling its population.

As I write, Greece, and with it the whole Near Eastern peace settlement, has fallen prey to a crisis, the outcome of which is difficult to foresee. The sudden death of the young king, Alexander, from blood-poisoning, following a monkey-bite, reopened the deep wound of the dynastic question. A month later, on November 15th, 1920, in the first elections which have been held since the war began, the Constantinists won an unexpected but a crushing victory. Venizelos, ignominiously defeated, took flight on a British yacht, escorted by British destroyers. A Constantinist government was promptly formed. The Venizelist Admiral Coundouriotis, who, on Alexander's death, had been elected regent, was replaced by Constantine's mother, Queen Olga, and the return of Constantine himself to the Greek throne became apparently inevitable. Venizelos' defeat was due not to his foreign policy, which had always been popular, but to his dictatorial and somewhat brutal internal policies. Many Greeks, moreover, resent the way in which the allies expelled Constantine during the war. At present, they would like to have their old king back again, and at the same time keep all the territories which were won for them by Venizelos' brilliant diplomacy. The new government is hastening, therefore, both to recall Constantine and to ratify the Treaty of Sèvres, so as to confront the


allies with accomplished facts before the latter can make up their minds how to react.

The French, who on second thought, do not approve of giving the Greeks so much territory at the expense of the Turks and Bulgars, and who are opposed to Constantine on principle, would like to make the latter's return an occasion for revising the Treaty of Sèvres in a sense favorable to the Turkish nationalists, thereby "punishing" the Greeks for their infidelity to Venizelos. But the British are inclined to proceed with prudence. The reasons which led them to make of Greece their trusted agent in the Eastern Mediterranean have not changed. If, indeed, Constantine should defy them, then they might adopt the French viewpoint, and the revision of the Sèvres Treaty would become probable. But if, as is far more likely, Constantine should give assurance of his support to the British in all questions of foreign policy, just as Venizelos did, then it is difficult to see what interest Britain would have, after enlarging Greece, in diminishing it again.

Such crises as the present are not uncommon in the Balkans. The only way to see clearly through the apparent contradictions they engender is to keep firmly in mind the fundamentals of the character, constitution and foreign policy of the countries concerned.

Such, then, are the individual factors in this anarchic region of Europe: Austria, weak, will-less, depressed, brooding over the forbidden idea—partly from a real cultural affinity, partly from mere despite—of allowing itself to be absorbed by Germany; Hungary, fiery and unreconciled, bent on recovering its lost territories by any means whatsoever; Bulgaria, quivering passion-

ately under its defeat, but quick to accept realities, proposing reconciliation to Roumania, federation to Jugo-Slavia, and concentrating all its animosity against Greece; Czecho-Slovakia, with its undefensible frontiers, fearful of Austro-Hungarian restoration, profoundly Slav in sentiment, yet forced by its economic and geographical situation to seek peace through the maintenance of neutrality; Poland, fervent and afraid, squeezed as in a vise between the aggressive hatred of Germany, and the hatred, no less aggressive, of Russia; Roumania, a Latin nation in a sea of Slavs, gathered in a surly defensive, ready for any entente which promises self-preservation, but unwilling as yet to commit itself deeply in any direction; Jugo-Slavia, confident, valorous, warlike, dreaming of grandeur; Greece, the child of Athens and Byzance, once more restored to precarious empire, staking all its hope on the friendly help of Britain, and gambling on the future with vigilant serenity. Such are the elements out of which the federations or understandings, lacking which no genuine reconstruction will be possible, must be builded.



PART V

FORCES OF COHESION

I

THE NATIONALISM OF THE MASSES

THERE are four current fallacies regarding the amelioration of international relations which must be at least partially dissolved by analysis before the real forces which are working for reconstruction in "Balkanized Europe" can be laid bare. These fallacies may be stated thus:

That the masses of the people in any nation, if left to themselves, would quickly establish a régime of universal friendship.

That foreign policy is a creation, not of the popular will, but of more or less chauvinist governments.

That the League of Nations, or any other institution or set of laws, can eradicate at one stroke the age-long ills from which men suffer.

That the increasing economic solidarity of the world will of itself lead inevitably to political solidarity.

The first of these fallacies, which implies that the masses are born internationalists and become nationalistic only through perversion, is exceedingly widespread in America and in the democracies of Western Europe. It may be well to define nationalism. Nationalism, in internal affairs, demands the sacrifice of individual interests to the common interest, and in external affairs places the interest of the nation above all other considerations. The theory of the internationalists is that just as, within the nation, the individual makes sacri-

fices to the commonwealth, so, in the concert of nations, the individual nation must be prepared to sacrifice itself to the general good of the world. So long as the nations were kept in ignorance of one another by lack of adequate communications, the realization of this ideal was obviously impossible. But with the development of railroads, fast steamers, the telegraph and the telephone, the various peoples are at last beginning to make one another's acquaintance. Each people, it is asserted, is finding out that the other peoples of the globe are merely human beings like itself, and if matters were left to the common sense and friendliness of the masses, there would be no more wars.

This theory, though plausible enough, is unfortunately belied by the facts. The development of modern communications has been attended not by an increasing internationalism, but by the reverse. The sentiment of nationalism is probably stronger to-day than it has ever been. In the old days, when there were no newspapers and travel was difficult, men might popularly suppose that all peoples are alike, think in the same ways, and share the same sentiments. But no sooner have they begun to make intimate contact than they have discovered, to their amazement, that not only the personal habits, but the moral codes, the motives and feelings of the various races are highly characterized, and by no means identical. The philosopher, the psychologist, the man of science, the artist, may reach the conclusion that these striking differences are to some extent superficial, that one moral code, and one set of values is as good, in its way, as another, and that men differ chiefly with respect to their degree

of civilization. But for the great masses of mankind, such philosophical considerations are completely immaterial. The ordinary Anglo-Saxon, on ascertaining that the Turks are polygamous, that the French do not consider sex to be unclean, and that at the seaside resorts of Southern Russia it is customary for men and women to bathe stark naked together, is simply non-plused and repelled. The contact of Mexicans and Americans in the southwest; of Greeks and Bulgars in the Balkans; of Czechs and Magyars in Central Europe, results not in friendly understanding, but in hostility and mutual contempt. The beginning of American hostility to Japan coincided with the beginning of Japanese emigration to California; and the American doughboys who set sail with a tremendous admiration in their hearts for the French returned from France disillusioned, uncomprehending and contemptuous.

Hatred of persons who dress or speak or behave or think differently from oneself seems indeed to be one of the earliest human instincts. With children, it is proverbial; the boy who differs from the rest merely in being a new-comer generally has to fight to establish his place in the juvenile community. The farmer objects to the city man's clothes, and the city man laughs at the farmer's way of speaking. Four years of civil war were necessary in the United States before the north could impose its conception of life upon the south, and forge the unity of the nation. To overcome the rivalries and hatreds of class and locality, even between peoples of the same race, and build up the modern nations, was the work of long and painful centuries. Even to-day the contempt of the rich for the

poor, and the envy of the poor for the rich, bid fair to disrupt society again. With even national solidarity so new and so precarious a conquest, the realization of the dream of international solidarity seems far away indeed.

The sources of internationalism are limited almost entirely to a few small composite countries like Switzerland and Belgium; to a few truly international cities like Paris and Vienna, which have large mixed foreign populations, to one or two countries which, like the United States, are surcharged with undigested foreigners; to labor organizations which hope by uniting to increase their revolutionary strength, and to a few humanitarians who either have never traveled, or whose powers of observation are dulled by their ideals. Outside of these limited categories, and even inside them, the individual who can divest himself of his prejudices of heredity and environment, and declare sincerely that he likes foreigners, is rare. To attain the sympathetic insight necessary to enable one to comprehend the viewpoint of a strange people requires an effort of study and of penetrative imagination which exceeds the common capacity. And if to this assertion the objection be made that labor organizations are international in spirit, I would reply that they are so only as a measure of opportunism, and that no sooner would they control the reins of government, the seizure of which is their aim, than their false internationalism will quickly vanish. Even the Roman Catholic Church, which is the greatest international organization in the world, has had to adapt itself to the nationalistic sentiments of its diverse communicants.

For the truth is that the real seed of xenophobia is not in the upper but in the lower classes of the population. It is they who are most easily stirred to rage by differences of appearance and action. "Who's that?" asks the British workman. "Looks like a foreigner," answers his comrade; which leads the other to suggest: "Heave a half a brick at him." And my father has told me of seeing two sober American workmen in a small, middle-western town, step up coolly to a Chinese standing peacefully in the door of his laundry and without a word of explanation hit him in the face, "to see what he would do."

These incidents are typical. The hope therefore that the masses of the people, if left to themselves, would establish a régime of universal friendship is obviously vain. But if the instinct of xenophobia has its ugly side, it has also certain virtues. The gradual upbuilding of the great modern nations, after centuries of local and factional feuds, represents an indubitable advance. Before attempting to make still another step forward, and establish a United States of the world—a task which may perhaps be practically envisaged a thousand years from now—it is necessary to make fast the advance already achieved. The cohesive strength of a nation is in its common habits and traditions, as developed and maintained by heredity and environment. The foreigner, through his influence on both these factors, is to some extent a dissolvent force; and the instinct either to eject, or complete and immediately to absorb the discrepant particle, partakes of the nature of self-preservation. Nationalism is the normal antidote both to internal disorders and to foreign invasion,

either by force of arms or by peaceful penetration. And whether we like it or not, it is indubitably, in my opinion, the strongest social force of our modern time. The problem, therefore, is not how to waste one's energies by trying to combat it, but how to turn it to the most useful and benevolent ends.

THE GENESIS OF FOREIGN POLICY

A SECOND fallacy is that foreign policy is a creation, not of the popular will, but of more or less chauvinistic statesmen, who from ignorance, carelessness, personal ambition, or even sheer deviltry, persist in making trouble between the nations; and that if these nefarious individuals were to be replaced by a government of philosophers, philanthropists or labor leaders, peace on earth and goodwill toward men would automatically ensue. When, as often happens, the holders of this belief are able to "catch" the government in the act of exciting the masses by premeditated propaganda against some neighboring country, their contention, they think, is proved irrefutably. During the war, in particular, the saying was popular in all belligerent and most neutral countries, that if only the soldiers from the opposing trenches could be gathered together around a council table, they would quickly succeed in reëstablishing peace.

Such assertions are singularly unimaginative. They betray a complete misunderstanding as to the genesis and aims of foreign policy, which, in its essentials at least, far from being the invention of individual statesmen, is dictated imperiously by the conditions of national existence, and changes only as these conditions change. Everything that lives is subject to two laws: the first is self-preservation, and the second is expan-

sion. The study of history, both ancient and contemporary, reveals that it is on these two biological laws, and these alone, that the foreign policy of any given state is based. The first instinct of a people gathered together under a single government is to insure the national defense. This is a matter not merely of armies and navies, but of alliances, of strategical frontiers, and sometimes of the annexation of territories intended as "buffers." It may even require, as in the case of Britain, the conquest of sources of food-stuffs and raw materials. The pre-war Franco-Russian alliance had no other motive than self-preservation. England's refusal to accord full self-government to Ireland is at bottom merely a fear that this island may be used as an enemy base in time of war. Poland's desire to form a string of buffer states on its eastern frontiers is due to fear of Russia. The purchase of the Danish West Indies by the United States had no other than a strategic object. Some small states which have powerful neighbors, as for example, Switzerland, never surpass this first stage of foreign policy. Switzerland's entire preoccupation is one of self-preservation. Most states, however, soon begin to react to the promptings of an instinct no less insistent—that of expansion. They cannot help it; nothing that lives can escape the impulse. A healthy human being is an active center of expansive force, and so is a healthy state. Governments merely follow, they do not lead, this centrifugal movement. The British Empire was built, not by foreign ministers, but by individual merchants and sailors. The growth of the United States within the last hundred years was not planned and executed by the government; the people themselves brought it about; and

even they were not wholly conscious of what they were doing. All true growth is instinctive.

"The instinct of nations," says Guizot, "sees further than the negotiations of diplomats;" and it is true that the main lines of foreign policy are dictated to whatever government may happen to be in power by the instinct of the people. But only the main lines! The people know the end which they wish to be achieved; they do not know how to choose the proper means to achieve it. This, and this alone, is the function of governments with respect to foreign policy. The nation's first instinct is for self-defense. The statesman's mission is to devise the most practicable means of insuring this self-defense. He will be judged by the results. The nation's second interest is to expand. It is the statesman's duty to discover, if possible, means by which this expansion may be accomplished without endangering the national existence by arousing powerful foreign enmities—a task increasingly difficult in this present day. Indeed, it may well be asked whether this vital force of expansion will not soon have to be directed entirely out of the field of territorial competition, and into that of economic and cultural competition; for at the present time, in whatever direction a state may seek to expand its territory, it is met, as a rule, by an equally strong force of expansion on the part of its neighbor, and unless it is willing to endanger its national existence in the hazards of war, its progress is blocked.

It thus appears that statesmen, far from inventing foreign policy, are merely its interpreters. No statesman can oppose the popular instinct in this respect, and remain in power. The case of Mr. Wilson is one

in point. He felt correctly that the American people desire henceforth to take a larger share in the affairs of the world (instinct of expansion), but he misjudged them in thinking that they would therefore be willing to involve themselves in far-off quarrels which do not immediately concern them (instinct of self-preservation). It is proper to criticize a statesman for failure to take account of the national instinct; it is proper to criticize the means he may adopt to gratify this instinct; but to criticize him for not initiating policies, which however beautiful ideally, are inharmonious with the instinct of his people, is both unjust and futile.

Most popular criticisms of government arise from a failure to understand the problems of government. These problems do not change with changing ministries; they remain essentially the same, as the philosopher, philanthropist, or labor-leader would quickly find if he were elevated to the rank of foreign minister and were confronted with the responsibility of having to solve them. To have made private soldiers from the French and German armies into plenipotentiaries would not have settled the conditions on which the German army was to evacuate France and Belgium, or the matter of reparations, or the future of Alsace-Lorraine. The private soldier, confronted with these questions, could not have reacted to them other than would the professional diplomat—that is to say, in the sense of conflicting national interests. In the same way, labor, having at present no national responsibilities, and desiring to strengthen its revolutionary activity by associating itself with others of the same class in different countries, believes that if its leaders were put in power they would immediately cast out all ele-

ments of discord from the concert of the nations. But take for example the case of England, which has the largest per cent. of laboring people in its population of any country in the world. Does any one imagine that British labor, on attaining to power, would sink the British navy? England's life depends on its foreign trade. Unless it continues to receive large supplies of rawstuffs from its colonies, notably India, and to sell large quantities of manufactured goods, it cannot feed its population. The rise of a labor ministry could not change this fundamental fact. The need for sea-power and colonies would therefore persist. The work-people, indeed, would be the first to suffer from the loss of India and Egypt, endangering not only the textile industry, but the supply of wheat. A labor ministry in England or any other country would have to face the same problems of foreign policy, and would have to meet them in much the same way, as a conservative ministry. Indeed, from what I have seen of nationalism in international labor meetings, I suspect that a labor government would soon become even more chauvinistic than a bourgeois government, for its members, being less cultivated, are more subject to the suggestions of the nationalistic instinct. A good example of what is to be expected from labor governments is given by the recent coal strike in England. The state by selling coal abroad at three or four times the domestic price, was making sixty-six million pounds profit a year. If the British miners had been moved by a spirit of humanitarian internationalism, they would doubtless have proposed that this coal, so badly needed by France and Italy, should be supplied to these countries at a lower price. Instead, the miners merely de-

manded that the exorbitant export profit hitherto collected by the government should be diverted in large part to increase their wages!

The quickest way to silence critics of the government is of course to associate them in the responsibilities of government. It is by this means that radicals are soon converted to conservatism.

In concluding these remarks, I may add the curious observation that despite their relatively wide culture and experience, statesmen and diplomats themselves are not free from the instincts of race fanaticism which prevail among the masses. The employ of a common language was an unreasonably strong bond between the British and American delegates at the peace conference. Neither the British nor the Americans, with their practical, rather taciturn cast of mind, could forgive the logical, voluble French and Italians for making long speeches.

In short, the hope of establishing an era of self-sacrificing, world-wide peace and happiness, in the present stage of human evolution, either by elevating workmen and philanthropists to power, or by maintaining the present régime, is entirely utopian. A change of government does not change the problems of foreign policy. The labor leader, on assuming the responsibility of power, is unable to escape either from the realities of national existence or from his own instinctive nationalism. As for the professional statesman and diplomat, his nationalism, despite his wider advantage of travel, education and experience, is apt to be scarcely less strong than that of the farmer, clerk or workman, who dislikes and distrusts all foreigners without even troubling to ask himself why.

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

THE fallacy that any institution or set of laws can eradicate at one stroke the age-long ills from which men suffer, has always been common to political reformers, and is indeed their chief stock-in-trade. The fact, nevertheless, seems to be that neither goodness nor wisdom can be instilled into a people by acts of legislation. Laws are applicable, and institutions effective, only in so far as they are a true expression of popular sentiment. An institution transplanted from an advanced society into one more backward may prove to be not only a misfit, but an actual source of harm, as the French, for example, have discovered in their attempt to uplift their African colonies by establishing there the right of suffrage and the French system of courts. The natives, accustomed to extreme simplicity both of executive authority and of meting out justice, are said to be merely bewildered by the complexity of the white man's governmental machinery. A distinguished Italian jurist of my acquaintance was sent to London by his government to ascertain why the parliamentary system seemed to work so much better in London than in Rome. His findings, after several months of careful study, were a disappointment to Italian statesmen. "The reason is," he reported, "that the Italian character is very different from the English." In the same way, a law may be a misfit. A

law which is opposed by most of the members of a community can be enforced only sporadically. Witness, in certain American cities before the prohibition régime, the Sunday closing laws; or in communities which do not consider gambling a menace to public morals or the state, the laws against gambling. An even more striking instance is the case of Ireland to-day, where the British laws and courts, legally established, are ignored, and have been all but supplanted by the outlaw courts and edicts of Sinn Fein. A law, we are told by eminent jurists, is what has come to be regarded by public opinion as right. In other words, law does not form opinion; it follows it, on pain of becoming a dead letter.

The application of these principles to the League of Nations is obvious. The object of the League is to prevent wars, by giving a greater sanctity to international law, and by providing a machinery of action for the condemnatory verdicts of the courts of world opinion against unjustified aggression. The weakness of international law heretofore has been that, having no penalties attached to it, it could be broken with impunity. And the verdicts of the court of world opinion are empty talk so long as they remain unenforced. The murderer and the thief are not deterred from their crime by mere knowledge of the existence of the law, or by the consideration that opinion is against them; while to convict the assassin of murder and let him go unpunished is simple folly. Plainly, so long as it has no concrete force at its disposal, the League will be unable either to inflict penalties or execute verdicts. This force has been withheld from it because no nation at present is willing to surrender any fraction

of its full sovereignty to a super-state. Public opinion is favorable to the maintenance of international law, but not at the expense of individual nationalisms. Such is the dilemma of the League of Nations; and so long as public opinion remains in the present temper, there is no remedy.

On considering the national instincts of self-preservation and expansion in connection with the League, it appears that, as regards the former, the League tried to satisfy it by Article X of the covenant, guaranteeing the territorial integrity of all signatories against foreign aggression. But to the popular mind, the danger involved in having perhaps to fight, under this article, in far-off battles in which no personal interest is felt, outweighs the vague security of the verbal guarantee; and the antipathy is thus aroused of the very instinct which this article was intended to gratify. As regards the almost equally vigorous instinct of expansion, no measure of giving it satisfaction is provided by the League covenant except the somewhat obscure mandatory system, and the opportunity to take an active part in international debates. If this instinct could be entirely sublimated, lifted out of the geographical realm into the realm of economics and general culture, mankind would have occasion to give eternal thanks; but such a happy eventuality hardly seems possible. Judging from the past there is profound reason to believe that some peoples will grow stronger and more numerous, while others grow weaker and fewer. To keep the stronger from expanding, ultimately, at the expense of the weaker, seems an illusory aim. The world is alive; it is very much alive. It cannot be frozen suddenly into a given shape, and be expected to remain

so frozen eternally. Laws or institutions which run counter to the nature of man or state, instead of being merely expressive of this nature, are destined to futility.

For all these reasons it is an error to expect the League to effect any real change, for the time being at least, in international relations. This is not to say, however, that the League is useless and should be dissolved. On the contrary, it seems to fill a very real popular demand, namely, that the nations, without, for the present, unduly committing themselves, should have a common meeting place wherein to discuss their affairs and to take general account of the condition of the world. To ask more than this, to require the League to prevent war, to enforce international law, to pronounce and execute verdicts, when it has no force at its command, is simply to kill at the outset what may gradually develop into an indispensable organism. Let the League be content for the moment with the modest rôle which public opinion is willing to assign to it—the rôle of an information center and international council chamber. In time, opinion may evolve. The prejudice against the delegation of sovereignty, in certain matters, to a super-state may decline. Meanwhile, unless it is to succumb altogether, the League, like any other human institution, must aspire not to lead world opinion, but only follow it—the more faithfully, the better.

THE ECONOMIC SOLIDARITY OF THE WORLD

THAT the increasing economic solidarity of the world will of itself lead inevitably to political solidarity is not, like the other three fallacies which I have discussed, complete; but the fact that it is only partially false, the fact that it contains a large element of truth, makes it only the more dangerously seductive.

It is true that owing to the development of railways and steamships, which in turn have permitted the fuller development of agriculture and industry, the world has become so inter-related that an economic disturbance in one part is likely soon to be felt in all. Industrial nations tend to have more inhabitants than they can feed, and to produce far more manufactured goods than they themselves can use. Agricultural nations, in selling their surplus food to industrial nations, are able to buy the manufactured articles which they themselves are unable to make. Most industrial nations, furthermore, are at least partially dependent on less advanced nations for mineral or vegetable raw-stuffs, while agricultural nations are apt to depend on other countries for the bulkier chemical fertilizers. The resultant extension of foreign trade has necessitated the growth of a highly sensitive system of international credit. Industrial England, cut off from American, Egyptian and Indian cotton, would be plunged into a terrible industrial crisis; and cut off from the

wheat of America and the British colonies, would starve. Agricultural Bulgaria, unable, because of deficient transport, to export its surplus of grain, flounders helplessly in debt. The collapse of any one great regular market brings on an over-production crisis in the countries purveying to that market, and throws the whole international credit machinery out of gear. These facts, demonstrated theoretically by such writers as Norman Angell, were proved with brutal forcefulness in the war, which not only has ruined the vanquished, but has ruined, or half ruined, the victors as well. No economist who is in his right senses can pretend, henceforth, that war is economically profitable to any belligerent. It seems probable that even the conquest of colonists is apt to be more expensive than remunerative.

If, therefore, men were reasonable beings, intent only upon their material interests, no more wars would occur. The Magyars would forget their lost territories, and the Irish would settle comfortably down under British rule to enjoy their present unwonted prosperity. Moreover, the workmen of all countries, realizing that a good administrator is invaluable, would cease to envy the successful manufacturer his profits and would beg him only to tell them how production might be still further quickened, so that soon, with the steady fall of prices under the increasing output of goods, their standard of living might be raised to the point almost of affluence. But men are not reasonable—not economically, at any rate—else Germany, which in 1914 was well advanced toward the peaceful economic conquest of the world, would never have started the war. Taking no account of material interest, the

workman will ruin himself in the effort to ruin his employer. The lord mayor of Cork will starve himself to death for a political ideal. And from time to time some nation, dreaming vague dreams of grandeur, will foam into the folly of an aggressive war. It is vain, therefore, to expect the nations of "Balkanized Europe" to put by their quarrels simply because they have an obviously economic interest to do so. Their inclination is to think more of their quarrels than of their interests. Passion is always blinding. The first thing to do is to cure them, if possible, of their passion by counsels of political expediency. This much having been realized, their eyes will soon open to the advantages of economic compromise.

I will give an example of what I mean. Enlightened opinion in England, Italy and America, partly from selfish business and political interests, but largely from the philanthropic argument of economic solidarity, seems at present to favor such measures as will ensure the rapid recovery of Germany, esteeming that thereby the general prosperity will be increased. There are several reasons why France should be more interested than any other nation in the development of commerce with Germany. France has iron, and lacks coal; Germany has coal and lacks iron: an exchange is clearly indicated. Moreover, controlling between them the world's potash supply, they have an interest not to compete. It is France, however, which persistently stands in the way of measures intended to help Germany. The reason is, first, that France fears if Germany recovers its strength it will again attack France, or at least will refuse to pay the reparations indemnities without which France, in turn, will be unable to

repay its debt to Britain and America; and second, that the French industries having been practically destroyed in the war, it fears that before these industries can be restored, the other industrial nations, including Germany, will have preëmpted all the best markets, and that the French, in the universal competition, will be crowded out by those who had the earlier start. It is no use trying to quiet France's fears with talk about economic solidarity of Europe, or of the world. What is needed is a practical political proposal. If Britain, Italy and the United States were to agree to guarantee their immediate armed assistance to France in case of a renewal of German aggression; if, further, they were to guarantee their support to make Germany pay the full reparations indemnities, in such a way that Germany would remain under a kind of allied control until France's industries were fully restored, I feel sure that the French objections to helping Germany would instantly vanish. This is what I understand by councils of political expediency. The statesman who can formulate them in such a way as to seem to conciliate the interests of all concerned has a great field open to him among the small nations of "Balkanized Europe."

A time may come when classes and nations alike, caring and understanding where their true material interests lie, will cease both from revolutions and from wars. Certainly, as peoples become more civilized, as their wants increase, as their life becomes more complex, they tend more and more to seek and to follow the directions of material interest. But civilization, in the western sense of the word, is still limited to a very few countries; and over the others forms but the thinnest of veneers. The economic solidarity of the

world has been achieved by a slow and tedious evolution; the achievement of the political solidarity of the world, though it will perhaps be even slower and more tedious, is none the less worthy of all generous effort. The only danger is that this effort, unless it keeps close to realities, and is careful to preserve the great constructions of the past as the foundations of the future, will act merely as a dissolvent, leaving the world worse off than it is even at present.

POLITICAL REALITIES

THE scientist, desiring to obtain results in the plant or animal world, does not begin by making up his mind how things ought to be ideally, and then try to force them to conform to his ideal. But knowing the end he desires to accomplish, he studies the nature of the plant or animal, what environment suits it best, how best it may be nourished, what are its peculiarities and its reactions, and how far it may be practical to atrophy by his science the more useless characteristics and develop the useful ones without injuring the organism as a whole. From first to last he is dominated by the knowledge that to attempt to go contrary to nature is surely to fail. Indeed, he can succeed only in so far as he is able to associate nature itself in his projects, so that its laws will work for, rather than against, him.

With all its diabolical lapses and its heights of sublimity, mankind remains nevertheless a part of the biological world. As surely as the sheep or the bee, man has his nature, infinitely complex, yet subject to immutable material and psychological laws. No purpose, certainly, can be nobler than that of bettering the conditions of human existence; but the amount of brave idealistic effort which comes to naught through having neglected to take account of human nature, and in particular of economic and psychological principles, is enormous. We may pass laws, we may establish in-

stitutions, we may make revolutions; but the law will slip gently into oblivion, the institution become perverted, the revolution accomplish nothing save destruction, if its aims are inharmonious with the nature of the individuals concerned. The waste involved in abortive reforms is shocking to all modern standards of efficiency. There will always be cranks, I suppose, and they will never lack followers—for this, too, is a part of the curious nature of man. And I realize that perfection, even in science, is not of this world. At the same time, it is perhaps not too much to hope that the day is near when the same intelligent analysis and study which are devoted to the affairs of the mineral, vegetable and animal realms will be extended to the affairs of our human communities. It is time that the term "political science" should become something more than a name for a chair in the universities.

I do not wish to be understood as maintaining that human nature is unchangeable. The perusal of ancient literatures shows, certainly, that in knowledge, and in his conquest of the material world, man has marched forward tremendously in the last three thousand years; but in the quality of his emotions and sentiments, scarcely at all. Hector's armor has become archaic; the idea which he probably had of geography would make a school-boy smile; but the scene of his meeting with his wife and baby on the wall of Troy, as he was going back to the fight, is as fresh as this morning's dew. The truth seems to be that that part of man's nature which is sentimental, emotional, instinctive, is practically permanent, for all its individual and racial variations, and for all its mysterious intricacies; while that part which has to do with ideas is almost con-

tinually in flux. The statesman and the reformer will do well to take the former as it is, and to concentrate their efforts on the latter. As examples, I would say that a law, like the proposed abolition of the right of inheritance, destined to prevent the children from benefiting by the parents' labor and economy, would be sure to fail in any era, because it is contrary to the parental instinct. Indeed, the parents' chief pleasure is to work for the future of the offspring, and people would quickly find a way around any law endeavoring to deprive them of this pleasure, which they feel at the same time to be a duty. A law, on the other hand, for compulsory schooling, unpractical two hundred years ago, can now be enforced, because people have been brought to believe that education is a good thing for everybody, and this belief does not run counter to any deep-rooted instinct.

Applying these principles to conditions in "Balkanized Europe," I would say that the statesman, with an eye to the future, should encourage the dissemination of ideas harmonious with the final end he wishes to attain; and with an eye to the present, analyze the material and psychological realities, and try to combine them in such a way that they will serve instead of opposing him. Thus, to reduce the existing national and international anarchy, there can scarcely be too much careful propaganda, destined, first, to instruct the workpeople in the true processes of production and in the rôle, respectively, of capital, labor, and of technical and administrative brains; and second, to instruct each nation in the reasons for, and the benefits of, international economic solidarity. But before this propaganda can bear fruit, some time must necessarily elapse.

Politics is essentially the science of immediate possibilities. There are decisions to be taken, acts to be performed, every day. These, too, must have their direction. It is small consolation to the present generation to reflect that those who follow may be wiser. What is wanted is a solution applicable here and now. The statesman must therefore endeavor, to the best of his ability, to understand and utilize present realities, so that he may work with, and not against, the forces of human nature.

I have already had occasion to show that the improvement of international relations is not to be expected from an international collaboration of the masses, from an arbitrary reform of foreign policies, or from the League of Nations; for the masses are even more nationalistic than their leaders, foreign policy is instinctive and not subject to arbitrary transformations, and no institution can rise higher than the individuals concerned in it. Even the economic solidarity of the world is not sufficient to keep the peace, because nations are not ruled entirely by interest, but are frequently carried away by their emotions.¹ What, then, are the factors on which the statesman must build?

In the first place, he will not combat but will respect the sentiment of nationalism. It is possible, in the course of time, to undermine this sentiment, but it is dangerous to do so; for so preëminently is it a safeguard against internal anarchy, that with its collapse, society itself tends to go to pieces. The formation of powerful nationalistic states represents politically an advance over the tribal or feudal régimes. Lacking the sense of nationality, India is governed against its will, in so far as it has any will, by a handful of Brit-

ish; and China has fallen a prey to civil war and to foreign encroachments. Unless it is founded solidly on nationalism, any international society whatsoever will be but a grand superstructure on a foundation of quicksand.

In the second place, the idea of international economic solidarity must be pushed as far as possible, and made, as far as possible, to harmonize with political aspirations.

In the third place, there is the sentiment of race to be reckoned with, both as a factor of cohesion, and as a factor of disaggregation.

Finally, there are the national instincts, of which I have already spoken, of self-preservation, and of expansion. Fear keeps some nations apart, but brings others together. Even the instinct of expansion, pregnant with conflict as it is, has certain cohesive aspects.

As the scientist studies and seeks to utilize the properties of the plant or animal on which he is working, so must the statesman seek to utilize these five puissant factors in international relations—nationalism, economic interest, race sentiment, the instinct of self-preservation, and the instinct of expansion—seeking how far, without injuring the organism as a whole, it may be possible to atrophy the less, and develop the more, useful traits.

THE RESTORATION OF EQUILIBRIUM

THE cure for Europe's ills, political as well as economic, is, I have sought to show, entente or federation; and I have indicated the factors which the statesmen may use in the formulation and application of his policies of reconstruction. It is now time to inquire what kind of federation may be possible in the present circumstances. The idea of one single federation engulfing all the European nations, the dream of a United States of Europe, though in itself both noble and appealing, is still, I fear, premature. The poet and the visionary may continue to prepare its advent by their puissant propaganda; but the statesman, finding it incompatible with the quickened sentiment of race, and difficult of realization because of the wide differences, mental and material, now existing between the European nations, will prefer to devote his energies to schemes of more immediate promise. There remains the possibility of partial federations, which is indeed the solution toward which, more and more obviously, Europe is tending.

At the risk of seeming to draw a far-fetched analogy, I would point out that, according to one of the latest scientific tenets, health and equilibrium are synonymous throughout the manifested universe, and disequilibrium is concomitant with disease. There is a theory of physics which suggests that matter itself, in its ultimate

particles, may be merely an equilibrium of positive and negative force. However this may be, it does not seem to me fantastic to conclude, no less from the evidence of history than from the suggestions of physics and biology, that in the body politic, as in the human body, disequilibrium means trouble, and that to eliminate this trouble, nothing less than a restoration of equilibrium will suffice. Those governments, certainly, appear most stable which, like that of the United States, are based upon a nice balance of classes, parties and functions. The hegemony of one class or of one party within the state leads in time to its overthrow by revolution; and the hegemony or the attempted hegemony of one nation over the others leads inevitably to disastrous wars.

Much evil has been spoken of the principle of the balance of power, because it was that under which Europe was living in the fatal year, 1914. I would remark, however, that it was not the principle which was then at fault, but its application. The war was brought on, not by the establishment of an equilibrium of alliances, but by what appeared to be a disequilibrium in favor of the Central Powers. If Germany and Austria had realized they would have to fight not only France and Russia, but also Britain, and later even the United States, they would not have provoked the war; which may thus in a sense be said to have been due to the equivocal attitude of Britain in Europe.

At the present time, Europe is groping blindly, instinctively, toward a reorganization of the balance of power, which will restore its shattered equilibrium. This instinctive groping is even now playing an essential part in the foreign policies of all the European nations. If the results are so slow to appear, it is for no other

reason than that certain essential elements in the future balance—notably Russia and Germany—are still obscure in their political orientation, and that the other nations are thus obliged to proceed with extreme wariness. Sooner or later, the future direction both of Russia and of Germany will begin to become clear. In that day, within the League of Nations if the League persists, or without it if the League succumbs, the balance of power in Europe will be restored. Then, and not until then, may the work of political reconstruction be said to have been accomplished, and health to have returned.

Meanwhile, within the area of small and relatively weak nations which have been designated as "Balkanized Europe" the leading statesmen, soundly inspired, are already endeavoring, by a more or less clever use of the factors of nationalism, economic interest, race sentiment, self-preservation and expansion, to build up a number of partial and local balances. This is the secret underlying all the checker-board intrigues of neighbor against neighbor. This is the meaning of the "Petite Entente" of Czecho-Slovakia, Roumania and Jugo-Slavia. It is the reason of Hungary's sympathy with Italy and Poland, and of Bulgaria's desire to federate with Jugo-Slavia. To become alarmed over these manifestations is therefore a singular error, for they are nothing more or less than a sign of returning health. Of necessity, one combination opposes and threatens another. Such opposition, indeed, is the very reason of its existence, without which it would lack cohesive force. The danger is not in the fact of opposition, but in the possibility that here again the newly formed equilibrium may be broken by the apparent superiority

of one combination over another, thus tempting the stronger to risk the hazards of war. This contingency, however, can be effectively prevented by the great powers, if they will have a care always to lean their weight a little on the weaker side and so right the toppling scales.

To form even a dual entente, in the present state of mind of the nations of Central Europe, is no small undertaking. It is easy to look at the map and ask oneself why in the name of common sense this small people does not federate with that; but in practice, each people is so suspicious even of its friends, so fearful of making a costly mistake, that nothing less than the whole skill of an able statesman is sufficient to bring the shy young couple to the signing point. In the first place, he must be careful not to wound the tender susceptibilities of the people's nationalism. He must then appeal to their reason with demonstrations of mutual economic interest. If the two countries are similar in race he will seek to quicken racial sentiment; if dissimilar, to allay this sentiment, or to place it in common opposition to still a third race. Taking account of the instinct of self-preservation, he will show how the proposed alliance strengthens the defensive position of the two countries against a common danger; and, finally, taking account of the instinct of expansion, he will indicate some obvious programme of collaboration in economic, cultural or political penetration abroad.

The objection may be raised that the alliances formed in the attempt to establish a new equilibrium may serve not to reconcile neighbors to one another, but only to embitter them the more, thus failing to

break down the present disastrous economic barriers. But I would reply that the mainstay of these barriers is fear. The establishment of firm alliances, in quelling this fear and restoring self-confidence, will permit of trade agreements even between neighbors belonging to opposite combinations. The principal foreign trade of Germany, before the war, was not with Austria-Hungary, Germany's "brilliant second," but with France and Britain, Germany's great rivals.

PART VI

PRESENT POLITICAL TENDENCIES

I

THE RECOVERY OF RUSSIA

IN the opinion of many observers—an opinion which I myself share—the chief obstacle to the reestablishment of European equilibrium at the present time is the prevailing doubt as to the future political orientation of Russia. Even in its present abject misery this powerful block of nearly one hundred millions, settled solidly midway between Europe and Asia, simply cannot be ignored, either politically or economically. According to Niederle's estimate, there were in 1900, fifty-nine million Great Russians (Moscovites), six million White Russians, and twenty-seven million Little Russians (Ukrainians, Ruthenians); and the number has probably increased by ten per cent. in the last twenty years, for the race is strong and prolific. But to attempt to foresee, in the existing confusion, what direction Russia will ultimately take, is hazardous; and to elaborate a balance of power leaving Russia out of account, is impossible, for the entire Pan-Slav movement, involving Czecho-Slovakia, Jugo-Slavia and Bulgaria, is based, as I shall show later, on the idea of "Mother Russia." Moreover, any equilibrium built up now, without Russia, is destined inevitably to fall into violent disequilibrium as soon as Russia once more begins to make its weight felt.

The unanimity with which statesmen seem to consider that Russia will again become a great power is

impressive. No less in Poland and Roumania, than in France, Britain and America, this view is prevalent. In the great sickness which has afflicted the mighty empire since 1917, not only has it been desperately weakened within by the deadly venom of Bolshevism, but its "hereditary enemies"—first Germany, then Britain, Japan, Roumania, Poland—have sought to dis-aggregate it for ever. Poland and Finland have been reconstituted as independent states. Roumania has re-annexed Bessarabia. Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania have proclaimed and upheld their autonomy. The Caucasus has dissolved into a number of small nationalities. Japan has occupied Vladivostok and Northern Sakhalin. China has reoccupied Northern Mongolia. There has even been an effort to create an autonomous White Russia on the Polish frontier, and an autonomous Ukraine. Thus, instead of acquiring, as it had hoped when it entered the war, Constantinople, Northern Persia, a part of Asia Minor, and a rectification of the German frontier, Russia has been clipped, shorn, diminished on every side, and shaken to its very vitals. But the probabilities are that this vast, brooding and powerful Slav people can neither be permanently dis-aggregated, nor deprived for long of its expansive force. It is true that the White Russians and the Little Russians are in some small particulars of dialect and custom distinct from the Great Russians; nevertheless, they are all self-consciously Russian and they will hold together. They number, as I have said, one hundred millions. Absent from the Paris conference, is it to be imagined that the Russia of the future will passively accept the settlements, injurious to Russian interests, dictated by this conference? Or that it

will recognize the treaties made by the Bolshevik government? To think this would be naïve. The day will surely come—and in this, as I have said, European statesmen seem to be agreed—when Russia will demand an accounting. In that day, the so-called Baltic and Caucasian states, too small, too weak, to exist alone, will, most observers expect, slip back under the powerful influence of Moscow. The question of the Eastern frontiers of Finland and Poland will be reopened. Roumania, holding Bessarabia, may well tremble. The Greeks, newly reinstalled in the outer precincts of Constantinople, will turn anxiously to Britain, their protector, for advice and aid. The British protectorate over Persia, the Japanese encroachments in the Far East will be viewed with the cold eye of an implacable hostility. In short, the day of Russia's return to health and strength will be a day of reckoning. This day may be far off; for the sickness of Russia is profound, and the cure must needs be long. But that it will come, eventually, five years hence, ten years, twenty—who can doubt? And the mind of the statesman, meditating upon these things, is clouded and troubled; for the years of Russia's recovery can only be years of anxious suspense to war-torn Europe, and not until the Russia of the future has clearly spoken its word can the Europe of the future begin to take symmetrical form.

In his book, "The New Europe," Dr. Masaryk, now president of Czecho-Slovakia, who is a noted pan-Slav, expressed himself thus regarding the future constitution of Russia—and I do not know that any better informed or more authoritative opinion has as yet been emitted:

"Russia, in conformity with the right of self-disposition, will organize itself as a federation of nations. In addition to the Poles, there will enter into this federation the Esthonians, the Letts, the Lithuanians; the Ukraine will form an autonomous part of Russia. The various small nations of the Caucasus and of the other parts of Russia and of Russia-in-Asia, will enjoy a national autonomy corresponding to their degree of culture, their national consciousness, and their number. The Prussian part of Lithuania, with a few Letts, will be joined to Lithuania. The Roumanian part of Bessarabia will be reunited to Roumania. Finland, if it concludes an agreement on this subject with Russia, will be independent."

While there is little doubt that Russia will aspire ultimately to reconquer, not merely one or two, but the entirety, of the provinces and spheres of influence lost since 1914, it cannot, obviously, pursue them all at once. The question of which of them it will consider most vital is the important question for Europe, for upon the response made to it, depend whole series of possible political combinations. If, for example, Russia should first turn its attention to Finland and Poland, it would find friendly sympathy and perhaps even active support in Sweden and Germany, which are hostile to the Finns and Poles, and it would avert for the time being the almost inevitable moment of conflict with Britain. If, on the other hand, it should ignore the Finns temporarily, make friends with the Poles, and turn its attention to the Balkans and Constantinople, its immediate enemies would be Roumania, Greece and Britain, and its natural allies, Jugo-Slavia, Bulgaria and France. If, finally, in still a third hypothesis, it should

direct its first efforts at a re-expansion rather toward the east and southeast than toward the west, as indeed the Bolsheviks seem now to be doing, it would straightway encounter the British in Persia, Mesopotamia and perhaps Afghanistan, and the Japanese, Britain's allies, in Manchuria.

All in all, the great problem for the Russians is whether they have most to gain by an alliance with Germany or by an alliance with France. They cannot have both; they must choose. If they ally themselves with Germany against Poland, Britain doubtless will be disinterested, and France hostile, though largely helpless. But having disposed of Poland, they would once more find themselves face to face with the Germans. The fear has been expressed that they might then, in compact with Germany, set forth upon the conquest of Europe; but this is not likely, for they would find a powerful Franco-British combination arrayed against them, and even if they were successful they would be sure, sooner or later, to come into conflict with the Germans. Indeed, the two most numerous and most vital races in Europe are precisely the Germans and the Slavs. They cannot both prevail. At best, they can merely serve to balance one another, in opposing sets of alliances.

If, on the contrary, making their peace with the Poles, and rejecting the proffered German alliance, the Russians should come to an understanding with the French, they would confront the hostility of Germany on the one hand, and the hostility of Britain on the other. But they would be protected from Germany by the Polish rampart, and they would have the support, as well, of the pan-Slav states—Czecho-Slovakia,

Jugo-Slavia and Bulgaria. They could aim at Constantinople to the southwest, and at Persia, Mesopotamia, Afghanistan to the southeast. If Japan interfered in Britain's favor, the United States, already so sensitive in this direction, would probably soon be aroused against Japan. Britain, to whom Russia is militarily inaccessible, would be threatened at its weakest point—its Asiatic Empire. And if the Franco-Slav combination against Germany should prove fruitful, it would not be under the disadvantage of having to quarrel over the spoils, for France and Russia have no rival interests. On the whole, I suspect that Russia's best course would be to abstain from the obvious temptation of a German alliance, and accept the challenge which Britain, in the Balkans, in Asia Minor, in Persia and in the Baltic states, has so boldly thrown down to it.

I do not wish to be understood, in setting forth these political hypotheses, as coolly prophesying the calamity of war; though I do consider a future conflict between Russia and Poland, between Russia and Japan, or even between Russia and Britain, to be by no means out of the question. What would seem to be certain is that, one way or another, by fair means or foul, by peaceful negotiations if possible, but by active hostilities if necessary, Russia is going to seek satisfaction for what it considers its present wrongs. To keep the peace, it will perhaps be necessary, when the time comes, to make concessions to a revived Russia. The latter can perhaps afterwards be held within proper bounds by the balance of power which can at any time be arrayed against it by the concert of peaceful nations. Unless, however, it receives a minimum of satisfaction,

even the world's widespread desire for peace will hardly, I fear, be sufficient to restrain Russia's belligerent resentment. Such, too, is the feeling of many other observers in Europe at the present time.

Even those Anglo-Saxon politicians, who are perhaps not greatly concerned over Russia's political recovery, are prompt to admit the general advantages which would accrue from its speedy economic recovery. Unfortunately, here as elsewhere, the latter cannot precede, it can only follow, the former.

The world's great need at present is food and raw-stuffs. In 1913 Russia exported the equivalent of 4,043,000,000 gold francs, almost the whole of which was in the form of grain, dairy products, animal products and raw-stuffs. There is just now a worldwide crisis in building materials; Russia furnished thirty-seven per cent. of the world's total timber exports. There is a crisis in the linen industry; Russia supplied seventy-five per cent. of Europe's flax. Irish linen is made from Russian flax. Belfast, in 1917, was still importing fifty-two thousand tons of flax; it receives at present scarcely six thousand tons. Ninety per cent. of the French linen mills are dependent on Russian flax. Finally, in the list of Russia's 1913 exports, let the hungry peoples of Austria and Poland glance at these significant items: Cereals, 11,000,000 tons; eggs, 3,572,000,000; butter, 78,082 tons! Obviously, the persistence of Russia's sickness is a serious handicap to European reconstruction.

At the same time, Russia as a future market for development is exercising a powerful fascination on the minds of industrial and commercial countries. It is generally conceded that Russia will need foreign cap-

ital, manufactured goods of all kinds, foreign technical assistance, and the services of foreign middlemen. Before the war, Germany was in a fair way to capture this immense territory economically. It had flooded Russia with German foremen, engineers and merchants; it was lending capital and was shipping in the products of its factories. There is no doubt that Germany is now hoping to resume this remunerative collaboration. Russia, indeed, offers it not only a market, but a field of emigration for its surplus population. Germany's pre-war example, however, has not been lost on the other nations, and its ambition will not be without rivals. There seems scarcely to be a trading country in the western world which is not dreaming of the Russian market. Sweden, Denmark and Finland are feverishly preparing "free zones" in their ports, and hope to profit by the transit trade to and from Russia. Germany already has its commercial agents in the land of the Soviets. Czecho-Slovak and Italian manufacturers expect their goods to flow toward Russia in a steady stream. Russia's pre-war textile industry was in Poland; and the Poles now claim Russia not only as a market for their great textile mills, but also as a field of activity for their commission dealers and middlemen, whose knowledge of the Russian language and customs is supposed to equip them peculiarly for this rôle. France is making vague commercial tentatives in the Caucasus and the Baltic States, and looks forward, no doubt, to increasing its already considerable investments of capital in native Russian industries. Britain is making a tremendous effort. It has acquired vast interests in Danzig, the Baltic ports, and the Caucasus. It has formed a great corporation for

Russia's trade. The armistice was no sooner signed than its cloth mills stocked Constantinople with British textiles, expecting soon to move them on to Odessa. But Russia's gates remaining closed, British cloth may still be bought in Constantinople cheaper than in London. Finally, the United States, whose pre-war trade with Russia was largely conducted through British and German intermediaries, is displaying a lively interest in Russia as a field both for export and for the investment of capital. In short, from every commercial country under the spell of Russia's fascinating promise, agents have gone forth, to Reval, to Danzig, to Helsingfors, to Riga, to Libau, to Sebastopol, to Tiflis, and even to Petrograd and Moscow, inquiring, prospecting, bargaining, drafting contracts. The condition of Russia's transports is such that some time must necessarily elapse before there can be any considerable trade with the country; but every one seems to realize that those who come first will be first served, and that the Russian market is a prize well worth a few years' patience.

PAN-SLAVISM

PAN-SLAVISM is the idea that all Slavs, being of the same race, should unite, in one way or another, to resist foreign assimilation and to work for the greater glory of the Slav peoples. There are in Europe something like one hundred and forty-nine million of Slavs, to wit: 100 million Russians, 22 million Poles, 11 million Czecho-Slovaks, 12 million Jugo-Slavs, 4 million Bulgars. The movement is therefore of no slight import. The weakness of all the Slav peoples, up to the present—no less of the Russians than of the Poles, no less of the Czechs than of the Serbs and Bulgars—has been their chronic addiction to internal dissensions. Though pan-Slavism is several centuries old, though it had had its poets and its historians, it was powerless, until something like half a century ago, to influence this fatal racial anarchy; and little by little, the Slavs, falling under foreign dominion, were being assimilated. In the last half century, however, the beginnings of a genuine race consciousness have begun to manifest themselves. Russia was instrumental in liberating the Balkan Slavs from the Turkish yoke, and it at once assumed the rôle of their protector. The occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina by Austria quickened a common Jugo-Slav sentiment. The Polish agitation for independence, though directed in part against Russia, was generally viewed with sympathy by the Slavs.

Finally, the Czechs of Bohemia, finding themselves threatened with absorption by the Germans, began a vigorous cultural warfare in favor of the Slav tradition. There was a pan-Slav congress at Prague in 1848, one at Moscow in 1867, and another very important one at Prague in 1908. The Serbs, in 1912, marched against the Turks singing a famous pan-Slav hymn written by a Czech. The assassination of the Austrian Archduke at Sarajevo was the act of a pan-Slav fanatic. Indeed, the Germans' growing fear of the Slavs, and their desire to crush this dangerous movement before it could be developed any further, may be set down as one of the principal motives of the war.

The Germans were right to dread the deepening intensity of Slav sentiment, for it was in truth directed chiefly against them. Pan-Slavism may almost be said to have been stimulated into active being by pan-Germanism. The opposition of the one to the other was cultural and racial, in the deepest sense of these words. The achievement of German unity, under Bismarck, was both an object lesson and a dire threat to the Slavs. It was a lesson, because it suggested to them that if the Germanic peoples could join together in a single Empire, the Slav peoples might be well inspired to do likewise. It was a threat, because it was immediately followed by an intensive effort on the part of the Germans, both in Austria and in Germany, at Germanizing and so assimilating the Central-European Slavs, a task which was all the more promising owing to the obvious influence and unchallenged superiority of German culture throughout Central and Eastern Europe.

But the Slavs had no intention of allowing themselves to be swallowed up in the swelling sea of Germanism.

They knew only too well how thoroughly the thing could be accomplished. There is in Germany to-day a small, compact community of Slavs, numbering perhaps a hundred and fifty-seven thousand, known as the Serbs of Lausitz—a region which once formed part of the Bohemian crown, but in 1635 was ceded to Saxony. These are all that now remain of the powerful Slav tribes who once inhabited the valleys of the Elbe and the Oder. They were not driven out; they were assimilated. The weaker culture succumbed to the stronger. But Bautzen, Kottbus, Zerbst, Dresden, Leipzig, Chemnitz, Torgau, Glogau, Stargard—all these are old Slav names, Germanized. And the Slavs who still remain have not forgotten. The pan-Slav poet, Kollar, wandering in the neighborhood of Jena, where he went to school in 1815-19, wrote: "Each place, each village, each hill and stream bearing a Slav name seems to me a tomb, a monument, in a gigantic cemetery." And if the Germans, in the name of pan-Germanism, could, in 1914, boldly claim to annex Belgium, Switzerland, Holland and North Eastern France, the Slavs, using precisely the same vague philological and historical arguments, may claim to inherit Saxony and most of Prussia. The sword is two-edged, and cuts both ways. Who knows what mystic propaganda may arise in the future among the Slav peoples for the "liberation" of "our brothers, the Serbs of Lausitz," and the reconquest of those ancient Slav lands, the valleys of the Elbe and the Oder?

The renaissance of Poland, and the establishment of Czecho-Slovakia and Jugo-Slavia as independent states, have given a new impetus to pan-Slavism. A mystical, or if you prefer, a pseudo-scientific doctrine is arising

in Prague, Belgrade and Sofia, which asserts that each race in turn is destined for a time to dominate the world, and that the day of the Slav is at hand. That the doctrine is historically false matters little to its adherents, for pan-Slavism is derived less from reason than from faith, and a kind of blind racial instinct. It is animated not by definite aims but by a vague force of expansion exceedingly difficult to define. Taking no account of social or political ideas, indifferent alike to Czardom and Sovietism, reposing confidently upon the profound and obscure sentiment of race, it looks toward Moscow as the mystical mother of Slavdom. If the existence is threatened of Czecho-Slovakia, Jugo-Slavia or Bulgaria, who else should save them but Russia? Conversely, is it not the bounden duty of the smaller Slav peoples to work with all their strength to further the interests of the greatest Slav people, and of the Slavs in general? A movement of this unreasoning, semi-religious character is full of high-explosives. It is by no means impossible that, moved by pan-Slav emotion, Russia should be the next misguided candidate for the hegemony of Europe. The Slav combination, even in its present half-formed phase, is strong enough to have become already the most significant political tendency in Europe—the central current around which the policies of the western powers are beginning to eddy and foam.

As to Russia's ultimate recovery, and as to the certainty of a day of reckoning for Russia's foes, the pan-Slavs have not the slightest doubt. Their immediate preoccupations are rather the Polish question, and the question of Bulgaria's relation to the Jugo-Slavs. The Poles are the only Slavs who are not at present sensi-

tive to pan-Slavism. Following the traditional Slav proclivity for racial dissensions, the Poles have quarreled with the Czecho-Slovaks, and have felt obliged to go to war against Bolshevism. It is possible that the Poles will continue in the same headstrong, short-sighted policies. It is equally possible, however, that reconciled to Russia, and making their peace with the Czecho-Slovaks, they too will be swept along in the pan-Slav stream, adding their puissant millions to its already formidable potentialities. It is in this sense, in any case, that the Slavs are bending their efforts.

Between the Czecho-Slovaks and the Jugo-Slavs there is already a firm alliance. Between these two and Russia—any Russia!—an understanding is assured. Except for the Poles, the only other Slav group whose future orientation is doubtful is the Bulgars. The latter, as I have fully explained, desire to join the Jugo-Slav confederation, but are still waiting for an invitation. Prague is even now employing its good offices for the reconciliation of Belgrade and Sofia; and no doubt Russia will in time exercise an even more potent mediatory influence. Here again it is possible that this union will never be effected, and that Bulgaria, isolated and embittered, will turn against the other Slavs; but it is probable that the Serbs will not long be able to resist the splendid prospect of creating, by taking Bulgaria into Jugo-Slavia, a South-Slav state, extending from the Adriatic to the Black Sea, and dominating the Balkans with its twenty million hardy, war-like inhabitants. This solution is confidently foreseen by all true pan-Slavs.

Finally, pan-Slavism has a grievance—a grievance new and deep. A belief, which has quickly acquired

the majestic proportions of a legend, has sprung up, and is current no less in Sofia and Warsaw than in Belgrade, Prague and Moscow, that the decisions of the Paris Peace Conference were dominated by a gigantic plot, largely of British instigation, to keep the Slavs away from the sea. "We ask you only to look at the evidence," they say. "You may smile if you like. The fact remains that the recognition of the Baltic States and Finland practically cuts Russia off from the Baltic; that Poland was prevented from acquiring Danzig outright; that Czecho-Slovakia is buried in the middle of Europe; that Fiume is withheld from Jugo-Slavia; that Bulgaria has been cut off from the Ægean; that Greece has been installed in the vicinity of Constantinople, which was to have been given to Russia; that every effort has been made to exclude Russia from the Black Sea by the creation of an independent Ukraine, and of a series of Caucasian states; and lastly, that Russia has been cut off from the Pacific by the Japanese occupation of Vladivostok. Draw your own conclusions." In this legend, there is perhaps an element of truth; there is certainly an element of fantasy. Its argument is nevertheless impressive. The Slavs—all the Slavs—resent what they consider a treacherous wrong to their race. They do not forget; they are biding their time.

THE FUTURE OF GERMANY

RUSSIA is not the only country the uncertainty of whose future is retarding the restoration of European equilibrium; there is also Germany. Almost every aspect of the defeated empire's national existence—economic, political, even territorial—is enveloped, at the present moment, in impenetrable doubt. Will the Treaty of Versailles be fundamentally revised? Will Germany recover its old commercial and industrial strength? Will the Bavarian and Rhineland separatist movements develop? Will Germany lose the Silesian plebiscite? Will it finally succeed in annexing Austria and reëstablishing its influence in Mittel Europa? These questions are of the greatest moment to the whole of Europe. But as I write, not one of them can be answered with genuine assurance.

One obstacle in the way of Germany's prompt recovery is the reparations programme of the Treaty of Versailles. The Germans, it is true, have lost their army and navy, their merchant-marine, their colonies, and some of their domestic territory. But they have intensified their agriculture; their factories and commercial organizations are intact; and they still form a block of sixty million industrious and disciplined people, holding sway in the middle of Northern Europe, from France to Poland, and from Austria to the North Sea and the Baltic. Left to themselves, they would probably astonish every one with the promptitude of their

return to prosperity and power; for their economic rivals have also been badly crippled by the war. But they are not left to themselves. They are held accountable by the peace treaty for reparations indemnities running into hundreds of billions of gold marks, in default of which the seizure of their coal mines, their railways and their customs houses is by no means an impossibility. They are obliged thus to live in an atmosphere of obscure menace, nervous tension, and moral exasperation which renders all serious reconstructive efforts exceedingly difficult.

It must not be imagined that the Germans are filled with penitence for the wrongs they inflicted in the course of a war for which their country was largely responsible. On the contrary, it is they who conceive themselves to have been wronged by the peace conference. Of the condition in which their armies left northern France, they have, as a whole, no idea. The reparations clauses seem to them simply an outrage, contrived by Germany's enemies for the permanent enslavement of the German people. This plot they are determined to frustrate. And though they are anything but reconciled to the Polish "corridor" cutting off East Prussia from the rest of the reich, to the military occupation of the Rhineland, or to the treaty prohibition against the union of Austria and Germany, these things, they consider, can wait; the first, the dominating, the all-important necessity of the present, is the revision of the reparations clauses of the Treaty of Versailles.

The policy by which the Germans hope to effect, and indeed, are already succeeding in effecting, this revision is obvious enough. In the first place, they

have encouraged the investment of allied—especially English and American—capital in German enterprises. The more allied capitalists who thus acquire an interest in German prosperity, the greater will become the allied propaganda in Germany's favor. In the second place, while taking care not to seem to be intriguing to foment discord between the various allies, they are of course quick to profit by such discords, which in the end, they expect, will prove their salvation. In the third place, they are trying by every means to excite popular sympathy throughout the world for their miserable predicament, and to deflect attention from the ill-deeds of German militarism and imperialism by creating a corresponding counter-sentiment against French militarism and imperialism. In order to prove their absolute good will, and thus to strengthen their resistance on the main points at issue, they have finally begun to disarm, and to deliver coal indemnities, though with many a sigh and groan, and with an occasional outburst of popular resentment against France. They have of course promptly adopted the theory of economic solidarity of Europe put forward by certain English liberal economists, but which had not heretofore been popular in Germany. Finally, in order to prove its utter incapacity to pay the proposed indemnities, the German government seems to be making a deliberate effort to force the country into bankruptcy. The German national debt, increasing still by leaps and bounds, will soon, at the present rate, stand not far behind the total French reparations indemnity.

This last maneuver, however, is a dangerous one. The French are vigilant. They are quite aware that already the total of German exports exceeds that of im-

ports, and that at the same time that the country is crying woe it has just paid twenty-five million marks for foreign liquors, and an even larger sum for foreign tobacco—neither of which can be considered essentials of existence. As for the pretended misery of German industry, the German newspapers, in October, 1920, report the payment of dividends of twenty-two per cent by the Lindenberg metallurgical plants, twenty-two and a half per cent by the Runingen flour mills, thirty per cent by the Zypen metallurgical plants, sixty per cent by the Ammendorf paper mills, etc. With the exception of the United States, Britain, France and Belgium, Germany is already in better condition, in every respect, than any other of the recent belligerents. If, therefore, the German government declares bankruptcy, the French will certainly put in an immediate claim upon the country's resources and active assets.

Scarcely less important to Germany than the division of the reparations clauses is the Upper Silesian plebiscite, still in abeyance, and the outcome of which is very doubtful. If Upper Silesia goes to Poland, Germany will have barely enough coal for its industries; if it remains German, there will be an ample surplus. The issue is therefore fundamental, and the Germans are sparing no pains—propaganda, terrorism, intrigue—to ensure success. They have, for example, transferred, it is said, some sixty per cent of their industries in this region to the control of British capital, thereby enlisting the active sympathy of the British on their side. The Poles, however, have been scarcely less active, and by a similar deal have made doubly sure the support of France. It is possible that, in the end, this matter will be compromised by arbitration of the allies,

as was the Teschen dispute, for the possibility of holding an honest plebiscite seems to have become more and more remote.

As a result of the interior strain and tension brought about by the calamity of defeat, by foreign military occupation, and by the menace involved in the reparations clauses, the question of German unity, which was thought to have been settled once for all by Bismarck, has again arisen. On the one hand, it might appear that with the abolition of the Empire and of the provincial dynasties, and with the establishment of the republic, German unity has in fact been forged more firmly than ever; and this indeed, in the course of time, may prove to be the case. But, on the other hand, tendencies of separation have recently manifested themselves, particularly in the Rhineland and in Bavaria, which cannot be ignored. Both these provinces, chagrined at having been led to disaster under the hegemony of Prussia, seem to be in a kind of revolt against this hegemony. The industrial and commercial Rhineland, occupied by allied troops, has perhaps a certain economic interest to tend to pull away slightly from Berlin. Bavaria, which fought on the side of Austria against Prussia in 1866, and was forced into the confederation against its will, is the second largest German state, and pretends, indeed, to be the largest truly German state, for the Prussians, it maintains, are merely Slavs, Germanized by the Teutonic Knights. Bavaria is Roman Catholic, artistic, agricultural; Prussia is Protestant, crude, industrial. There is accordingly a genuine temperamental difference between these two peoples. It is too soon to say what may come of these tendencies, which, for obvious reasons, are being

supported passively, if not actively, by France. Probably if Germany weathers successfully the crisis of the next few years, German nationality will emerge more strongly cemented than ever. If, however, conditions should become worse, if Germany should lose the Silesian plebiscite, if France should occupy the Ruhr Basin as security for reparations, if Bolshevik disorders should increase, if one economic, political and industrial disturbance should follow another, it is in my opinion by no means impossible that the Rhineland and Bavaria should secede to follow their own individual destinies.

The German government, scenting the danger, is at present trying to forestall the separatist movement by making concessions to it, and turning it to advantage. Thus it is not unusual to hear Prussian leaders talk at present of a new federative constitution in which a large local autonomy should be accorded to the various states. By way of plebiscite propaganda, local autonomy has already been promised to Upper Silesia. And there are those who suspect that, knowing Bavaria's traditional aspiration to absorb the Tyrol, Salzburg and Styria; knowing, moreover, that the French, though opposing the union of Austria with Germany, would even favor the union of Austria with an independent Bavaria,—there are those who suspect that Germany is not unwilling to risk a temporary secession of Bavaria, confident that in time it would come back again into the reich, and Austria with it, thus solving satisfactorily an exceedingly difficult problem of annexation.

This question of the union of Austria with Germany is worthy of the most careful study by all serious observers of European affairs. The Austrians, exasper-

ated by famine and partition, seem rather to favor the union. Germany, though observing for the moment a discreet silence, strongly desires it. Italy, hoping thereby to acquire a common frontier with Germany, favors it. Some American, neutral and British opinion, concerned over the principle of self-determination, favors it. Yet in the peace treaty, largely at the instigation of France, this union is absolutely forbidden. Why? The French viewpoint is not without significance. In the first place, say the French, if Germany annexes six million Austrians, it will have come out of the war, in spite of its defeat, greater and stronger than ever. But in the second place—and this is at least as important—the way would thus be opened for the prompt resumption of the famous *drang nach osten*, the dreaded German expansion down through Central Europe into the Balkans and toward Asia Minor, which was so disquieting to both France and Britain before the war, and which was indeed one of the most formidable politico-economic movements in the world. By the union of Austria and Germany, revengeful Hungary would be brought back into touch with the Germanic block, no less revengeful; Czecho-Slovakia would be surrounded and isolated; and if Roumania, through its anti-Slav sentiments, could be joined to the combination, Germany would once more dominate from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Obviously, this is a matter worth pondering over. Much as "Balkanized Europe" would profit from the application, in general, of the principle of federation, it is really questionable whether the disequilibrium which would thus be created in Germany's favor would not more than nullify the benefits which would accrue by this solution of the Austrian

problem. In any case, the French veto to the union will not readily be lifted.

Convinced, perhaps, that in the end Austria will inevitably drift under the influence of Berlin, the Germans, in this as in other important political issues, are for the present keeping punctiliously quiet. Their direct political influence in Europe is for the moment conspicuous by its absence. They have, of course, a warm sympathy for those countries—Soviet Russia, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, Turkey,—which are also unwilling victims of the peace settlements. Anything which shakes the foundations of the Paris treaties serves their turn, and while they are careful outwardly to observe all the proprieties, they are only too willing, unofficially, to smuggle arms and lend technical military aid to the Russian Bolshevists and the Turkish Nationalists. In August, 1920, at the height of the Bolshevist advance against Warsaw, they were, it is true, seriously tempted, and were perhaps on the verge of casting in their lot with the Russians. If Poland had been crushed, they would almost certainly have done so. Meanwhile, the German foreign policy continues, pending economic reconstruction and the campaign for treaty revision, to remain negative, disconcerting, and obscure. Pan-Germanism, however, is by no means dead. In the face of a flourishing pan-Slavism, the Germans have not the slightest intention of sitting helplessly by in a kind of Buddhistic contemplation. They will never forgive Poland for its pretensions on Upper Silesia, and for its Danzig corridor. Nor will they ever forgive France, either for its friendliness to Poland and the Slavs, or for its firm stand, disastrous to Germany, against the revision of the Treaty of Versailles.

ASPECTS OF FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY

THE Russians and the Germans are the two most numerous, and are among the most vital and most prolific, races in Europe. The absence from the concert of nations of the one through a revolution whose aims are hostile to every established government, and of the other through defeat following a great aggression, is sufficient explanation of the prolongation of political anarchy. It is true that these two peoples are even now exercising a powerful, perhaps even the predominant, influence on European affairs; but this influence is negative, having no other basis than what the various states hope, or imagine, or fear, the future in Russia and Germany may bring. Until the future status and political orientation of these two peoples becomes clear, there can be, as I have already pointed out, no reestablishment of continental equilibrium. Meanwhile, it will be instructive to examine what positive contributions the powers of the entente are making to political reconstruction, and what are the general tendencies of their foreign policies, as affecting this part of the world.

As far as "Balkanized Europe" is concerned, it is France, and one might almost say France alone, which has anything like a concrete reconstruction policy; for Britain's principal interests lie elsewhere, and Italy's internal condition is too troubled to permit it the luxury

of a widely active diplomacy. Even the French policy, having to deal in such complete uncertainties as the future of Russia and Germany, is necessarily vague; nevertheless, one can, I think, descry in it the outlines of certain definite aims.

The key to all French action in Europe, now as before the war, is fear of Germany—a fear which is beyond any doubt fully justified. To most French students of foreign affairs, it is a source of great regret, and of great anxiety, that the French negotiators at the peace conference, cajoled by the vague promises of a permanent defensive alliance against Germany, offered by Mr. Wilson and Mr. Lloyd George—promises which have not been realized—failed to obtain either the disruption of Germany into four or five separate independent states, or even the Rhine as a permanent military frontier. To have “Balkanized” Austria-Hungary, it is argued, without at the same time “Balkanizing” Germany, leaves the latter in a singularly favorable condition. There is not even a sufficient guarantee of reparations indemnities, failing of which France will have the greatest difficulty in meeting its financial obligations to Britain and the United States. Of course, a good many years must probably elapse before Germany can think of again attacking France, for the German army is shattered, and the French army is strong. But that Germany is even now meditating revenge, no Frenchman seriously doubts. There are sixty million Germans; there are only forty million French. Who knows if, next time, France will have the help of Britain, Russia, Italy and the United States? And if France does not, what then? The logic of these considerations is clear. In the first place,

despite what British liberals may postulate regarding the necessity, for the common good, of restoring Germany to full prosperity as quickly as possible, France has probably a genuine interest to delay this recovery by every legitimate means, at least until devastated France is restored, and until Russia begins to recover. If, meanwhile, as a result of internal crises, the Rhineland and Bavaria should secede from Prussia, the French would doubtless be disposed to make these states some very important concessions. In the second place, disappointed in the hope of having a permanent defensive alliance with Britain and the United States, thrown back, as it were, on its own resources, France is resolved to contrive whatever other defensive combinations, or barriers against German expansion, circumstances or the ingenuity of statesmen may make possible. For this reason, it is deploying at present a vigorous diplomatic activity in every country of "Balkanized Europe." Pending the reestablishment of equilibrium, it is trying to play the rôle of general conciliator, and to pose as everybody's friend, so that, whatever the future may bring, it will never be left entirely alone. This policy has its inconveniences: to be everybody's friend is of course to be nobody's friend, but neither is it to become anybody's enemy. On the whole, the policy is one of far-sighted prudence; and incidentally, it is in many respects a valuable reconstructive force. Those who criticize France for delaying the return of real peace by its attitude toward Germany are apt to forget that in the succession states of Austria-Hungary, and in the Balkans, France is doing far more than any other power to hasten the re-

turn of real peace by its intelligent and untiring efforts to reconcile these various peoples to one another.

Though proceeding with extreme caution, and never committing itself so far that withdrawal is impossible, the action of France may be said to be chiefly interested, on its positive side, in two possible combinations. One of these is a confederation of states bordering the Danube, and the other is a renewal of the Russian pact, in the form, perhaps, of a French-Pan-Slav alliance. Of the two, the latter is the more promising. As I have already shown, the only effective counterpoise to pan-Germanism is pan-Slavism. Moreover, the French having failed in their attempt to conclude an Anglo-American-French alliance, the only other really strong power available for their purposes is Russia. But a Soviet Russia means inevitably a Russo-German alliance, which is precisely what the French dread above all things. Their antagonism to the Soviets is therefore not merely financial, as some Americans have imagined, or merely narrowly conservative; it is based on profound political strategy, and it is implacable. The French program, with regard to Russia, is, for the present, to support Poland against the Soviets; to utilize Poland to keep Germany and the Soviets apart; to aid any anti-Soviet leader who may arise, and to encourage anti-Soviet tendencies in the Baltic and Caucasian states, without, however, recognizing the permanent independence from Russia of these states. But once the Soviets fall, the French, bent upon winning Russia away from Germany at any cost, will inevitably modify their program as follows: reconciliation of Poland and Russia, even to the extent of urging Poland

to make territorial sacrifices to Russia; reconciliation of the Baltic and Caucasian states within Russia; reconciliation, if possible, of Roumania and Russia; sympathy for Russian aspirations toward Constantinople; in short, the fullest possible support of Russia's claims, so long as Russia resists the temptation of an alliance with Germany. Meanwhile, France is encouraging in every possible way the reconciliation of Czecho-Slovakia and Poland, the Czecho-Slovak-Jugo-Slav alliance, and the union of Bulgaria with Jugo-Slavia, utilizing thus the pan-Slav sentiment which is already making such progress in these Slav countries.

However, it is entirely possible that even a non-Soviet Russia will accept a German alliance. In this event, France would back Poland to the bitter end, and would urge the permanent independence of the Baltic and Caucasian States, thus falling into harmony with Britain's bold anti-Russian policy. Meanwhile, French diplomacy, as an additional precaution, is interesting itself in a possible Danube Confederation. Such a confederation could of course offer manifold advantages to the states concerned; it interests France for quite another reason. The *drang nach osten*—German expansion toward the Mediterranean and the Near East—has been momentarily arrested. But who is to say that it will not presently be resumed? The "Balkanization" of Central and South Eastern Europe would even seem to make the way easy for the forward march of the powerful German politico-commercial interests. The only sure way to dam back this influence would seem to be to forestall it by establishing a cross current, which, traversing Europe from west to east, would effectively block the German current south-

ward. The Danube, to be linked soon to the Rhine, and so to French Alsace, by the Rhine-Danube canal across Bavaria, is the central artery obviously designated for this purpose. The completion of the Rhine-Danube canal, I may remark in passing, will give France a direct water route from Strassburg to Odessa; and the opening of this new water route will render Britain's control of the Mediterranean, at Gibraltar, to some extent illusory. As ideally conceived, a Danube confederation would begin with an independent Bavaria to which Austria would be joined; and would include Hungary, Roumania, and possibly Bulgaria. However, with Bavaria still clinging firmly to Prussia, the only amenable elements whom the French have to work with are the Austrians, Hungarians and Roumanians—with possibly the Bulgarians. The British, for economic reasons, are almost as much interested in the project as the French are for political reasons. As a possible means of bringing Austria and Hungary together, both France and Britain have at times seemed to favor the proposed Hapsburg restoration in Hungary; but this proposal is attended by so many disadvantages that the French, for the present at least, are working rather at the other end of the Danube, to reconcile Roumania and Hungary, without raising the difficult Hapsburg question. Thus is explained the "mystery" of the French negotiations to gain control of the Hungarian banks and railways. This control, aside from its economic advantages, would greatly facilitate the work of the French as Danubian conciliators.

But it is doubtful if both the Danube combination and the pan-Slav combination can long be simultan-

ously cultivated. I am myself of the opinion that as time goes on, the French will evolve more and more toward the Slavs, even, if necessary, at the expense of abandoning the Austro-Hungarian-Roumanian combination to the Germans. As for Greece, though still outwardly professing sincere friendship for it, the French have in reality already unwillingly abandoned it to Britain, as a factor in Britain's anti-Russian combinations. The important thing to remember is that, for the moment at least, the French in their desire to circumscribe future German expansion, seem to be interested almost equally in a Danube confederation, and in pan-Slavism.

ASPECTS OF BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY

THE striking feature of British foreign policy is its fundamental consistency. The details may vary with lightning-like rapidity; the underlying principle remains the same. Sea-power, colonial expansion, the maintenance of continental equilibrium! By these fixed stars the British pilots have sailed their ship of state for centuries. The whole national existence is organized according to these principles, and if one of them were to fail, its existence would be threatened. There is no deeper instinct, in man or nation, than that of self-preservation; and the fundamentals of British foreign policy are as true for the radical workpeople as for the staunchest tory.

Britain is a densely concentrated industrial community, established on an island and dependent on its colonies in four quarters of the globe, not only for its raw-stuffs but for the very food it eats. The corollary of this condition is sea-power. If, in time of stress, the great sea-routes were to be blockaded to British shipping, the British people, deprived of raw-stuffs, would have to close their factories, and deprived of meat and grain would starve. The ever-increasing demand for food and raw-stuffs, together with the desire to protect existing colonies by linking them together or by surrounding them with still others, leads inevitably to colonial expansion. Finally, it must be remembered

that the Island of Britain lies close beside the mainland of Europe, on which for centuries have dwelt in ceaseless rivalry some of the world's most formidable military powers. If these powers were to combine, or if one of them were to attain to hegemony over the others, Britain, for all its navy, might well tremble. It is careful, therefore, not to arouse the antagonism of the continental Europeans as a whole, by harboring continental territorial ambitions, or by seeming to interfere too persistently in their affairs. If, however, one continental power seems on the point of dominating all the others, Britain's weight must be thrown unhesitatingly into the balance against it. Thus, in 1815, Britain helped to overthrow Napoleon; in 1918, it helped overthrow William II. But its stern purpose accomplished, and continental equilibrium restored, it retired as quickly as possible, in 1815, from the complications of its war-time alliances, and resumed its attitude of disinterested vigilance, just as it is doing once more to-day. And with France, crippled but fiery, standing forth at the end of the war as the strongest military power on the continent, the British instinct to keep the balance is even now functioning unfailingly. Little by little, Britain leans toward Germany, not from affection for the Germans or hatred for the French, but simply that the scales may steady to a rest. For whatever the bonds of the recent battlefield comradeship between the two peoples, who is to say if the prolonged continental predominance of France would not, fifty or a hundred years hence, prove as dangerous to Britain as, for example, Spain's predominance in the XV Century, or Germany's in 1914? If, on the other hand, Germany should recover its political

and military strength more quickly than is anticipated; if it should again threaten France; and particularly, if it should ally itself with Russia, Britain would instantly, and by the same sure instinct, swing back to France, of this there cannot be the slightest doubt.

Britain's vigilance in all international affairs is energetic and untiring. It never neglects an opportunity to prepare the way for what may ultimately prove to be the necessity of intervention to reestablish equilibrium. "The occupation of Cyprus," said Lord Salisbury, in a speech shortly after the Congress of Berlin, "was simply the development of what has been for a long time the traditional policy of the English government. When the interest of Europe was centered in the conflicts which were being fought out in Spain, England occupied Gibraltar. When the interest of Europe was centered in the conflicts which were being fought out in Italy, England occupied Malta. Now that there is a chance of Europe's interest being centered in Asia Minor or Egypt, England has occupied Cyprus." Not having the original at hand, I have been obliged to re-translate this illuminating passage from the French; but the sense of it is no less clear.

So much for general principles. In a more immediate sense, Britain, at the present time, has two great pre-occupations. The first is to restore its badly stricken commercial and financial situation as quickly as possible. For this purpose its chief need is markets which can pay it for its goods with something better than fine promises. Until Germany, Russia and perhaps even the states of "Balkanized Europe" are once more placed upon a sound economic basis, there can be no real prosperity for Britain. Thus Britain is brought to favor

modification, in Germany's favor, of the reparation clauses of the treaty; resumption of economic relations even with Soviet Russia; and the formation, if possible, of a Danube federation, which will ensure some means of stability to Central and Southeastern Europe. British financial and business interests have been exceedingly active, negotiating, organizing, investing on a large scale, throughout this part of the world, as well as in the new limitrophe states of Russia; and Britain's economic, no less than its political interest is everywhere to put the war and the war mentality out of mind as quickly as possible, and get back to work. The British are thus, in one respect, a potent factor in European reconstruction, but in another respect they are an obstacle. For in their insistence on the purely economic viewpoint, they fail to understand, they lose patience with, the purely political viewpoint which, as I think I have adequately shown, must inevitably take precedence, in "Balkanized Europe," over the more coldly reasonable economic viewpoint. It is perhaps in recognition of their initial error in this respect that the British are tending more and more to quit the continental political field altogether, and let the continental states arrange things between them as best they can. Compared to its tremendous efforts just after the armistice, the present activity of British diplomacy in most continental European states is relatively modest.

Britain's other great preoccupation is the future of Russia. Just as the key to French foreign policy is Germany, so the key to one of the most important aspects of British foreign policy is fear of Russia. The Russian empire, in the days of its grandeur, threatened not indeed Britain itself, as did Napoleon and William II,

but that part of the British empire which is at once most valuable and most vulnerable—India! Prior to the war, Russia made no secret of its desire to possess Constantinople, where it would be within easy striking distance of Suez. But this was not all. Russia held the whole of the Caucasus, Northern Russia, and was encroaching upon the middle, or neutral zone of Persia; its influence was permeating Afghanistan, where its propaganda was active in fomenting raids against the British. Just beyond lies India itself. No wonder the Anglo-Indians were alarmed. The state of mind in which, for several generations, these British colonials have lived with respect to Russia's expansion, is admirably presented in Kipling's powerful short story, "The Man Who Was,"—an instinctive antagonism too deep for mere words—profound as the human heart, and irreconcilable.

Convinced, probably with good reason, that to count upon the lamb-like friendship of a reconstituted Russia would be merely naïve, Britain has profited by Russia's collapse in defeat and revolution to fling out widespread and intricate defenses for its Indian realm. The Slavs accuse it of deliberately attempting to prolong civil war in Russia by always shifting its support to strengthen the losing side; but this would be contrary to Britain's economic interests and is probably a mere pan-Slav fancy. What is certain, however, is that Britain, since the armistice, has strengthened its hold upon Egypt, Mesopotamia and Afghanistan, has extended its influence over the whole of Persia, has encouraged the independence of the Baltic and Caucasian states, has encouraged its ally, Japan, to occupy Eastern Siberia, has assisted the expansion of its ally, Greece,

straight across the Balkan peninsula, so as to protect Constantinople from the Slavs on the north, and in general, has tended more and more to detach itself from the various Slav states—Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Jugo-Slavia, Bulgaria—and to favor rather their rivals—Germany, Hungary, Austria, Greece, Italy. This is, in my opinion, an extremely bold policy. It may be true that the hostility of a reconstituted Russia is inevitable; but the present British policy, which even the British liberals do not oppose, seems actually to be aiming to provoke it. If the Soviets would recognize by treaty the independence of the Baltic and Caucasian states, the former shutting Russia off the Baltic and the latter shutting it out of Asia Minor, no doubt Britain would have every interest to recognize the Soviet government, provided it gave serious promise of remaining in power. But suppose it should fall, as it probably will? The fact that Britain had recognized it would make the game only too transparent. Britain would be in an even worse position, with regard to Slav hostility, than at present. And the present position is far from reassuring. The British people, more than any other, will have occasion to watch with the closest attention, the struggles of Russia to recover itself. They may, indeed, try to conciliate Russia, when the latter becomes threatening again, by making it concessions; but concessions obtained under threat inspire no gratitude; and the clouds which are now obscuring Russia are ominous with future trouble for Britain.

In conclusion, I may point out that, quite apart from the large share of fine sentiment and generous idealism with which the British people are supporting the

League of Nations, the British, more, perhaps, than any other people, have a political interest in supporting the League. Interested, on the continent, solely in peaceful reconstruction and the preservation of the balance of power, masters in the rest of the world, of the most magnificent empire ever created on earth, they have nothing to desire beyond the enjoyment of their vast possessions in prosperity and peace. The League meets these desiderata admirably. The fact, however, that the British are so actively interested in it is no reason for other nations to turn against it. On the contrary, the essential purpose of the League is that each shall find therein the means of furthering peacefully his own best interests. Moreover, the British Empire, as at present constituted, is so variegated, vast and complex, that it is paralyzed by its very constitution against any considerable aggressive action in the world; it can not, therefore, be properly considered a serious military menace to the other powers, except in the case of a purely defensive war.

ASPECTS OF ITALIAN FOREIGN POLICY

MODERN Italy is old only in culture. Politically and economically, it is still very young. Indeed, one may maintain that prior to the war, it had not even fully established its national unity, for Sicily and Piedmont were almost complete strangers to one another, while between these extremes, in the various other provinces, might be found innumerable differences of dialect, custom and social organization. However, the war and the psychological reactions engendered by the war, are tending rapidly to weld the Italian people together, and the achievement of that semblance of social, political and sentimental homogeneity so essential to national strength seems now only a question of a few more years.

Conscious both of past grandeur and of young, fresh energies, modern Italy is ambitious. It feels that during its long struggle for independence and unity, the other powers stole a march on it, seized all the best colonies and slighted its wishes. It entered the war, and fought the war with a stern determination to make up for lost time, claiming at the peace conference, the following territories: Trieste and Istria, the South Tyrol with Trent, Fiume, considerable portions of the Dalmatian coast, Albania's chief port and a portion of its hinterland, a large share in the partition of Asia Minor, and the cession by France and Britain

of a part of their North African colonies. All of these things except Fiume had indeed already been promised it by the allies as the price of its entry into the war. It aspired, in short, to dominate the Adriatic completely, and to exercise an increasingly strong influence in the middle and eastern Mediterranean. The acquisition of the Albanian port of Valona would, moreover, have opened the way for its political and economic expansion into the Balkans, where it dreamed of playing the rôle which had been Austria's before the war. Italian nationalism, as a force of expansion, was at a very high pitch during the days of the peace conference.

But unfortunately for Italy, the country, in its youth, and its post-war exhaustion, was not strong enough materially, socially or diplomatically, to realize those large and perhaps not unjustifiable ambitions. Italy received Trent and Trieste as by right. It even received the South Tyrol and a sphere of influence in Southern Asia Minor. But the colonial concessions accorded it proved to be mere frontier rectifications, and Fiume and the Dalmatian coast were refused it altogether. Taking advantage of the social disorders which followed, and of the grave disaffection in the Italian army, the Albanians, in the summer of 1920, descended upon the Italian garrison of Valona, and drove it to sea, thus clearing the Italians out of Albania.

Though these facts are well known to every one, I have ventured to recall them because they go far to explain Italy's present foreign policy. I do not consider that this policy has changed, in reality, from what it was at the time of the peace conference. The Italians are young, strong, intelligent, vital; they have a large surplus population and a considerable cultured

force. All in all, it is inevitable that they should aspire to dominate the Adriatic and to play an increasingly important part in the Balkans and the Mediterranean. On the other hand, they are apparently not yet as strong as they thought they were. They made the mistake, in the vulgar phrase, of "biting off more than they could chew."

Economically, Italy suffered during the war, and is still suffering, more than any allied country. However, if the government had been successful in its peace program, the people, doubtless, would have continued to bear this suffering proudly. But the failure of the government's diplomacy, especially in the Adriatic question, which is a question of national security to Italy, exasperated all classes. I regard the recent disorders in Italy as due in large part to what the people consider the insult and humiliation of their country at the hands of the allies. Nationalism seeming to "fail," the way was immediately opened to a violent reaction against nationalism, even taking the form, in some extremist groups, of Bolshevism. The consequent weakening of the entire social structure has made any further thought of expansion impossible, for the time being. But as I have said, I do not consider by any means that Italy's expansive aspirations are ended; they are merely in abeyance. With the return of interior health, they will promptly revive.

Meanwhile, made impotent for any aggressive diplomacy by the country's bad interior situation, the new government has fallen back on what may be considered a purely defensive policy. In a general way, this policy takes the form of a somewhat radical liberalism, more or less on the British model. Since Italy is

not to be allowed to expand, neither shall other allied states. Let the war, therefore, be forgotten as quickly as possible, let the equilibrium of Europe be restored by the application of the doctrine of economic solidarity, and the treaties be revised in favor of the enemy states.

More specifically, however, Italy is afraid of France, its great rival in the Mediterranean, and of Jugo-Slavia, its rival in the Adriatic, and is acting quietly in a variety of ways against these supposed dangers.

As far as "Balkanized Europe" is concerned, Italy's ideas are those of a strict opportunism. It is opposed to anything which may tend to strengthen the Jugo-Slavs, and in favor of anything which promises to weaken them. It is opposed to a Hapsburg restoration from a fear—in my opinion, mistaken—that this would prove but the first step toward the reconstitution of an Austria-Hungary which would include Jugo-Slavia. It is particularly nervous moreover over the recrudescence of pan-Slav sentiment, which it is trying to meet, on the one hand, by itself seeking the friendship of the Bulgarians, Czecho-Slovaks, Poles and Russians, so that it can attempt to effect other than purely Slav combinations; and on the other, by rapprochements with the anti-Slav peoples, as the British, Greeks and Roumanians. After violently opposing a proposed Danube confederation in the fear that it might include Jugo-Slavia, Italy now seems not ill-disposed toward a confederation which would include merely Austria, Hungary and Roumania, and would be opposed to Jugo-Slavia. However, the main idea of Italian foreign policy at present seems to be to work for the restoration of Germany, and for the union of Germany

and Austria. The advantage to Italy of this union is clear. In the first place, reviving pan-German sentiment, it would raise once more a formidable rival against pan-Slav sentiment; in the second place, it would enable Italy to play France and Germany one against the other, and so obtain favors from both; in the third place, giving Italy a common frontier with Germany, it would form a solid barrier against French economic and political expansion eastward; finally, it would greatly reinforce Italy's position in the Mediterranean. The German *drang nach osten* could reach the Mediterranean at Trieste. Not only would the port prosper by the transit of German commerce, but Italy, as Germany's shipping and commercial agent in the Mediterranean, would greatly profit. However, the French are well aware what such a combination would mean for them, and they are strong enough to prevent the union of Germany and Austria for some time to come.

Broadly speaking, it seems probable that Italy is destined to fall more and more under the influence of Britain. Its geographical situation in the south of Europe is not dissimilar to that of Britain in the north. It has indeed been compared to a pendulum swinging, figuratively, between the east and the west. Both Britain and Italy have an interest in seeing an equilibrium reestablished between the age-long rivals, France and Germany; both Britain and Italy are strongly committed against the Slav movement. However, being itself a country poor in resources, rich only in thrift, diligence and the plenty of its labor, Italy is dependent, to a large extent, on Britain for both the fuel and the raw stuffs required by its growing indus-

tries. At no point does Britain appear to block the path of future Italian expansion; indeed, it may even serve to further this expansion. Under the circumstances, a future Italo-British combination stands ready indicated.

THE DISSOLUTION OF THE ENTENTE

THE Entente, in everything except name, is ended. France, Britain and Italy associated themselves in the war for a common purpose—the defeat of the Central Empires. This purpose having been fulfilled, what should hold them together? Their interests are different. The only conceivable bond persisting between them is a vague and somewhat artificial sentiment of battlefield fraternity, and a vague desire for a prolonged peace; but with this question of peace or war, bold and determined men, in every country, pursuing personal or national aims, have always shown themselves ready to gamble.

At least, it may be objected, there are the peace treaties, conceived in concert, and involving both common privileges and common duties. An illusion! Even in the execution of the treaties, the interests of the various allies are not the same. Britain, having obtained the German colonies and the destruction of the German fleet, cares nothing for reparations; what it wants is the restoration of the German market. France, not yet in a position to trade on a large scale, cares nothing about the German market, but demands its reparations indemnities. Italy, convinced that with France and Belgium enjoying a sort of priority right, reparations for itself are out of the question, wants Germany to recover rapidly for political no less than for business

reasons. How reconcile these conflicting viewpoints? The peace treaties, far from being a center of conciliation, are merely an additional cause of dissension. The allied nations chafe and strain under the outworn harness of their alliance. The secret aspiration of each is to be free again—entirely free, so that it may seek unhampered the new friends, the new combinations, demanded by the new conditions in which the war has left it. Indeed, one might almost say that the necessity, under the treaties, of associating for the performance of certain common duties is a source less of harmony and understanding than of irritation and of friction.

The dark clouds which have been piling up during the last year on the horizon of Franco-British relations are no mere fortuity; they are the evidence of a long gathering storm. The British, having already obtained from the peace settlement everything for which they can hope, have nothing more to ask of the French. The latter, having still everything to hope for in the way of reparations, are placed continually in the position of having to beg favors of the British, and for every favor granted, they are obliged to make a concession; as for example, at San Remo, when the British, in return for withdrawing their support from the Emir Feycal, who was opposing the French occupation of Syria, induced the French to sign away all the oil in France and the French colonies to the British oil interests. At this game, Britain has nothing to lose and everything to gain; France must submit, under pain of seeing the difficulties in the way of collecting its reparations indemnities increased manifold by the British lending their diplomatic support to Germany. The

French and British, moreover, are rivals in the Near East, and they stand on opposite sides of the Russian question, the British inclining to favor the Soviets and to oppose the pan-Slav movement, the French opposing the Soviets and favoring pan-Slavism. On what terms, then, should a renewal of the Franco-British alliance be based? As long as Germany remains unable to threaten Britain's power again, it is difficult to see why the British should share in France's apprehensions. Nothing short of a Russo-German alliance could at present restore the *Entente Cordiale*.

The fundamental disagreements between France and Italy are no less deep than those between France and Britain. Although the French are not racially Latins, but Celts latinized, both France and Italy consider themselves the descendants of Rome, and a keen cultural rivalry is the result. The Italians may properly claim that it was they who, by their expansion in the Renaissance, brought the modern spirit into France. Yet at the present time, the French commonly look with a kind of contempt on the Italians, and the latter are furiously jealous of the French. Both nations aspire to the hegemony of the Mediterranean. The Italians look with envious eyes on France's North-African empire, while the French are vigilant to place obstacles in the way of Italian colonial expansion. The French are trying to establish an east-and-west commercial current across Europe, which the Italians are trying to block; and the Italians are working for the union of Austria and Germany, which the French have thus far successfully prevented. The French are friendly to the Jugo-Slavs, who are Italy's bitterest enemies; and Italy dreads and opposes the pan-Slav movement, which

France is inclined to encourage. Both countries lack coal, both import, and both export, much the same kind of things. Nothing less than the imminence of a great common danger would be strong enough to bind together two countries thus formed by nature for rivalry. The fact that in all recent allied conferences the Italians invariably joined with the British against France, leaving France invariably in the minority, is perhaps the chief reason why France, following the conferences of Spa and Boulogne, practically broke off negotiations with its two allies.

It is of no use, therefore, to speculate on what good reconstructive results the allies might have obtained in "Balkanized Europe" had they remained united in viewpoint; for they did not, and obviously could not, remain so united. The break-up of Austria-Hungary is only one cause of the prevalent political anarchy; the break-up of all existing alliances is a cause no less potent. But already the pendulum is beginning to swing the other way. Having attained a maximum of isolation, the nations are at last groping toward new combinations—combinations in conformity with their new political and economic interests—combinations out of which, little by little, will be builded the new equilibrium.

THE NEW BALANCE OF POWER

THE domination of the small nations of Central and Eastern Europe by one among themselves or by some outside nation is, I have said, neither desirable nor immediately possible. To reduce the present anarchy, which is hindering the return of peace, the only other means available is to reconstruct a series of federations, alliances or understandings which will restore public confidence. Neither the League of Nations nor the idea of economic solidarity will suffice for the formation of these new understandings. In nearly every case, a political solution must precede the economic solution, and these political solutions must be founded not on vague idealism, but on such realities as the instincts of self-preservation and expansion, and the sentiments of race and nationality. "*Natura non nisi parendo vincitur*," said Bacon; to conquer nature we must first obey it. Already the nations, great as well as small, are instinctively groping their way toward a new balance of power. So long as the future of Germany, and particularly of Russia, remains obscure, a complete equilibrium cannot be obtained. The difficulty, under these circumstances, of attempting to forecast the political future, is sufficient to give pause to the boldest analyst. There is no magic whereby that which is essentially veiled and uncertain can be conjured suddenly into a revealing light. Nevertheless, the tend-

encies now sensible in the foreign policies of the large and the smaller powers are such that the beginnings of this new equilibrium are already discernible.

I have discussed in some detail three important cohesive movements which are still in their formative phases, and which may develop or decline according to events, namely, pan-Slavism (including the union of Bulgaria and Jugo-Slavia), pan-Germanism (including the union of Austria and Germany); and the movement for a Danube confederation. It will be opportune to glance for a moment at the so-called "Petite Entente," which is the first definite alliance to be signed in "Balkanized Europe."

In August, 1920, when the Bolshevik army was at the outer forts of Warsaw, the French ministry of foreign affairs did its best to enlist help for Poland in the neighboring countries. Czecho-Slovakia and Roumania both refused to move; but Hungary, hating communism from having been ruined by it, and hoping perhaps to obtain an amelioration of the peace terms, proffered its services. In sudden dread lest the Magyars, backed for a larger purpose by the French, might regain some of their lost territory and become once more a menace to their neighbors, Mr. Benès, Foreign Minister of Czecho-Slovakia, took the initiative, in the course of a rapid voyage to Belgrade and Bucharest, of combining the "Petite Entente," the specified purpose of which is to ensure the permanence, in Central Europe, of the recent peace settlements, but which in reality is based almost entirely on the fear of Hungary. Both Poland and Greece have lately been invited to join this defensive federation of the lesser allies, the term of which has been fixed at two years. Poland, irk-

ing under its grudge against Czecho-Slovakia, and failing, moreover, to see what interest it would have in supporting countries which withheld their aid for it under the most tragic circumstances, has refused. As for Greece, its answer will doubtless be contingent on the agreement it reaches finally with its friend, Roumania.

The question arises, how far Roumania itself is committed to the "Petite Entente"? An alliance between Czecho-Slovakia and Jugo-Slavia was a foregone conclusion. Pan-Slav sentiment, economic and political interests—everything combined to make it inevitable. But Roumania's case is different. For the present, Roumania has no doubt an interest to exercise strict vigilance as regards Hungary; but on the other hand, it is almost as much afraid of pan-Slavism as of the Magyars. I do not believe, therefore, that Roumania has given more than a formal adhesion to the "Petite Entente," which is perhaps by no means the great stroke of diplomacy some have proclaimed it.

The truth is, it is too soon to foretell what is going to happen in "Balkanized Europe." There are too many unknown quantities. The French, in their prudent policy of waiting, and of acting meanwhile in the rôle of general conciliators, are well inspired. For who knows? The Europe of five or ten years hence may begin to crystallize in political combinations quite other than those which seem at the present day most probable. The revival of pan-Germanism, the growth of pan-Slavism, may quite submerge such flimsily immediate constructions as the "Petite Entente." However, by way of illustrating how complete may be the surprises of the future, and I might almost say for the

sheer fantasy of the thing, I will venture to sketch one possible basis of European equilibrium—not that it is any more probable than three or four others, but that it is no less probable.

As necessary preliminaries, I will assume, quite arbitrarily, that Russia recovers its power; that Poland and Russia are reconciled; that the sentiment of pan-Slavism develops; that the union is effected of Bulgaria and Jugo-Slavia; that Germany also recovers, and that pan-Germanism once more becomes active; that the French successfully prevent the union of Germany and Austria, but that Austria nevertheless falls completely under German influence; and finally, that Roumania, alarmed by the pan-Slav development, tightens its bonds with Greece, and seeks a reconciliation with Hungary. There might then be, on one side of the European balance, Germany, Austria, Hungary, Italy, Roumania, Greece; and on the other, France, Russia, Jugo-Slavia, Czecho-Slovakia and Poland. Both Britain and the United States would remain isolated; but the main sympathies of Britain would be with the Germano-Italian anti-Slav group, and the main sympathies of the United States with France and the Slavs; for in Asia, Japan, the ally of Britain, would be against the Slavs. Britain and the United States, while tending normally to counterbalance one another, would remain sufficiently detached so that in periods of crisis, when one alliance or another seemed tempted toward aggression, they could utilize their combined weight in the interests of peace. Such a hypothetical equilibrium may be quite imaginary; it is at least suggestive.

The eminent French authority on foreign politics, Monsieur Jacques Bainville, has recently sketched a

series of what he considers probabilities, which are based on quite opposite hypotheses. Monsieur Bainville takes small account of pan-Slavism. The reconciliation of Russia and Poland, being, in his opinion, extremely dubious, he regards a Russo-German alliance—Soviets or no Soviets—as inevitable. The possibility of the union of Bulgaria and Jugo-Slavia seems to him so remote that he does not even mention it. Italy, he foresees, will reach a common agreement with both Jugo-Slavia and Germany, just as it had reached an agreement, before the war, with Austria-Hungary and Germany. Under the circumstances, the best that France can hope for is, he thinks, on the one hand, a Polish alliance; and on the other, a Hungarian-Roumanian-Bulgarian alliance. Of course, as I have said, in the present state of international anarchy, no combination is impossible; and it is even likely that before any lasting stability is achieved, a number of ententes and alliances will have been tried for a few months, or a few years, only to be abandoned in favor of others more promising. At the same time, while I defer respectfully to Monsieur Bainville's profound knowledge of diplomatic history, I believe he entirely under-estimates the deep-rooted forces of pan-Slavism, with the ultimate conflict which they imply between the Slavs and Germans. The fact that Poland and Russia have always quarrelled in the past is inconclusive as proof that they will always quarrel in the future.

In a general way, I am optimistic regarding the immediate future. I believe that the nations are already working toward a new and healthy equilibrium, within some kind of general league or association of nations, and that gradually they will achieve it. I do not look

for any considerable reduction of armaments, but neither do I think there will be any more great wars—not for many years.

To assume, however, that there will never again be such a war as the last overtakes one's best optimism. I once had occasion to look into the biography of a somewhat obscure Elizabethan dramatist named Robert Greene. This talented, well-meaning, unhappy and very human fellow passed his entire life in a brisk alternation of debauchery and crime, repentance and honest endeavor. For weeks he would roll drunken through the streets in the companionship of cut-purses and thieves; then, sobering, a profound contrition would permeate his soul; he would weep and pray, and setting himself at his work-table, would produce denunciatory exposures of the London criminal classes, and write dramas and poetry of real distinction, until once more his devil conquered his angel, and he disappeared into the back-rooms of taverns. Reflecting over past centuries, no less than over the events of recent years, the double life of Robert Greene comes forcibly before me. Poor fellow! And poor miserable mankind that we are! Never again, we swear, shall there be such a relapse as the last. Chastened, repentant, resolute, we fervently denounce militarism and its causes, and settle down to a period of high and peaceful endeavor. But the generation whose minds are stamped with the horror passes away; the glamor out-lingers the shame; and little by little the old itch creeps into the blood—the spirit of excitement and adventure, the desire to dominate, the lust for revenge, the mere brute instinct to break things, to destroy—and soon once more the race is grovelling fiercely in the mud and

the blood of the eternal tragedy. Shall we ever escape from this fatal cycle of war and peace? It is in such moments of bitter vision that all the soul's rich strength of confidence is necessary to uphold the faltering heart. We look upon the waving grain, the sunlight flashing on the sea, the grace of a flower, the flight of a bird, the tender lips of love, and paradoxically, perhaps, but none the less surely, we know that this created universe is beautiful and good. An inscrutable future stares us, with gaunt mockery, in the face; let us meet it eye to eye, serene and unafraid.

THE RÔLE OF THE UNITED STATES

THERE remains to add a few words concerning the important part which the United States should and doubtless will play in world affairs from this time on—a part in many respects scarcely less important than that of Britain itself.

The United States has a special interest in the two American continents—an interest which has been specifically formulated in the Monroe doctrine and the doctrine of pan-Americanism. It has a special interest in the Pacific, where its young expansive force has come into a conflict, more or less avowed, with the young expansive force of Japan; so far as this interest has been formulated, it may be read from the so-called “open door policy” in China, and from the idea underlying the new four-power China consortium, which is a creation of American diplomacy. Finally, the United States has a general interest, as the late war proved, in the preservation of world peace, and consequently, in the just and expeditious settlement of international quarrels.

Bearing these several interests clearly in mind, one reaches the conclusion that it will be best for us, despite certain obvious objections, to ratify the Treaty of Versailles, and to join the League of Nations, with appropriate reservations. I believe, moreover, that

this is practically the only wise course which remains open to us.

American criticisms of the Treaty itself are directed, first, against the attribution to Japan of Shantung and of the Marshall Islands; and second, against the doubtful justice and wisdom of a number of the European settlements. It is true that the Shantung clause gives Japan a menacing strategic hold upon the throat of China; and that the acquisition of the Marshall Islands gives our Asiatic rival a good naval base between Hawaii and Guam, on the flank of the communications which we have painstakingly elaborated with the Philippines. A more experienced American diplomacy in Paris would no doubt have been able to prevent at least the Marshall Islands attribution. But as it is, the Treaty has already gone into effect; Japan has occupied both the Marshall Islands and Shantung. We are faced with the accomplished fact. Short of war, which is out of the question, we have no alternative save to continue the direct negotiations already opened with Japan, the outcome of which will probably be that in return for the recognition of our right to regulate Japanese immigration, we recognize the Shantung and Marshall Islands settlements.

In respect to those European decisions which seem to us of doubtful justice and wisdom, we are also faced with the accomplished fact. Even if it were wholly desirable, which is by no means clear, there is no immediate possibility whatever of a fundamental revision of the treaties. Suppose, therefore, that we were definitely to refuse to ratify. In the first place, we should accomplish nothing, change nothing, ameliorate nothing. In the second place, in order to be logical,

we should have to refuse to recognize the present constitution of the succession states, for to recognize them as now constituted would be, after all, but another way of ratifying the Treaty. In the third place, desiring to promote peace, we should by refusing to ratify, give a powerful encouragement to every force of disorder and revenge in Europe, thereby promoting the very end we seek to avoid. As for our own moral scruples in the matter—our dislike to put our name to a document in which we do not truly believe, which is certainly a very worthy consideration—we might, if necessary, assuage them, theoretically at least, by accompanying our ratification of the Treaty with a sort of general moral reservation.

The American criticisms of the League Covenant contend that for us to adopt it without reservations would be to betray our traditional policies; that even with reservations, the League tends to involve us too deeply in European affairs; and that, even granting the desirability of some kind of association of nations, the present League is cumbersome and unpractical.

I am not in favor of adopting the Covenant without reservations. We have only to propose whatever reservations we like; they will be accepted by the other members of the League, just as Switzerland's important reservation safeguarding its traditional policy of permanent neutrality was accepted.

As for the League involving us too deeply in European affairs, we are already involved so deeply that we shall never again become disinvolved, whether we join the League or not. We are involved morally because of our intervention in the war and our consequent responsibility in the peace. We are involved

politically by our Russian policy, which is in effect favorable to the integral restoration—except for Poland and Finland—of this vast, half-European, half-Asiatic country. We cannot disinterest ourselves from Russia without also disinteresting ourselves from Japan. The fact that our growing specific political interest in Europe enters by the back door, and works from east to west instead of from west to east, does not modify the essential fact; which is, that we have a peculiar interest in Russia's recovery. Financially and commercially, we are also inextricably involved in Europe—League or no League; financially, because of our official loans of ten billion dollars, and our private loans of three or four billion more; commercially, because with the growing necessity of export trade to the health of our industries, Europe is now, and will remain, our greatest market. Even from the viewpoint of national defense, we cannot disinterest ourselves from world affairs. The navies of the immediate future will be oil-burning navies. The United States, at the present enormous rate of consumption, has oil, according to a report of the geological survey, for only eighteen more years. Nearly all the rest of the world's oil sources have been cornered, and are held exclusively for Britain, which thus has a supply, theoretically, for one hundred and fifty years. Unless the American navy is to become dependent on Britain for its fuel, we must manage, somehow, to secure a more equable distribution of the world's oil fields. To consider ourselves, under these circumstances, to be disinterested in world affairs, would be suicidal; and to join the League would not, therefore, involve us any more deeply, I repeat, than we are already involved.

The objection remains that the present League is cumbersome and unpractical. This objection, in my opinion, is sound. The alternatives are to dissolve this League and start a new one, or to try gradually to modify the existing League in a more practical sense. The first alternative will doubtless have to be dismissed at once; for the present League is already functioning; over forty nations have joined it; and to imagine that merely to gratify the United States, they will abandon it and accept a new one of our dictation, would be an act of megalomania. In the way of the second alternative, there are no serious obstacles. If I have understood correctly the thought of the Republican party leaders, they desire that less emphasis should be placed on the executive side of the League, and more on the judiciary and legal side. They want a high international court to be established, the principle of arbitration to be adopted, and the codification to be attempted of fundamental international law. These aims do not seem to me incompatible with the present League. I believe they can be realized.

Before leaving this subject I would point out one thing more, which seems to have escaped most American commentators. We have, as I have said, special interests in the two Americas and in the Pacific. Japan has joined the League; China has joined; Canada, Australia and New Zealand have joined; most of the Latin American Republics have joined; even Cuba and Panama have joined. For us to remain isolated, under these circumstances, would be contrary to the most elemental good sense; for how can we adequately observe the activities of all these states which have so many direct interests in common with or opposed to

our own; how can we fully exercise the influence which is naturally ours, without participating in the common councils?

In short, we have no insurmountable reasons for not joining the League, and we have some very realistic and practical reasons which urge us to adopt the famous covenant, with reservations, and without delay!

So much for our immediate course. The League, however, will not effect any miraculous change in international relations. Within the League, the same ebullient political life will continue which has marked every phase of human history. And for us, the first great problem of practical politics will be that of our relations with Britain. The situation is as follows: Britain and the United States are to-day the two strongest powers in the world. The influence of Britain dominates Eastern and Southern Africa, and the Southern half of Asia; the influence of the United States dominates the two Americas, and most of the North Pacific. The supreme financial power long exercised by London has passed over to New York. The supremacy of the British navy is threatened by the rapidly increasing strength of the American navy, while the American merchant marine has suddenly become almost equal to that of Britain. The two countries are rivals both in the buying and selling of raw-stuffs, and in the selling of manufactured goods. Many Europeans consider that the principal conflict of the next generation will be the struggle for supremacy, peaceful perhaps, but determined, between Britain and the United States—both proud, both practical, both energetic, both ambitious, and both very strong.

It is with a clear vision of the circumstances—of

their dangers as well as of their possible advantages—that the British have as much as proposed to us an alliance of Anglo-Saxon peoples, the effect of which would be to dominate the world. Our only answer, so far, has been to increase our ship-building program, and to redouble our agitation in favor of Ireland. It will be well for us, however, to think over the matter with great care.

There are two serious objections to the proposed alliance. The first is that we cannot approve of some of the aims and recent acts of the British Empire, and that the alliance would therefore be morally vitiated at the outset. The second is, that generally speaking, there is no combination so strong that it will not in time, by the play of the instinct for equilibrium, find itself confronted by another combination equally strong. An Anglo-American alliance would risk arousing against it the whole of the rest of the world. In what, then, would the advantage to us be more than temporary?


But on the other hand, a rivalry with England, which might lead to open hostilities would be a frightful disaster, and is to be avoided at any cost. I am therefore of the opinion that some policy must be found which will hold a middle course between these two. Whatever form the new balance of power may take in the world, Britain and America will probably tend to range themselves on opposite sides, the one counterbalancing the other. It is to be hoped, however, that neither one nor the other will commit itself too deeply to either set of alliances. In time of peace the best interests of the world will perhaps be served by the preservation of a due balance between Britain and the United States; but in time of crisis, when emotion runs high, and the

light of the match glows red on the powder, both these great cool-headed, far-sighted, sensible peoples must be free to sacrifice their own immediate sympathies to the general interest; both must throw their whole weight, suddenly and violently, on the side of the peace.

Meanwhile, the danger for Britain is Russia, and the danger for the United States is Japan. Britain is already involved far too deeply in hostilities with Russia; its problem is how to extricate itself with both safety and honor from the threat of Russia's vengeance. The United States is tending more and more rapidly to become involved in hostilities with Japan; our problem is how to arrest this dangerous evolution without either loss of honor or sacrifice of interests. The Anglo-Russian enmity will tend to range Britain on the anti-Russian side of the future equilibrium. The Japanese-American enmity will tend to range the United States in the pro-Russian combination; for Russia, too, is the rival of Japan.

Such vast over-shadowing possibilities obscure the farthest horizon. We cannot, as I have shown, escape from the clutch of the myriad tentacles of world affairs. We should ratify the Treaty and join the League of Nations with reservations. While using our power, in most contingencies, to equilibrate that of Britain, we should remain free, in time of crisis, to act boldly with Britain, and Britain should remain free to act boldly with us, for the preservation of peace. As for the rest, the time has come for the United States to begin to educate itself along the lines of its new and momentous responsibilities. We should have not only a general European policy, but we should know what we think in the case of each separate European country,

great or small. An alliance between two Central-European states may have its repercussion in farthest Asia; and what happens in farthest Asia is by no means indifferent to us. A wilful ignorance of international politics is the worst possible preparation for the inevitable emergencies of the future.



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Zara

ADRIATIC SEA

Rome

ITALY

SPAIN

CORSICA

SARDINIA

SICILY

MEDITERRANEAN SEA



E

- *Boundaries as they existed before the War.*
- - - - - *International Territory and Territories subject to Plebiscite.*
- *Zone of the Straits.*
- . - . - *Zone of Allied Occupation.*



